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SIMULATING THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE ON COLLECTIVE
DECISION-MAKING: THE CASE OF EDUCATOR REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE
Roy Woodrow Wilson, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2005
The dissertation is directed toward a simulation study of social influence in small, task-oriented,
groups composed of education professionals of differing status who hold differing beliefs about
what constitutes the reportable physical abuse of elementary students by parents. It is asserted on
philosophical grounds that simulation allows the development and refinement of computational,
process-based, models that reflect the stratified nature of social and educational reality. More prac-
tically, simulation makes it possible to trace socio-cultural processes over time rather than simply
settle for an input-output analysis. The possibility of more adequate explanation, and transfor-
mation, of social and educational systems makes simulation relatively superior to other research
methods.
Persons are modeled as computational objects that participate in social relations. The simu-
lation is based on the social-psychological theory of expectation states and is expressly framed to
allow comparison of: (1) a static model and process model of social influence and (2) the social
theories of Giddens and Archer regarding the timing of social tie formation. National data are used
to formulate models of professional belief concerning N = 111 cases of reported physical abuse.
The chief findings are: (1) as applied to the group task of child abuse reporting, the collective deci-
sion outcomes obtained from the two models of social influence disagree by a number greater than
that expected by chance alone, and (2) as modeled, there is essentially no difference in the simu-
lated collective decision outcomes generated under each theory concerning the timing of social tie
formation.
iv
Several refinements are needed. First, it is important to construct a more adequate charac-
terization of the relevant beliefs of education professionals, best done via the construction of an
ethnographic decision model for each professional type. Second, given the importance of social
influence, the simulation should be extended to incorporate socio-linguistic, especially argumen-
tative, behavior. Third, it is important to extend the model to take into account the constraining
power of belief with respect to social action. These extensions would add believability to the model
and its outputs, thus enhancing its power to inform social and educational theory and practice.
Keywords: Education, Sociology, Simulation, Methodology, Philosophy, Child Abuse.
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xiv
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The purposes of this, introductory, chapter are numerous. They are to: describe the concrete set-
ting out of which the idea for this study grew; describe the research questions that animate the
dissertation and the answers which it provides; give the reader an overview of how the dissertation
is organized; provide historical background concerning the social problem of child maltreatment;
present evidence regarding the incidence of child maltreatment in the United States and in Penn-
sylvania; give an intellectual justification for the study of educator reporting of child maltreatment;
situate the simulation modeling approach within a broader social, intellectual, context.
1.2 THE ORIGINS OF THIS STUDY
Several years ago, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork at an urban elementary school attended by
mostly poor African-American children [202]. I noted three phenomenon: (1) the social (especially
class) composition of the student body was such that a relatively high rate of maltreatment could
be expected based on previous studies of maltreatment in connection with class, race, and gender;
(2) nearly very educator with whom I spoke stated “If I see abuse, I report it.”; and, (3) virtually no
cases of maltreatment were, or had been, reported. One non-structuralist way to account for these
phenomena might be to look for the contingencies in the situations that educators find themselves in
and to describe the observed outcomes as practical solutions to the problems such indeterminacy
poses (e.g., [166] and [22]). It seemed to me that a structural (perhaps constructivist structural
[188, p. 510]) approach was needed to explain the collocation of these events: that is, I wanted to
1
discover/hypothesize mechanisms that might generate these events.
1.3 A SHORT HISTORY OF CHILD MALTREATMENT
Teacher responsibilities have long included “the whole child,” although the attention given to child
maltreatment issues has oscillated. State policies requiring the reporting of suspected child mal-
treatment are perhaps laudable but are based on common-sense views of the work environment of
educators (and perhaps other mandated reporters). They do not take into account the effects of
material, social and cultural factors on the child maltreatment identification and reporting process,
especially within schools.
The emergence of child abuse as a social problem [59] is often dated to 1962, when it came
to public attention through a combination of medical support and media attention triggered by
the publication of The Battered Child Syndrome [111]. Child abuse legislation diffused through
the states [139], culminating in CAPTA and the establishment of the National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN).1 During the 1930s and 1940s, social and economic conditions had
occasioned a social policy emphasis on neglect rather than abuse of children, and also brought
ideological factors into play. “Most significant, the conflicting goals of family privacy and child
protection precluded consideration of a mandate to report alleged child abuse” [49, pp. 99-100].
Moreover, the hardships caused by The Great Depression and The Second World War generated a
national obsession with the sanctity of the family [124]. As a result, the idea of involuntary inter-
vention into family life “was unthinkable, almost abhorrent . . . [and ... by 1959] child abuse had
disappeared not only from public consciousness but from the agenda of professional social work-
ers” [49, p. 99]. Despite the importance of the publication of The Battered Child Syndrome and the
movement it helped generate, neither resolved the question whether protection meant coercion (by
removal of the child from the home or incarceration of the offender) or prevention (by providing
individual or family casework).2
The period from 1900 to 1920 was “replete with significant advances in public policy for
children” [49, p. 83]. Yet, by the end of the First World War it had become “evident to child
1The official mission of the NCCAN has been to fund research on the causes, consequences, prevention and treat-
ment of child abuse.
2Of course, as then conceived, the “training” of parents and child was implicitly part of casework.
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welfare professionals that cruelty to children was an obstinate problem that would not yield easily
in the existing society” [49, p. 86]. By the 1920s, the anti-cruelty movement was spent and there
emerged an emphasis on “prevention” [49, p. 87].
The anti-cruelty movement was borne when, in 1896, the New York chapter of the Ameri-
can Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) successfully lobbied to extend to
children the same protections afforded horses and dogs [186]. By 1910 more than two hundred
organizations in the United States alone could be counted under the umbrella of the Society to
Prevent Cruelty to Children (SPCC) [49, p. 46]. Yet, within the early SPCCs there were serious
philosophical disagreements concerning the meaning of child protection.3 The conflict between
protection and prevention, which reflects conflicting interpretations of child abuse, helps generate
the cyclic ebb and flow of interest in child abuse [142].
1.4 WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND HOWWIDESPREAD IS IT?
Child abuse legislation in the United States was, and continues to be, renowned for its ambiguity
[133]. Of particular relevance to this study is the acknowledgment of the NCCAN that
consensus has yet to be reached concerning the precise meaning of . . . [“abuse” and “neglect”], with
different professional groups and individuals maintaining widely varying perceptions concerning
the kinds and degrees of problems that constitute “child abuse” and “child neglect”. [163, p. 2-7,
emphasis added]
No wonder then that the incidence, prevalence, and social distribution of child maltreatment has
been a subject of heated debate among child welfare and social policy analysts [26, 71] as well as
politicians.
In its First National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-1), the NCCAN at-
tempted to provide “a single, objective set of definitions” of abuse and neglect in order to make it
possible to generate a methodologically sound estimate of the annual incidence of child maltreat-
ment in the United States. The authors of both the NIS-1 (1980) and NIS-2 (1986) attempted to
provide “operational definitions of child maltreatment that were both clear and able to be reliably
applied in order to specify whether or not a given situation should be included in the study” [163,
3Unfortunately, despite the nobility of the desire to “save” children, the practice of child protection in the United
States is also marked by the fact that such sentiments have sometimes been colored by judgments that presuppose the
cultural (or mental) inferiority of various ethnic, racial, and class groups [94].
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p. 2-7]. Quite reasonably, it seems, only those sampled “situations” conforming to “scientific” def-
initions of abuse and neglect would be used as the basis for statistically estimating the incidence
of child maltreatment in the United States.
Like the preceding NIS reports, the NIS-3 Final Report does not define maltreatment, instead
providing a list of acts and examples. Consider the following discussion of physical abuse.
Acts constituting physical abuse include hitting with a hand, stick, strap, or other object; punching;
kicking; shaking; throwing; burning; stabbing; or choking a child. . . . In the NIS-3, children who
were classified as physically abused included a 1-year old child who died of a cerebral hemorrhage
after being shaken by her father; a teen whose mother punched her and pulled out her hair; a child
who sustained second- and third-degree “stocking” burns to the feet after being held in hot water;
a preteen whose grandfather gave her a black eye; a teen who sustained bruises after being beaten
with an extension cord; and a 3-year old who had welts and bruises from being beaten with a belt
by his father. [163, p. 2-10]
As indicated by the qualifier “includes”, the above list is not comprehensive, nor does the NIS-3
provide a set of definitions that are operational in the sense that they provide criteria for distin-
guishing what is and is not physical abuse.
The NIS-3 did, however, stipulate two “standards” for study personnel to use when judging
cases of interest observed by study sentinels. Study sentinels (most of whom were teachers) were
not trained to apply either standard to the children they observed: rather, they relied on whatever
training and experience they had received prior to participation in the study. In this dissertation, an
analytical distinction is made between the sentinels who served as data sources for the NIS-3 study,
and actors in the simulation, whose initial beliefs are modeled on the basis of observed sentinel
behavior. Cases identified by study sentinels were subsequently classified by study personnel
according to the Harm Standard and the broader Endangerment Standard.
The Harm Standard applies to children judged to have already experienced harm (e.g. stabbed
with a knife). The Endangerment Standard applies to children who have not yet been harmed, but
are judged to be in imminent danger of harm (e.g., threatened with being stabbed with a knife). Ac-
cording to the NIS-3 study definition, each child meeting the narrower Harm Standard also meets
the broader Endangerment Standard.4 The problem with these two Standards, however, is that
4The NIS-3 statistical estimates are based on how study personnel classified the cases identified by study sentinels.
More specifically, NIS-3 statistical estimates are based on four numbers: (1) the number of distinct children observed
during the study period that were regard by study sentinels as maltreated; (2) the number of such children that study
personnel regarded as maltreated by a study definition of maltreatment (e.g., the Harm Standard); (3) the total number
of children observed during the study; (3) the total number of children in the U.S.A. at the time of the study. The
incidence rate during the NIS-3 study period was computed as the ratio of the number of maltreated children observed
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neither specifies criteria for determining whether an given act has resulted in harm, endangerment,
or neither.
Despite these difficulties, the authors of the NIS-3 Final Report state the following.
More children are now being abused and neglected than in 1986, and their injuries are more serious
. . . ;5 Community professionals are better at recognizing abused and neglected children, especially
those endangered but not yet harmed by maltreatment . . . ; Better targeting is needed to ensure
CPS investigations for the children who most need it [and those who don’t] . . . ; Forging working
relationships betweenCPS agencies and schools [is needed]. The NIS has consistently demonstrated
that professionals in schools play a central and critical role in identifying children who are abused
and neglected. As policies are developed . . . , they should capitalize on the unique role of school
professionals as front-line observers. [163, p. 8-19, emphasis added]
Not surprisingly, child protection advocates cite the claim by the NCCAN that child maltreatment
more than doubled between the time periods covered by the NIS-1 and NIS-3 studies as support
for the claim that the State child protection apparatus needs greater powers. If school professionals
are indeed front-line observers, this suggests the need for greater involvement by school profes-
sionals.6 Predictably, opponents of increased child protection have focused on schools as the first
line of defense.
While the application of the term “maltreated” may draw upon seemingly objective features
of children and their situations, the outcome of the classification process is best seen in terms of
“social construction” (understood in the more restrictive sense described in [36, p. 16]). Given
the difficulties of defining child maltreatment noted earlier, this dissertation focuses instead on
modeling the sociological and psychological mechanisms that affect the likelihood of reporting.
and the number of children observed. The estimated number of children maltreated under the Harm Standard during
the NIS-3 study period was calculated by multiplying the incidence rate by the total number of children in the country
at the time.
5An estimated 1.5 million children in the United States were maltreated under the Harm Standard. The NIS-3
incidence rate of maltreatment is 23.1 per 1,000 children, in comparison with the rate of 14.8 per 1,000 in NIS-2
(1986), and 9.8 per 1,000 in NIS-1 (1980) [163, p. 3-3]. These numbers suggest that incidence of child maltreatment
has increased by factor of 2.4(23.1/9.8) between 1980 and 1993.
6According to a report by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, most teachers come in contact
with abused children but under-report [179]. Over the last twenty years, perceived educator (generally teacher) under-
reporting has been “explained” as the result of a lack of both diagnostic skill and procedural knowledge. Although
greater training is the implied solution, it has not been widely provided [152]. Yet, some research suggests that
increased training has little impact on educator reporting decisions [51].
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1.5 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THIS STUDY
Although most of the literature on child abuse deals with causes, consequences, and treatment
of child maltreatment [82], some researchers have also investigated the recognition and reporting
by members of occupations mandated to report. For example, psychologists (especially those in
private practice) note that they often choose not to report instances that they understand to be re-
portable because reporting might make matters worse by causing removal of the child from the
parental home, the termination of therapy, or both [109]. Other studies have suggested occupation-
ally based differences in the perception and reporting of child maltreatment [100].
Similarly, researchers from different disciplines, professions, and research programs often
take different approaches to child maltreatment itself as a research topic. With the division of
expert labor that the professions (and the disciplines that support them) represent [1], each pro-
fession/discipline offers an approach (and, hence, a solution) to child maltreatment that reflects
a distinctive combination of ontology, epistemology, and methodology [174]. The partial view
of each occupational group is reflected in what Abbott terms different exclusionary schemes in
diagnosis, inference, and treatment.
Child maltreatment research has been dominated by psychiatry, social work, and psychology.
There are substantial disagreements over subject matter, forms of explanation, and methods. For
example, the structure and content of consciousness is of primary interest to a Psychologist, but a
Psychiatrist focuses on the organic substrate that enables and constrains structures of consciousness
and its contents. Such differences can plausibly be expected to play out at the organizational
level in various forms of inter-professional competition. I give an account of child maltreatment
reporting in schools that takes into account the social, cognitive, and cultural differences amongst
different knowledge communities.
Working within the framework of “strong (research) program of contemporary critical theory”
(because of its emphasis on rationality) [135], it is my view that critical theorists interested in the
problem of domination ought to work toward: (1) identifying different senses of domination and (2)
the mechanisms and conditions which make interventions more or less likely to succeed. As a step
in that direction, such researchers would be well-served to embed the problem of domination (in
minimal form) within the formal framework provided by general theoretical sociology. Although
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such a procedure will, like any other, be inadequate to the full variety and complexity of the
phenomena, it may lead to the development of a family of theories (or at least different models
representing different formulations of a theory) of domination.
Given the increasing specialization of knowledge and the proliferation of research programs,
those engaging in multidisciplinary work can expect, “punishment” from all directions for having
committed, as Durkheim and Mauss might have put it, the “crime” of linguistic or conceptual pol-
lution. Hence, interdisciplinary work, viewed from the perspective of evolutionary epistemology,
is likely to fail for reasons related to the increasingly specialized character of knowledge and its
social production. Why, then, undertake an multidisciplinary study of child maltreatment report-
ing?
Divide-and-conquer is a research strategy that often yields “good enough” solutions to nearly-
decomposable problems [167]. If the problem is messier, however, problem decomposition along
disciplinary/professional lines may generate sub-optimal social solutions, a (perhaps) unantici-
pated consequence of specialization [87, 159]. Given the persistence of child maltreatment as a
social problem, it seems clear that uni-disciplinary research efforts have not yielded optimal social
solutions.
1.6 WHY STUDY EDUCATOR REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE?
In this study, I seek to explain the phenomenon of educator detection (non-detection) and reporting
(non-reporting) of possible child maltreatment. I attempt to both identify a subset of situation-
specific conditions and posit a set of psychological mechanisms and social mechanisms[190] that
together generate detection (non-detection) interpretations and reporting (non-reporting) behaviors
in a concrete setting. There are three reasons why it is important to treat educator recognition and
reporting of possible child maltreatment in a theoretical way.
First, identifying the ways in which school personnel aid in social/cultural reproduction or
transformation is an important item in the agenda of contemporary critical theory as applied to ed-
ucation [39, 7, 136]. It seems almost axiomatic that that physical abuse is evidence of domination,
one of the central concepts of contemporary critical theory [135] (though it is explicable in other
terms as well [68]). It has been suggested that children who experience corporal punishment are
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likely to endorse and adopt its use as adults [176] so that one effect of corporal punishment is to
perpetuate its use. Assume now that the use of corporal punishment increases the relative odds
of physical abuse occurring [176]. If educator responses to corporal punishment help reproduce
that practice, then these same responses are indirectly reproductive of physical abuse. Hence, by
their responses to corporal punishment and possible physical abuse, educators may help reproduce
certain forms of domination.
Second, understanding the interplay of structure and agency [136] is also part of the agenda
of contemporary critical theory. I assume that: (1) administrative decisions affecting students (and
their families) are outcomes of interpretive acts [38] and (2) such acts may exhibit relatively weak
structural regularities [116] involving class, race, gender, and age classifications. For example,
the assignment of students to academic tracks, whether formal or informal, often depends less on
“objective” indicators of ability than class-based judgments. Such assignments often contribute
to the short- and long-term reproduction of inequalities that are at least partly grounded in mat-
ters of class, race, and gender. Likewise, the act of classifying a student as a receiver of parental
physical abuse may help maintain that student in a position that is is one or more respects subor-
dinate. Hence, understanding child maltreatment reporting in terms of the interplay of structure
and agency may help identify some of the mechanisms by which schools may aid in socio-cultural
reproduction/transformation via their response to child discipline/abuse.
Third, it has been claimed that Giddens’ structuration theory, an element in the “research pro-
gram” of critical theory [135, 87], highlights the problematic of structure and agency [190], but
obscures the nature of the interplay between structure and agency [6]. In particular, it is held
that structuration theory eliminates the effect of time. In this study, I assess the effect of tem-
porally constrained structure-agency interaction on the outcome of small-group deliberations by
school professionals concerning cases of possible child maltreatment. This study thus affords an
opportunity to assess more concretely the explanatory power of structuration theory and a “neo-
functionalist” competitor.
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1.7 HOW THE DISSERTATION IS ORGANIZED
In addition to the introductory and concluding chapters, the dissertation consists of three parts.
Part I consists of six chapters, entitled, respectively: Realist Ontology; Social Theories; Method-
ology; Cultural Systems; Social Systems; and Socio-Cultural Systems. The intent of these chapters
is to provide conceptual frameworks and theories pertinent to the use of computational simulation.
Part II consists of two chapters, respectively entitled Context: Social Workers and Reporting and
Context: Educators and Reporting. The aim of these chapters is to describe several professional
cultures as as they relate to child abuse reporting by educators. The third part consists of two chap-
ters entitled Initial Beliefs and Status Distributions and The Simulation Model: Inputs, Outputs,
and Outcomes.
1.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
This study addresses two questions. First, do the decision outcomes generated by a process model
of social influence (based on the status and task participation model) systematically differ from the
decision outcomes obtained from a static model of social influence (not based on the status and
task participation model)? Second, does the theoretical difference between how time is represented
in realist social theory and structuration theory produce systematic differences in the decision
outcomes produced via the simulation? How each question is answered bears on the potential
practical import of the issue addressed.
To allow the reader to assess the argument as it proceeds, I am describing my findings as they
pertain to the two research questions. First, as applied to the group task of child abuse reporting,
the outcomes obtained from the process model differ systematically from those obtained from the
static model of social influence. As modeled, the theoretical difference regarding the representation
of time does not produce a systematic difference in simulated group decision outcomes. Hence,
the answers obtained to the two research questions posed confirm the expected practical import
of a dynamic model of collective-decision making that is based on social influence while casting




Ordinary language is the necessary instrument [96, p. 126] with which to begin to formulate
sociological and educational theory, but verbal formulations alone are not sufficient [47]. For
example, determining the meaning or adequacy of “duality of structure” may require assessing the
theoretical and other consequences of this concept [44]. Yet, if part of the theoretical meaning
and adequacy of this concept lies in its purported ability to illuminate spatio-temporal networks
of social action, then it must be possible to represent such networks and interpret their state and
evolution in terms of the concepts of structure and agency. If agency is interpreted in terms of
actors constrained and enabled by their positions within evolving social networks [65, 87], then it
seems particularly unlikely that verbal formulations alone can track the fine-grained, longer-term,
consequences of social action, among them the emergence of such networks.
The idea of using simulation to compare competing theories (in this dissertation, realist social
theory and structuration theory) is certainly not new. More than a quarter of a century ago, soci-
ologist Murray Straus called for the development of a simulation model in which the explanatory
powers of competing theories might simultaneously be brought to bear on domestic violence [175].
Computer simulation modeling has not only been called for but also criticized [160] in a number
of fields.
Some historians hold professional ideologies that make the use of computer simulation irrele-
vant or sacrilegious. One might ask the following sorts of questions: How does this study address,
if at all, the social problem of child abuse? Why hasn’t greater attention been given to issues of
culture and ideology, for example, via a historical approach? In my view, this study does address
the social problem of child abuse, both by framing child abuse as a social problem to be understood
both historically and sociologically, and by proposing an approach and a method by which findings
from diverse professions might be integrated as part of a structural explanation of one aspect of the
phenomena of child abuse: namely, when it is or isn’t reported. While conceding the importance
of a more historical/cultural approach, it is by design that this study does not directly address child
abuse (but see [108, 83, 139, 94, 100, 204, 142]).
One traditionally trained cultural anthropologist acknowledges the deep suspicion that use of
simulation inspires in some colleagues.
10
Computer modeling, because it abstracts cultural processes and [sometimes] quantifies social vari-
ables, is often seen as contradictory to the rich qualitative rendering of culture that ethnography
offers. . . . [But] agent-based models, simulated over time, can elucidate the relationship between
individual or group (human) decisions and the social structures which both result from and con-
strain those decisions. In so doing, simulation can provide new insights into the ethnographic
record, edifying structural relationships, helping to generate explanations for phenomena . . . [170,
p.1]
The agent-based computer simulation model that forms the core of this study is an implementation
of a structural approach to explaining how education professionals make group-based decisions
regarding possible child maltreatment.
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2.0 REALIST ONTOLOGY
2.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that simulation methods promise the most adequate expla-
nation of social behavior because simulation offers the possibility of showing how and why social
behaviors are generated. I give a philosophical justification for computational simulation by claim-
ing that the nature of social reality favors the use of (process-based) computational simulation. If
so, then the exclusive use of statistical methods is likely to mistake that reality.
2.2 OFF TO THE PARADIGMWARS
Many social and educational researchers or policy-analysts who use computer simulation do not
attempt to justify its application other than by an appeal to expediency. Implicit in this absence of
justification is the shared “prejudice” [79] that the use of methods based on mathematics or statis-
tics does not require theoretical or philosophical justification. I assume that educational actions
and outcomes cannot be adequately understood without taking the “intentions” of the actors into
account [96, 87].
Weber’s distinction between understanding (Verstehen) and explanation (Erklaren) is by now
a part of methodological common sense and helps set the initial terms of debate. Results obtained
by members of the quantitative-only sect of educational research methodology may indeed be
“adequate” in the sense of explanation as prediction. Likewise, results obtained by members of
the qualitative-only sect of educational research methodology may indeed be “adequate” in sense
of explanation as understanding. Whatever their other differences, the disputants in what has been
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variously termed the “conventional discourse of methodology” [135] and “the paradigm wars” [80]
stand on common ground.
Qualitative-only and quantitative-only educational researchers are apt to say that the method
of their nemesis misrepresents or distorts the phenomena it is intended to explain. Both, then,
presuppose the existence of entities and processes that are at least partially autonomous in relation
to the researcher. Without such a realist presupposition, educational and social researchers are
committed to the assertion that they are making something (nothing) out of nothing (something).
It has been observed that the notion of “explanation” does not play a major methodological
role in statistics [91, p. 12]. Because of the demarcation between correlation and causation that
is usually insisted upon by statisticians, statistically-oriented educational research methodologists
often take the view that it is the job of subject matter experts to determine when and whether a
statistical effect should be given a causal interpretation.1 Hence, it is up to subject-matter experts
to explain phenomena using substantive theory and the results obtained via proper use of statistical
methods.
This ideal-typical division of labor does not prevent quantitative educational research method-
ologists from dismissing non-quantitative approaches.2 It is fairly easy to see why this might be so.
It is often observed that a claim asserting a causal relationship between variables A and B presup-
poses their covariation. Since it is hard to see what public evidence one might advance for causation
in the absence of covariation, attempts to characterize a phenomena in causal terms would seem
to presuppose the use of statistical methods. Such reasoning may prompt many quantitative-only
educational research methodologists to dismiss other methods as weak or unreliable.
The primary tacit assumption of quantitative-only educational research methodologists who
view other methods as inherently flawed can be expressed as follows: Whatever the processes
involved in the phenomena under investigation, the causal effects generated by these processes are
adequately expressed by a set of variables and the relationships between them.3 The remainder of
1There are, however, researchers examining the conditions under which causal inferences from statistical data
are warranted. For them, it is prior causal knowledge, expressed in the form of a directed graph, that provides the
constraints needed to infer causal order from empirical data [147].
2I have in mind an exemplar who maintained that qualitative approaches were valuable, if at all, only in exploratory
research.
3Although not addressed here, several other assumptions are also involved: given the need to rely on samples, only
statistical methods can reliably and objectively estimate the population values of the variables and the relationships
between them; whatever degree of approximation that is required to apply statistical methods, this is a necessary price
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this chapter calls into question the philosophical assumptions that undergird that methodological
assumption.
2.3 THREE TRADITIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Critical realism is the philosophical position that the nature of the world is logically independent
of how we come to know it. If a meteor hits Mars, it produces waves capable of being heard
regardless of whether astronauts are present to do so. It is critical in that it rejects the view that
the world itself determines what we know of it and how we come to that knowledge. The core of
critical realism, as developed by Roy Bhaskar, is a particular view about the nature of the entities
in the world.
According to Bhaskar, in classical empiricism as represented by Hume, the objects of knowl-
edge are atomistic events. The idea of causation consists in the constant conjunction of such events
so that knowledge is about atomistic events and, especially, their conjunction [30]. Much of psy-
chology and educational psychology is rooted in classical empiricism wherein facts are sovereign
and theories derivative.
In contrast to classical empiricism is the transcendental idealism spawned by Kant. In this
tradition, the constant conjunction of atomistic events is a necessary, but insufficient, condition
of causation. The objects of scientific knowledge are artificial constructs, models perhaps, that
depend upon human activity in general but not upon the activity of particular humans. Knowledge
in this tradition is a construction of the human, specifically scientific, mind.
According to Bhaskar,
Neither classical empiricism nor transcendental idealism can [philosophically] sustain the idea of
the independent existence and action of the causal structures and things investigated and discovered
by science. [30, p. 21]
Let us try to unpack this a bit.
For critical realists, science (social and natural) investigates and discovers causal structures.
Causal structures are distinguished sets of objects that are internally related on the basis of the
nature of each object [53, pp. 205-6]. Since classical empiricism takes causation as the exter-
to pay since there are no available objective and reliable alternatives.
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nal relation of constant conjunction between events, it cannot give an adequate account of causal
structures. Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, makes order in the world the imposition of
humans via their cognitive activity, so that causal structures cannot have an independent existence
and action.4 Since, for critical realists, scientific practice presupposes the idea of the independent
existence and action of the causal structures and things both investigated and discovered, neither
classical empiricism nor transcendental idealism can account for the practice, let alone the success,
of science. Critical realism, then, is based on upon a transcendental argument from the actuality of
scientific practice to what must be necessary for such practice to be possible.
Why are both classical empiricism and transcendental idealism both inadequate to the reality
of scientific practice? For Bhaskar,
It is in their shared ontology that the source of this common incapacity lies. . . . This ontological
legacy is expressed most succinctly in its commitment to empirical realism, and thus to the concept
of the ’empirical world’. [30, p. 21]
The concept of the empirical world, says Bhaskar, contains several philosophical mistakes.
First, it reduces the world to experience and hence reduces ontology to epistemology. Put oth-
erwise, it reduces knowledge about the nature of the world to knowledge about the nature of the
knower. Second, the concept of the empirical world makes the capability of being experienced an
essential property of the world rather than an accidental one. For example, when the ancient Cre-
tans encoded a tablet with Linear B script, it was possible, not necessary, that the script would later
be decoded at a later time by a being capable of such an experience. Third, the concept of the em-
pirical world neglects the social circumstances under which experience plays an epistemologically
significant role in science.
Undoubtedly, many quantitative research methodologists would claim that their account of
social science is ontology-free. The critical realist claims that every account of science presupposes
an ontology in the sense that it at least tacitly based upon “a schematic answer to the question of
what the world must be like in order for science to be possible” [30, p. 22]. Although such
schematic answers come from philosophers, not scientists, (says Bhaskar) this does not mean that
the ontological assumptions of scientists are without impact on the practice and, therefore, the
yield of science.
4As Bhaskar puts it, “Saying that light travels in straight lines ceases then to express a proposition about the world;
it expresses instead a proposition about the way men understand it.”
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What might be the practical consequences of empirical realism for quantitative educational
research? First, because science seeks causal accounts and, on the classical empiricist model,
that means the constant conjunction of events, quantitative educational research would focus on
the recording of events and the analysis of covariation among classes of events. Second, since
science is focused on events, processes that are not or cannot be experienced cannot generate
the events needed for scientific work and thus have little or no scientific meaning. Third, if the
social circumstances under which scientific coming to know occurs are ignored, then the social
circumstances under which coming to know occurs as a part of schooling are likewise ignored.
Perhaps not surprisingly, much of the criticism leveled against quantitative research in education
has taken one of the above three forms.
For Bhaskar,
Structures and mechanisms . . . are real and distinct from the patterns of events they generate; just
as events are real and distinct from the experiences in which they are apprehended. [30, p. 41]
In principle, says Bhaskar, failing to distinguish between structures, events, and experiences blocks
the possibility of understanding how (natural or social) science is possible. To open up that possi-
bility, it is necessary to distinguish between different strata of reality and to seek explanations that
take such stratification into account.
2.4 STRATIFIED EXPLANATION
The idea of ontological stratification is easy to illustrate:
Entities inhabiting one stratum will be composed of entities inhabiting a lower one. Societies are
composed (in part, at least) of people; living cells are composed of molecules, and so on. [45, p.
264]
To theorize about ontological stratification and its consequence for explanation, critical realism in-
troduces three, increasingly inclusive, strata. The domain of the empirical consists of experiences;
the domain of the actual consists of experiences and events; and the domain of the real consists
of experiences, events, and mechanisms. Quantitative-only and qualitative-only researchers alike
reduce reality to the domain of the empirical: they differ in the kind of experiences they privilege.
Mechanisms “. . . combine to generate the flux of phenomenon that constitute the actual states
and happenings of the world” [30]. To explain an event to which our experience has provided
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access, then, is to identify the mechanisms that generated that event. After a mechanism has been
discovered that explains some event, it often happens that underlying mechanisms are subsequently
sought and found which explain the initially discovered mechanism.
Consider, for example, a particular chemical reaction, an event that we can assign (for illus-
trative purposes) to Stratum I. What does it mean to explain the event? In the early history of
chemistry, chemical reactions were explained by invoking mechanisms described by the theory of
atomic number and valency. Thus, an event (the chemical reaction, at Stratum I) was explained
in terms of a lower-level mechanism (described by the theory of atomic number and valence, at
Stratum II). As suggested by the history of science, there is no reason to assume that explanatory
mechanisms cannot themselves be explained. It turns out that the mechanisms described by the
theory of atomic number and valency (at Stratum II) can indeed be explained by mechanisms de-
scribed by the theory of electrons and atomic structure (at Stratum III). It is the critical realist thesis
that the stratification of knowledge, and the process of deepening explanation associated with it, is
founded in the real stratification of the objects of the sciences [45, pp. 260-61].
The preceding discussion of how a chemical reaction might be explained calls to our attention
the need to distinguish philosophical and scientific ontology. A philosophical ontology lays out
what, in general terms, the world must be like in order for natural or social science to be possible
[53, p. 206]. It “does not tell us what the structures, entities and mechanisms which make up
the world actually are: this is a matter for the individual sciences” [144, p. 283]. If reality is
stratified, one might expect to be able to identify another level of presuppositions less general than
philosophical ontology that might inform social scientific ontology.
2.5 PRESUPPOSITIONS OF GENERAL THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY
The purpose of this section is to suggest that Whitehead’s philosophy of process provides a link
between the broad philosophical ontology of critical realism and the narrower social scientific
ontology required presupposed by general theoretical sociology [66]. In Process and Reality, the
mathematician, philosopher, and social thinker Alfred North Whitehead lays out a philosophy of
“organic realism” based on an attempt to generalize key developments in early twentieth-century
physics, biology, and sociology. It is Whitehead’s view that the “finally real”, and hence actual,
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entities of the universe are self-completed occasions of experience [198, p. 22]. For Whitehead,
each actual occasion completes itself by creatively forming a unique perspective on everything in
its causal past.
In the process philosophy of Whitehead, creativity and the autonomy that it presupposes lie at
the core of all experience. In the process of completing itself, and thereby becoming actual, every
entity creatively appropriates a relevant set of physical and conceptual entities. A collection of
entities constitutes a “society”, says Whitehead, if the members of the collection share a common
feeling derived from a history of interaction (a view not unlike that expressed by Homans [102]).
Whitehead’s thought is relevant to the interpretivist branch of general theoretical sociology. A
person is for Whitehead (not unlike Collins [46]) an enduring object. The dominant occasion of
human experience, the personality, depends upon, but is not reducible to, experiences “inherited”
from what Whitehead calls the animal body. Although consciousness is for Whitehead a light
that occasionally flickers in the dark room of the cosmos, this does not diminish what he terms its
causal efficacy. Indeed, Whitehead would probably concur with the observation that consciousness
is an emergent causal power capable of acting back upon the body and the material universe out of
which both arise [29, p. 601].
Macroscopic objects, Aristotelean “substances” like human bodies and chairs, are conceived
by Whitehead as spatio-temporally extended, interacting, societies that exhibit the kind of stability
that makes them, for human perception, enduring objects. Of course, human societies as ordinarily
understood may also satisfy Whitehead’s definition of society. By virtue of the importance it ac-
cords to societies, Whitehead’s process philosophy is of particular relevance to the social network
branch of general theoretical sociology [64, p. 87].
A small, task-oriented, group satisfies Whitehead’s definition of a society. According to the
theory of expectation states, as explained in greater detail in Chapter 6, members share a common
definition of task success, a commitment to that success, and a common set of evaluative standards
concerning what behaviors are likely to lead to task success. The social network branch of general
theoretical sociology focuses on the analysis of social action in terms of a set of (static or emergent)
ties between group members.
Whitehead’s concept of society is more general than the social scientific concept of social
network, but less general than the ontological concept of structure. The social scientific concept of
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social network (or pattern) instantiates the ontological concept of structure. Hence, Whitehead’s
philosophy of process provides an link between the broad philosophical ontology of critical realism
and the narrower social scientific ontology associated with the social network branch of general
theoretical sociology. I have emphasized the role of process philosophy with respect to the network,
rather than interpretivist, branch of general theoretical sociology because it is on the former that
this study draws most heavily.
2.6 CONCLUSION
If the reader accepts the ontology of classical empiricism in which only that which is experienced
is real, then this chapter will seem a distraction from the work to be done. Such a reader will return
to the job of extracting knowledge of the real from knowledge of the empirical. Although such
work might represent a great achievement, it will also be necessarily limited in scope.
It has been suggested that the realist ontological hierarchy advanced by Whitehead provides
a set of presuppositions relevant to general theoretical sociology. Although Whiteheadian or-
ganic realism cannot license any particular social ontology, it may “provide a framework in which
. . . alternative social ontologies can be rationally compared and discussed . . . [rather than] brushed
aside, as in the positivist and conventionalist traditions” [144, p. 292]. I now examine the social
ontologies that underly structuration theory and realist social theory.
19
3.0 SOCIAL THEORIES
3.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to link the preceeding philosophical discussion in the preceding, and
the methodological discussion in the succeeding, chapters. The link is established by providing
a social ontology that instantiates the philosophical ontology of Chapter 2. Without that link, the
philosophical discussion has no value, since it cannot constrain method.
3.2 INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested that process philosophy provides a link between realist philosophical on-
tology and realist social explanation. The process world-view can be implemented in empirical
research by giving realist accounts of human action systems: that is, accounts in terms of genera-
tive mechanisms and generative rules [65, pp. 42-43]. Of course, a shared commitment to broad
principles of realist social explanation does not rule out disagreements concerning social ontology,
social epistemology, or social methodology.
In a recent discussion of contemporary critical theory, Morrow and Brown observe that “critical
realism provides a post-empiricist alternative [to positivism] that is largely compatible with critical
theory” [135, p. 136]. Critical realism aims to establish (by means of transcendental argument) that
the intelligibility of [even social] science presupposes the existence of (possibly) as yet unknown
entities independent of the experiences through which they come to be known [27]. Morrow also
affirms the view that it is “no longer right” to put critical theory and critical realism into opposition
[135, p. 168n12]. Of course, critical theory is not monolithic.
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In a survey of social theory, Morrow argues that the work of Habermas constitutes the strong,
and that of Giddens the weak, “research program” of contemporary critical theory. Crudely put,
the “weak” program is less, and the “strong” program is more, interested in providing an episte-
mological and normative grounding to critical theory [135, p. 173]. Morrow does not indicate
whether the “weak” program of critical theory is also “largely compatible” with critical realism.
Making the kind of detailed comparisons need to assess the compatibility of the “weak” program
of critical theory and critical realism is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
In what follows, I examine the nature of theoretical integration and the sense in which this study
attempts to integrate the structuration theory of Giddens and the realist social theory of Archer
via E-state structuralism, an element of general theoretical sociology. E-state structuralism is a
procedure for the development and assessment of sociological theories [68]. The central concept,
that of an E-state, is based on certain features of an expectation state: an expectation state itself is
an abstraction of the concept of expectation.
As detailed in Chapter 6, for expectation states theory, individual “behavior is a function of
expectation states and such states arise in prior social interaction” [65, p. 325]. The occurrence of
a particular social behavior, such as a gesture that (in a particular setting) expresses deference or
dominance, may shape the expectation states associated with a and b (and other actors z who have
observed that behavior) concerning the future behavior of each. A social relation is dyadic. A
social behavior involving actors a and b may, but need not, result in the formation of one or more
social relations. Once it forms, however, a social relation shapes, via status organizing processes,
the subsequent expectation states (and, therefore, the social behavior) of each actor in the relation.
A pattern is a collection of dyadic social relations of a particular kind with respect to a particular,
concrete, collection of agents.
Attempts at theoretical integration of traditions within sociology may not only be possible, but
desirable [155, 136], despite the conceptual and linguistic “pollution” this entails. In the context of
considering social reproduction in education, it is possible to combine ontology, epistemology, and
methodology in historically novel [136, p. 28] yet meaningful ways. By attempting a theoretical
integration of realist social theory and critical social theory via E-state structuralism, I hope to
provide part of the material basis for future integration within the sociology (of education) and
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across the educational research methodologies it may span.1 Since integration is one of the avowed
tasks of metatheory, I turn to metatheory as a way of situating the integrative aim of this study.
3.3 VARIETIES OF METATHEORY
3.3.1 Mapping
Over the last several decades, an increasing awareness of disciplinary fragmentation [85, 141, 159]
has led to calls for theoretical integration. Some sociologists have advocated moving from the
meta-theoretical strategy of theory reduction [31] to that of theory linkage [3]. As suggested by
the terms “fragmentation” and “linkage” [113], the interpretation of theory as a kind of discourse
[74] invites the consideration of theory in spatial terms. Because of their potential for increas-
ing or decreasing “distance”, maps have become a popular meta-theoretical tool in the quest for
theoretical integration.
Educational and sociological theorists have created and deployed “maps” for both coarse- [136]
and fine-grained [193] metatheoretical analysis. For example, Fararo has (implicitly) “mapped”
sociological theories by characterizing their “closeness” to each of three “pure” theoretical forms:
normative social theory (instanced by Habermas), world-historical sociology (instanced byWeber),
and general theoretical sociology (instanced by Parsons) [65]. Metatheoretical mapping might
serve important expository and pedagogical purposes and, more grandly, generate new knowledge
of “the discursive field” [146].
Mapping is not presupposition-less nor do maps “speak” for themselves: maps are both inte-
grative and dispersive [197, p. 20]. One social cartographer in comparative education suggests
that, after confronting an objectionable “discourse map”, a critic ought to revisit the source texts
and reconstruct the map [145]. Although this approach offers a kind of “empirical”, iterative, pro-
cess that promises the possibility of convergence (with respect to a given, or perhaps emergent,
community), it nevertheless seems sociologically (and perhaps philosophically) question-begging.
Ironically, social cartography is as yet insufficiently social, for it does not yet (aspire to?) identify
1I say “material basis” because the material result of any work process can, in principle, form part of the basis for
future work processes.
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sociologically “real [versus abstract] potentials” [198] for social and educational change [185]. Of
course, mapping is not the only tactic open to an integrative meta-theoretician.
3.3.2 Textual analysis
Consider the following verbal formulation (which nevertheless invokes certain spatial relations).
There are important differences between trying to integrate macro (e.g., structural functionalism)
and micro (e.g., symbolic interactionism) theories and attempting to develop a theory that can deal
with the relationship between macro (e.g. social structure) and micro (e.g. personality) levels of
social analysis. [155]
As we shall see, although the distinction between (a) integratingmicro- and macro-theories and (b)
developing a theory of the relation between micro- and macro-levels may be useful, that distinction
is misrepresents the integrative aims of E-state structuralism.
For Ritzer, somemeta-theoretical works are more “integrative” than others. The meta-theoretical
work of Giddens and Bourdieu is, he says, “inherently integrative” and “the most promising effort”
to achieve a “dialectical approach” to micro-macro integration [155, p. 358]. One virtue of that
work, says Ritzer, is that Giddens has “explicitly sought to give a time dimension to the analysis
of micro-macro linkages” [155, p. 360].
Of course, these virtues may reflect a particular way of reading Bourdieu and Giddens in
accordance with a set of metatheoretical prejudices [79, 154]. Consider van den Berg’s rather
different assessment:
The fact that these two virtually indistinguishable positions [of Giddens and Bourdieu regarding the
“agency vs. structure” problem] could prompt such entirely opposite responses [by critics] is itself,
I think, a sure sign of their effective vacuousness. [190]
Less polemically, it has been noted that
[s]uch concepts [namely, agency and structure] are solutions only if they are accompanied by so-
phisticated and detailed accounts of mechanisms of change. Otherwise, they simply deny over-
socialization without offering a real alternative. [56]
Ritzer may have also misread an early work by Fararo and Skvoretz [68] as oriented toward the
integration of theories rather than the development of a theory. In another work, perhaps unknown
to Ritzer, Fararo differentiates between two types of elements involved in an integrative episode:
(1) theories invented in research programs and (2) ideas and techniques (as distinguished from
theories) associated with research programs [65, p. 334]. In the work cited by Ritzer, Fararo and
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Skvoretz expressly adopt the second of these two approaches to integration. Before describing E-
state structuralism, I now turn to the ideas and techniques of structuration theory and realist social
theory that are represented formally in this dissertation.
3.4 STRUCTURATION THEORY AND REALIST SOCIAL THEORY
Realist social theory, critical social theory, and general theoretical sociology each accord great
importance to Giddens’ structuration theory. Realist social theory as developed by Archer is in
large measure a critical response to structuration theory [6, 7]. Other expositors view structuration
theory as one of the major research programs of critical social theory [135]. Working under the
banner of general theoretical sociology, Fararo and others [106, 67] have created social system
simulations that formalize several key notions of structuration theory. The remainder of this chapter
attempts to achieve a theoretical integration of realist and critical social theories by expressing
certain key notions of each, especially the duality of structure, in terms of formalizations developed
under the rubric of general theoretical sociology.
Although structuration theory is of importance to this study, I have not adopted the expository
strategy of beginning with a detailed account of structuration theory, followed by an overview of
realist social theory, and concluding with a detailed comparison. That would constitute a sizable
task, given the considerable primary [85, 86, 87] and secondary [165, 188] literature concerning
structuration theory. Since realist social theory [6, 7] is very much defined in opposition to struc-
turation theory, a detailed consideration of the former would necessitate close consideration of the
latter. I have chosen to simply select and sketch broad areas of difference between realist social
theory and structuration theory claimed by Archer.
Archer acknowledges that ’structure and agency’ is indeed a central problem of social theory,
for reasons both academic and existential [6, p. 65]. Somewhat surprisingly, Archer acknowledges
the principle of mutual constitution expressed in the key notion of ’duality of structure’ [6, p. 87].
Yet, according to Archer, structuration theory “sinks” rather than “links” structure and agency [6,
p. 65].
What is “structuration”? Giddens summarizes it as the “structuring of social relations across
time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure” [86, p. 376, emphasis added]. Hence, “duality
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of structure” is a key notion of structuration theory. Giddens offers the following summary of
“duality of structure”:
Structure is the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes: the structural proper-
ties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production
and reproduction. [86, p. 374, emphasis added]
Giddens and others, both friends and critics, have labored to - as some philosophers put it - unpack
the concept of “duality of structure”.
The concept of time is also, apparently, a matter of dispute. According to Giddens, social
theory “must acknowledge, as it has not done previously, time-space intersections as essentially
involved in all social existence” [85, p. 54]. According to Archer, although Giddens stresses that
“theorizing must have a temporal dimension: what is missed is that time is an actual variable in
theory” [6, p. 89].2
Archer claims that structuration theory actually “suppresses time” and such suppression makes
it impossible to give an account of the conditions under which reproduction or transformation are
likely to occur [6, p. 87]. According to Archer, Giddens’ methodological bracketing of the duality
of structure entails that both structural properties and strategic conduct (the two bracketed aspects)
are “co-terminous in time”. If the two aspects are simultaneous, says Archer, there is no logical
basis for examining temporal relations between structure and agency [6, p. 88]. For Archer,
“structure and agency can only be linked by examining the interplay between them over time, and
that without the proper incorporation of time the problem of structure and agency can never be
satisfactorily resolved” [6, p. 65].
The dispute of Giddens and Archer over the role of time in the “mutual constitution of struc-
ture and agency” may illustrate the claim that the linearity of language sometimes makes it poorly
suited to rendering non-linear phenomena. Although language is the primary vehicle for the articu-
lation of social theory [47], the numerous efforts of Giddens and others [165] to clarify the concept
2In discussing social integration, Giddens invokes the Heideggerian distinction between time and temporality [99]:
Roughly put, temporality is that essential characteristic of human being which is presupposed by the ordinary hu-
man experience of measuring time. This is evident in Giddens’ description of the body, not in terms of time-space
coordinates, but in terms of “the situation of the active body oriented towards its tasks” [86, p. 65] and his citing
of Merleau-Ponty [132]. Yet, in subsequent discussion, when discussing Hagerstrand’s time-space geography [95],
which deals with time as ordinarily understood, Giddens does not explicitly relate time and temporality. Indeed, the
discussion in Central Problems in Social Theory alternates so easily between the terms time and temporality that the
reader can easily miss what might be taken as a “merely philosophical” distinction between the two. In short, Giddens
employs language in ways that conflate time and temporality and Archer does not take exception [81]. Of course,
since Giddens and Archer are sociologists, not philosophers, this is easy to forgive and forget.
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of structuration testifies to the insufficiency of language alone for the clarification and assessment
of structuration theory. I hope to show, in the context of the social problem of child abuse report-
ing, that general theoretical sociology offers technical and linguistic resources for characterizing,
clarifying, and assessing, the positions of Giddens and Archer concerning the mutual constitution
of agency and structure.
3.5 GENERAL THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY
Recall from Chapter 2 that, for critical realists, the world consists of events, mechanisms, and
structures [27, p. 57]. The relations among these different ontological strata are summarized in
Figure 3.1 [161, p. 116].
Events E1 E2 E3 . . . Ei
↑ ↗ ↗ ↑
Mechanisms M1 M2 M3 . . . M j
↑ ↗ ↑ ↖
Structures S1 S2 S3 . . . Sk
Figure 3.1: Relations between events, mechanisms, and structures
Figure 3.1 is intended to suggest several things. First, when activated, the same mechanism
may produce different events, as depicted by causal arrows from M1 to both E1 and E2. Second,
an event may have different or multiple causes, as depicted by causal arrows from both M2 and
M3 to E3. Third, a structure can cause one or more mechanisms to be activated, as depicted by
causal arrows from S1 to both M1 and M2. Finally, the cause of a mechanism being activated can
be multiple structures, as depicted by the causal arrows from S1, S2 and S3 to M2. Figure 3.1
depicts the ontological stratification of the real and suggests, as discussed in Chapter 2, the need
for a corresponding stratification of knowledge.
It might be objected that, as human being differs from the being of things, the analysis of so-
cial reality in terms of mechanisms is at best tangential. That human being presupposes a material,
thing-like, being is not inconsistent with a phenomenologically fundamental (human) ontology.
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Likewise, the agency [87] required in any adequate account of social reality presupposes the ma-
teriality of the actors. In the realist view, mechanisms are rooted in the causal powers of things,
which in turn express their tendency to act (or refrain from acting) in particular ways because of the
kind of things they are. As “reasons” sometimes figure as constitutive elements of human being,
reasons are sometimes causes and can, therefore, count in mechanism-based explanations of social
reality [96]. Hence, although they both stress the importance of mechanisms, social realism ought
not be confused with the social physics of classical empiricism.
It might also be objected that, for social realists, the ultimate cause of all things social is located
in the structural since, in Figure 3.1, the forest of arrows is rooted in the level of structures. In order
to clarify this, consider the social ontology shown in Figure 2, adapted from [65, p. 327], which is
intended (roughly speaking) to instantiate the philosophical ontology depicted in Figure 3.1.
Social Philosophical
Social behaviors Events
Status organizing processes Mechanisms
Patterns of social relations Structures
Figure 3.2: Elements of a social ontology
A social behavior involving two actors a and b is stipulated to be observable. The occurrence
of a particular social behavior, such as a gesture that (in a particular setting) expresses deference
or dominance, shapes the expectation states of a and b (and other actors z who have observed the
behavior) concerning the future behavior of each.
Status organizing processes are elements of expectation states theory. According to the theory
of expectation states, social behaviors are causal elements in the formation of expectation states
and, in turn, expectation states shape the selection of social behaviors by actors. For expectation
states theory, individual “behavior is a function of expectation states and such states arise in prior
social interaction” [65, p. 325].
A social relation is dyadic. During each communication involving actors a and b, a social
relation may or may not form. Once it forms, however, a social relation shapes the subsequent
expectation states (and, therefore, the social behavior) of each actor in the relation. The distribution
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of a social relation over a population constitutes a pattern. Put otherwise, a pattern is a collection
of dyadic social relations of a particular kind with respect to a particular, concrete, collection of
agents. Given a fixed population, the set of dyadic social relations over the population may be
different at two points in time: if this occurs, a distinct pattern exists at each point in time.
For each of two populations, at least one pattern will exist at some point in time. Considered
in abstraction from the populations involved, the two patterns may be equivalent in some formal
sense. A set of patterns that are formally equivalent is termed a structure.
What Fararo terms a structure is an abstract entity constructed by the social theorist according
to some criteria. For social network theory, “social structures are bundles of interconnected social
relations, each represented by a type of tie [or line connecting two points] in a [mathematical]
graph [structure consisting of a set of such points]” [65, p. 324]. For Fararo, a structure is not a
causal element: rather, a structure expresses the stability of a set of patterns. Put otherwise, the set
of patterns realizes a structure considered as an abstract, conceptual, element.
Since Figure 3.1, however, shows causal arrows from structures to mechanisms, there appears
to be a contradiction. In the models created for this study, the social system begins in an unstruc-
tured state. Initially, no social relations exist between any of the actors represented in the model.3
The actors do, by hypothesis, share a set of expectation states. Each actor a selects a communi-
cation partner b based on the current set of expectation states. When a addresses b, one or more
social relations may form. At each point in simulated time, the set of social relations constitutes the
state of the social system. Hence, the social system evolves from an unstructured into a structured
state. For the purposes of coordinating the vocabulary of E-state structuralism and critical realism,
what critical realists term a structure would be termed a pattern . Patterns are causal elements.
Fararo’s “hybrid generativity” of mechanisms and rules seems part of an attempt to render
formally Giddens’ notion of the duality of structure. Archer, whose social theory is explicitly
rooted in the realist philosophical ontology of Bhaskar, criticizes the social ontology of Giddens.
Fararo, while anchored in realist history and philosophy of science, does not seem perturbed by
Giddens’ alleged lack of concern with ontology.
Sounding very much like Giddens, Fararo glosses structuration theory as follows:
Social practices . . . are recursive [emphasis added]: They are continually re-created by the actors
3In a simulation, it is possible to initialize the social system to any particular set of social relations.
28
in such a way as to reproduce the conditions that make these same activities possible. [65][pp.
199-200]
This suggests the possibility of representing the interplay of structure and agency in the mutual
causation of social behavior and social patterns, mediated by expectation states.
Although Giddens wishes to distance his concepts from the linguistic homonyms deployed by
modelers, it seems that formal recursion is a “root metaphor” [148] of structuration theory. After
citing a major work in the theory of computation, noting that it has little obvious relevance to
social theory, Giddens allows (in 1979) that parallels between automata theory and social theory
might become important. The major point of connection between biological and social theory, says
Giddens, involves “recursive or self-reproducing systems” [85, p. 75].
Formal recursion does not, however, seem to be part of Archer’s conceptual universe. Consider
the following element in Archer’s methodological critique of Giddens:
[I]nstitutional analysis brackets strategic action and treats structural properties as ’chronically re-
produced features of social systems’. This image of recursiveness figures prominently, but many
would deny that these features necessarily are ’chronic’ . . . [6, p. 87]
Archer seems to link recursiveness and reproduction, yet the formal concept of recursion has no
intrinsic association with either reproduction or transformation. This seemingly one-sided under-
standing of recursion casts suspicion on Archer’s critique of structuration theory.
Although Archer and Giddens both claim at least partial allegiance to realist philosophy of
(social) science, substantive sociological differences separate them. According to Archer, struc-
turation theory entails shorter, while realist social theory requires longer, time intervals during
which patterns “emerge” to structure subsequent interaction. I model this theoretical dispute over
the role of time in the mutual constitution of structure and agency as follows.
To the extent that the ideas and techniques of structuration theory and realist social theory can
be represented formally, E-state structuralism provides a vehicle for integrating the two. Fararo
expressly interprets Giddens’ notion of duality of structure in E-state structuralist terms [65] and,
more recently, Fararo and Butts drew upon both Giddens’ idea of the duality of structure and Bour-
dieu’s notion of habitus in constructing a model expressing “the multi-level dynamics of structured
agency” [67]. In contrast with Giddens and Bourdieu, the E-state structuralist approach to inte-




Despite my indebtedness to Fararo, there are some noteworthy differences. Like him [64], I view
each person as a (inherently complex) process [198]. Perhaps most importantly, although I deploy
E-state structuralism to synthesize patterns that emerge as a result of social interaction, this study
is not one of general theoretical sociology as understood by Fararo. For him, the task of the
general theoretical sociologist is to identify the conditions under which social structures (rather
than patterns) emerge (or change) as a result of social interaction. Secondly, whereas Fararo views
ethnography as a diversion from the aims of general theoretical sociology, I attempt to encapsulate
the internal, especially cognitive, complexity of actors in order to approximate an ethnographic
model of how actors interpret certain situations.4 Finally, much of the simulation work done by
Fararo is based on discrete-event simulation (as described below) [106], whereas I, like Hummon
in later work [105], rely on real-time simulation.
Like Hummon, I conduct real-time, versus discrete-event, simulation. In discrete-event simu-
lation, the occurrence of events are scheduled in advance and a simulation (versus ordinary) clock
is advanced from the scheduled occurrence of one event to the next. In effect, the time between
events is collapsed to zero. By contrast, in real-time simulation, there is no simulation clock dis-
tinct from an ordinary clock and events are not scheduled in advance: they simply occur and the
time of their occurrence in real-time is recorded. I choose real-time simulation because I intend to
eventually use the simulator to model more realistic interactions.
Although my approach to simulation is derived from the object-oriented approach of Hummon,
there are some differences[105, 106]. Whereas Hummon models each actor as a passive object and
constructs a network to support interaction, I model each actor as an active object and formalize the
social network as a system of communicating (sequential) processes [101, 58, 156]. The essence
of an active object is nicely captured in the following: “Both its data and algorithms are private.
The outside world can neither see that data nor execute those algorithms. Each process is alive,
executing its own algorithms on its own data.” [196, Description of a CSProcess obect]. By
contrast, neither the data nor the algorithms of a passive object are private: they are available to
4Fararo has most recently increased the internal complexity of actors by representing each as a finite-state machine
[67].
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any other program with sufficient access privileges. In short, active objects are better suited to
representing humans as (at least, semi-) autonomous beings.
I formulate a model along E-state structuralist lines. Recall that an E-state is an abstraction of
an expectation state. In E-state structuralism, a social relation is constituted by the E-states of the
two agents involved. The status of E-states as real, but unobserved, objects is established by the
ability of the theorist to predict social behaviors on the basis of assumptions that posit causal links
between social behaviors and E-states. When simulated, the behavior of the model is differenti-
ated into social realist and structurationist versions by varying the the amount of (simulated) time
required for a social behavior to generate a new social relation and, thus, a new set of E-states.
When simulated, the behavior of the model is differentiated into social realist and structura-
tionist versions by varying the the amount of (simulated) time required for a social behavior to
generate a new social relation and, thus, a new set of E-states. The outcomes generated by each
simulation are then used to assess the potential practical impact of different assumption about
time on a particular social-educational practice. It is plausible to frame the dispute over time in
these terms, given both Archer’s concession that structure and agency are mutually constitutive
and Fararo’s explicit interpretation of duality of structure in E-state structuralist terms. The setup
and analysis of the two models are described more fully in Chapter 11.
By modeling persons as active computational objects, I implement the fundamental realist
proposition that “generative mechanisms are . . . nothing other than the ways of acting of things”
[27, p. 14], in the case where human beings are considered as special sorts of things [8, 120]. It
is necessary, however, to justify the use of simulation in a way that shows it to be both consistent
with realist ontology and necessitated by the real nature of the objects under consideration. After
considering the perennial debate over quantitative versus qualitative methods, I will claim that




4.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
In this chapter, I sketch an approach by which qualitative and quantitative methods might be inte-
grated via simulation. I do so by formulating two mechanism sketches, one based on a qualitative
study, the other based on a quantitative study, and then integrate them. The account I provide does
not describe how to integrate the qualitative and quantitative components of the empirical part of
the study, but rather suggests that such an integration is plausible.
4.2 INTRODUCTION
The idea of the mutual constitution of structure and agency is a concept central to both structuration
theory and realist social theory. Realist social theory developed in response to structuration theory
and is based on the idea of ontological emergence. Simulation is an ideal methodology for the
exploration of emergence [88]. It has been claimed that social system simulation provides a vehicle
for integrating qualitative and quantitative methods [47]. The possibility of modeling educational
actions on the basis of the actions of persons makes social system simulation as a mixed method
superior to either quantitative-only or qualitative-only methods.1
The history of antagonism between quantitative-only and qualitative-only researchers is long,
punctuated by (generally one-sided) attempts to bridge the gap. It was recently suggested that both
of the following equations are flawed: quantitative = scientific; qualitative = non-scientific. Yet,
the author writes as if the nature of science were entirely unproblematic and gives little evidence
1Yet, a recent treatment of mixed-method approaches that presents various realist methodological arguments does
not examine simulation [178].
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of familiarity with the turmoil that has marked the philosophy of science and social science over
the last three decades [125]. A more radical critique sinks the distinction between quantitative
and qualitative research within a consideration of the competing values and commitments that
characterize competing traditions within social science [150].
I begin by briefly characterizing mechanism sketches, and then describe two studies of class-
room communication. These studies are methodologically disjoint and, in some respects, exem-
plary: the first is a qualitative study by McDermott; the second is a quantitative study by Ben-Ari.
I then describe, and construct a mechanism [121] for, each study. I then construct a mechanism
that integrates the quantitative and qualitative mechanisms. Finally, I discuss various arguments
that have been, or might be, advanced in opposition to the use of simulation.
4.3 MECHANISM SKETCHES
Mechanism sketches are (surprisingly) based on mechanisms, which Machamer and colleagues
define as “entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from
start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” [121, p. 3]. Mechanism description is the
linguistic basis for mechanism-based explanation.
There are three types of increasingly detailed mechanism description: showing how possibly
things work; showing how plausibly things work; and showing how actually things work [121, p.
21]. Since almost anything is in some sense possible, it is possible that inequality in the U.S. is
the result of interference by aliens from another time-space dimension. One could say that the
alien interference mechanism description shows “how possibly” inequality arises in the United
States. Another candidate explanation might be the inequality is due to the genetic inferiority of
those at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy. Since poverty is often generational, there is
some evidence for such a claim, rendering the genetic mechanism description as showing “how
plausibly” inequality is generated. Of course, until there is evidence of particular relationships
between genetic material and behavior, one would be hard pressed to say that genetic differences
show “how actually” how social inequality works. These types of mechanism description allow for
mechanism-based explanations of different strength. I use these distinctions between mechanism
descriptions to characterize the arguments of McDermott and Ben-Ari.
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In order to emphasize the integrative possibilities afforded by simulation, I draw on the follow-
ing graphical formalism developed by Machamer and colleagues:
If a mechanism is represented schematically by A→ B→C [where A, B, and C are entities] then
the [productive] continuity lies in the arrows and their explication is in terms of the activities that
the arrows represent. [121, p. 3]
This graphical representation is intended to show that the activities of A produce the entity B and the
activities of B produce the entity C. In using this graphical template to reconstruct the arguments
of Ben-Ari and McDermott, I will assign a specific meaning to each of A, B, C, and the activities
represented by arrows.
Each arrow relates a producer entity to a produced entity. In terms of mechanism-based ex-
planation, I take the task of simulation to be that of providing a computational “unpacking” of
the arrows in a mechanism sketch. Put otherwise, simulation involves tracing the sequence of op-
erations by which terminal objects are generated from initial objects. In the next two sections, I
describe two different kinds of studies and try to interpret them in terms of mechanism sketches.
4.4 A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CLASSROOM INTERACTION
In the United States, social movements during the 1960s and 1970s and accommodation to them
resulted in intensified interest in reducing racial, ethnic, class, and gender-based inequalities. As a
key institution in industrialized societies, the school was identified as a key site for insuring what
has recently been termed the “durability of inequality” [182]. A number of investigators examined
how, and under what circumstances, formal schooling played a socially reproductive rather than
transformative role.
Provocative investigations at the level of the society and the economy were both illuminating
and concealing. The correspondence thesis, which posited a structural isomorphism between social
relations in the school and those of the workplace [33], and suggested that schooling promoted
a lack of mobility, was criticized as too mechanical and too deterministic. Some researchers,
both quantitative and qualitative, worked to “open up” the “black box” of formal schooling. One
such study was produced by Rist, who departed from the use of large-scale sociological research
methods by employing extensive fieldwork.
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Rist’s study in the late 1960s has been described as “the first major attempt by a sociologist
to explore self-fulfilling prophecies in the classroom” [107, p. 173]. Following earlier work on
expectations [157], Rist claimed that teachers formed student ability groupings on the basis of their
differential, even conscious, class-related expectations for students’ academic success. Moreover,
initial ability groupings were relatively permanent.
From the day that the [kindergarten] class was assigned permanent seats, the activities in the class-
room were perceivably different from previously. The fundamental division of the class into those
expected to learn and those not expected to [learn] permeated the teacher’s orientation to the class.
[153, p. 423]
Rist observed sharply different patterns of interaction between teachers and students in the three
ability groups. Students in lower-ability groups received both less instruction and fewer opportu-
nities to demonstrate their knowledge. According to Hurn,
. . . there is in the findings [of Rist] the strong implication that ability grouping is a majormechanism
by which teachers’ expectations become self-fulfilling prophecies. [107, p. 174, emphasis added]
. . . [Because of its importance] . . . almost all [recent] research [on primary schools] is in one way
or another concerned with exploring how teacher expectations for student performance tend to help
produce that expected performance. [107, pp. 170-71]
Rist makes the implicit claim that the mechanism of ability grouping produces regular changes:
namely, changes in classroom social structure and the behavior of students and teachers.2
Although my analysis focuses on McDermott, it is important to distinguish between McDer-
mott and Rist, especially since the findings of both have been taken up by those concerned about
teacher and student expectations. I claim that Rist provides a mechanism-description that shows
how possibly, and perhaps how plausibly, but not how actually classroom stratification is produced.
Quantitative-only researchers might grant how possibly standing to Rist’s mechanism description
but would probably withhold how plausibly status on the ground that his study findings have not
been replicated in either small- or large-scale research. Some qualitative-only researchers might
assert how plausibly status for Rist’s mechanism description. Other qualitative-only researchers
might, ignoring contradiction, hold to its “essential” incompleteness, asking “What assurance is
there that other teachers, even the majority of them, do not ’have’ rather different ’expectations’
from those ’possessed’ by the teachers in Rist’s study?” To the extent that the rationality of science
2Amore recent quantitative research study confirmed the importance of ability grouping by suggesting the superior
power of contextual, versus individual, variables in “explaining” variation in student attention [60]. Much of the
research on teacher and student expectation, however, has been qualitative.
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is “socially constructed” [150, p. 7] within communities of practice, the above criticisms suggest
that Rist has at best shown how possibly classroom stratification is produced.3
Although subsequent qualitative research tended to confirm much of what Rist observed, the
interpretations varied. In a 1974 paper reviewing the ethnographic literature on what he termed
“black classrooms”, McDermott asserted that the high rate of reading disability and illiteracy
among African-Americans is due, not to racism or biologically damaged brains, but to a mis-
communication between teachers and students that arises out of cultural conflict. School failure
amongst African-American elementary school students is, for McDermott, an “achievement” co-
produced by students and their teachers.4
McDermott, in effect, explains the mechanism of ability grouping in terms of the lower-
level mechanism of teacher-student communication. Whereas McDermott highlights the rela-
tional content of teacher-student communication, Rist highlighted the instructional content. In
the mechanism-language of Machamer and colleagues, instructional communication and relational
communication are among the (not necessarily separate) activities in which the entities (human be-
ings) engage. The mechanism of teacher-student communication, in this view, produces regular
changes in the social structure of the classroom.
For McDermott, explanations of classroom stratification in terms of teacher expectation alone
are insufficient. According to earlier researchers into the “self-fulfilling prophecy”, says McDer-
mott, “white teachers expect black children to fail and subtly induce their expectations into the
children who indeed do fail” [127, p. 104]. McDermott explicitly distances himself from the term
“expectation” and the teacher blaming associated with the work of Rist.
How does the mechanism of teacher-student communication explain the mechanism of ability
grouping? McDermott claims that communication acquires its sense by virtue of its rootedness
in the cultural and socio-cultural systems of the sender and receiver. Cultural systems involve
3To say that the rationality of science is socially constructed has very different meanings depending on whether
endorses the multiple-realities or realist versions of social construction [36].
4I have takenMcDermott’s 1974 paper as an exemplary qualitative study: McDermott does not share that evaluation
[129]. Although McDermott sees the 1974 paper as a move in right direction, it is one accompanied by a number of
theoretical and political missteps. For example, whereas I regard the reliance on neuro-psychology in the early work
as a positive (if worrisome) feature, McDermott joins early reviewers in largely dismissing it. From my perspective,
however, the latter work is riddled by an excessive utopianism borne out of an anthropological version of sociological
labeling theory. Hence, from the realist premises which inform my thought, it is McDermott’s later paper which is,
despite the admirable analytical work it contains, inferior to the earlier work.
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more than simply abstract entities. When students and teachers initially encounter each other in
a kindergarten classroom, each neurologically embodies a (possibly divergent) cultural system.5
The significance of such culturally-based, neurologically-encoded, differences depends in part,
says McDermott, on whether such differences are viewed more as pedagogical resources or as
constraints.
Drawing on a model of human communication [12, 195], McDermott claims that the timing
of communication, the protocols involved, and the message content all affect the establishment of
the kind(s) of teachers-student connections that facilitate (or inhibit) learning. McDermott (1977)
asserts that “all communication between people conveys not only it’s obvious content but also im-
plicit or explicit messages attempting to define the nature of the participants relationship” (quoted
in [138, p. 223]). A message that raises claims concerning the nature of the student-teacher rela-
tionship (as, for example, asserting dominance or intellectual/cultural superiority) may be rejected,
resulting in the rejection of the instructional content of the message.
McDermott suggests that classroom miscommunication is generated, in part, by differences
in the cognitive taxonomies [75] employed by members of diverse cultural groups. An entity or
relationship accorded great importance in one taxonomy may not even have existential status in
another. Once it is granted that perception and conception are only analytically separable, it fol-
lows that “perception” as well as “conception” are products generated - in an ontologically limited
sense [30, pp. 31-44] - by processes of social construction.6 McDermott illustrates the impor-
tance of such culturally-based, taxonomy-generated, miscommunication through the example of
“whimperatives”.
Consider the following expression: “Roy, would you please close the door?” Syntactically, it is
a question, yet in the context of a kindergarten classroom it is more likely to be a command. A poor
or working-class child may fail to understand such a “whimperative” or, understanding it, refuse to
accept the symbolic significance that compliance with it might entail [201]. A failure to understand,
or comply with, a whimperative may be interpreted as defiance or inattention. Quantitative analysis
indicates that the conduct grades mediate the statistical effect of IQ and gender on academic marks
5McDermott asserts that “to study the brain is to study social organization, and vice-versa.” As McDermott ac-
knowledged, he was “heavily influenced” by neuro-psychologist Karl Pribram and cognitive anthropologist Charles
Frake.
6Here, “social construction” is understood in terms of a single objective reality that is implicitly referenced by
multiple interpretations or perspectives [36, pp. 67-68]
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[63].
Other researchers (e.g., [89, 130]) conclude that the broader organizational contexts within
which the classroom is embedded influence the timing, protocols, and content of classroom com-
munication and, in turn, the learning of African-American and other groups. For example, an
over-emphasis on standardized tests may so structure both the formal and the hidden curriculum
that the relational considerations [128] essential to the achievement of a communicative connec-
tion between teacher and student fade into the background. Hence, the evaluation and response of
teachers to neurologically-encoded cultural differences has sources outside the immediate context
of classroom communication.
One might object that the existence of initial differences in cultural coding is insufficient to
explain the continued, and increasing, performance gap between poor, working-class, African-
American students and their counterparts. Recall that, in the communication model assumed by
McDermott, both sender and receiver code and decode messages according to their own cultural
and socio-cultural cognitive taxonomic system. Code-switching (see [54, 25]), the ability to move
from one linguistic form to another, presupposes the ability to encode an alternative cognitive
taxonomy within one’s own. When such interpretive capability has not yet been developed, the
communicative “self” may render less important or even “invisible” those entities and relationships
that are of greater significance to the communicative “other”.
The effect of sustained miscommunication is, says McDermott, “selective attention” on the
part of poor, working-class, African-American students.7 Although the phrase “selective atten-
tion” suggests a significant element of volition on the part of students, McDermott emphasizes that
the traces of such miscommunication are laid down neurologically. The process of social construc-
tion leaves neurological traces: as one researcher puts it, “the body keeps the score” [191]. The
social process of schooling renders some differences insignificant while magnifying others, thus
explaining how the perceived performance gap between African-American underclass children be-
comes increasingly pronounced over time.8
What advantages does McDermott’s analysis offer? For some, social scientific progress con-
7Of course, the reality is much more complex: see, for example, work on the difference it makes being a member
of a voluntary versus involuntary immigrant group [84, 73].
8Again, a more complete account would take account of how school careers are shaped by the distribution of
economic, social, and cultural capital [32].
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sists in the construction of sequences of progressively more powerful mechanism-based explana-
tions [27]. I claim that McDermott, in effect, offers a mechanism-based explanation for the mech-
anism of ability grouping advanced by Rist. To see why McDermott’s explanation is stronger than
that of Rist I rely upon the distinction between different kinds of mechanism-based explanation.
I claim that McDermott provides a mechanism-description that shows how plausibly classroom
stratification is produced. What assurances are there that cultural differences noted by McDermott
are more than local effects? Or perhaps these differences only matter in certain context or to
different people in a given place? Might some teachers view their communication with students as
not substantially altered by cultural differences?9 These questions suggest that McDermott does
not show how plausibly classroom stratification is produced.
Yet, other sources of support may be available. Among the material bases of McDermott’s
work is the prior knowledge systematically articulated in human communication theory.10 It is a
mechanism description rooted in communication theory that allows McDermott to show how plau-
sibly ability grouping (and with it, classroom stratification) is produced. It is because McDermott
explains the mechanism of ability grouping in terms of the mechanism of communication that his
explanation of classroom stratification is stronger than an explanation based on ability grouping
alone.
Does McDermott show how actually ability grouping is produced in classrooms? To do so, he
must show that teacher-student communication produces
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions . . . where . . . [M]echanisms
are regular in that they work always or for the most part in the same way under the same conditions
[121, p. 3, emphasis added].
To say that X produces regular changes in Y is to say that X always (or for the most part) affects Y
under certain conditions.
If we are to assume that McDermott’s account is more than idiosyncratic, it implies that
teacher-student communication produces regular changes in the initial social structure of a class-
room by inducing the formation of ability groups.11 But McDermott does not provide evidence
9These questions implicitly raise the issue of how mechanisms and specific cultural content are related. The
definition of mechanisms as “entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from
start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” is quite general. Specific cultural content, whether embodied in
books or minds, can in principle be regarded as an entity.
10The production of knowledge presupposes a material basis in the form of prior knowledge [28].
11Of course, other factors are also involved, but these are not within the scope of McDermott’s mechanism-
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Primary entities (Positions): A’ = Teacher, B’ = Student
Secondary entities (Measurements): C” = CognitiveScore
A′ −−−→ B′ −−−→ C′′
Figure 4.1: A reconstruction of McDermott’s account
of regularity: his claim about the relationship between teacher-student communication and ability
grouping relies on ethnographic studies and findings from human communication theory. Lacking
evidence of regularity, he cannot show how actually ability grouping and social stratification are
produced in classrooms.
For the purpose of inscribing McDermott’s account in a mechanism, I have taken some (at
least terminological) liberty. It is the occupant of the Teacher position that is the chief, but not
sole, agent in the mechanism of teacher-student miscommunication. In response, occupants of
the Student position develop selective inattention, which ultimately results in lower achievement
scores.
For the sake of the exposition, I have constructed the simplified mechanism shown in Figure
4.1. It is not necessary that A and B belong to the same ontological category: through their activ-
ities, for example, human beings produce entities quite unlike themselves. Here, a Teacher entity
produces a Student entity and a Student entity produces a CognitiveScore entity. Although it is
odd to say that a Teacher “produces” a Student, it is less so if we think of Teacher and Student as
Positions and assume that (other things being equal) whoever occupies the Teacher position often
exercises greater power in relation to the occupant of the Student position (a similar metaphor is
used in [118]. This mechanism highlights Positions rather than Behaviors.
4.5 A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF CLASSROOM INTERACTION
Most educational research, including research on the self-fulfilling prophecy, presupposes teacher-
centered instruction. This is quite natural: Most classrooms in the United States, and perhaps
description.
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throughout the world, remain teacher-centered, despite forays into other modes of instruction [52].
Yet, in taking the teacher as sociometric star educational research helps naturalize the practice of
formal schooling as a centralized banking system of deposits (via instruction) and withdrawals (via
examination) [78] administered by those with privileged access to the repository of highly valued
cultural capital [32] or official knowledge [5].
Recent quantitative research suggests the importance of de-emphasizing the teacher as the
center of instructional communication. Researchers associated with the Center for Complex In-
struction at Stanford University, based on work by Elizabeth Cohen in the 1970s, have applied
expectation states theory to the study of instruction in heterogeneous classrooms. Roughly put,
expectation states theory concerns the effect of performance expectations for self and other on the
future performances of each. Concerns about teacher and student expectations raised by the work
of Rist and others have found their way into the expectation states theory research program via
quantitative work [63]. While much of the research on Complex Instruction has focused on the
effect of status differences between children on learning, a study by Ben-Ari concerns the negative
effects of the status difference between a teacher and their students on learning and how, using
Complex Instruction, these effects can be ameliorated.12
Ben-Ari asserts that learning requires social interaction, citing Vygotsky, Piaget, and Bandura.
“Interaction supports multiple perspectives, reveals differences, raises conflict, and forces children
to confront complex situations” [16, p. 197]. It is the encounter with such differences that spurs
cognitive gains in students. According to Ben-Ari, children act differently in the presence of adults,
so that adult authority may (albeit unintentionally) delay, limit, or prevent the kinds of encounters
between students (and perhaps between a student and a text) necessary to cognitive development.
The dampening effect of adult presence on cognitive growth can be explained by expectation
states theory. According to it, group members with relatively low status (in this case, the students)
are likely to receive fewer opportunities to interact and to take or make use of such opportunities,
deferring instead to group members with relatively high-status (in this case, the teacher). If cog-
nitive growth requires interaction, interaction requires autonomy, and adult authority reduces both
autonomy and interaction, then those who wish to promote cognitive growth ought to consider
12Complex Instruction emphasizes collaborative work in heterogenous groupings and the use of expectation training
to reduce the negative effects of status differences.
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restructuring classroom interaction.
According to Ben-Ari, “the goal [of Complex Instruction] is to maximize interaction among
students in small groups and minimize direct instruction by the teacher” [16, p. 198]. Complex In-
struction, then, creates the “necessary conditions for the cognitive development of students: social
interaction and autonomy of the learner” [16, p. 200]. In Ben-Ari’s evaluation study of Complex
Instruction it was predicted (in a specific setting) that, first, “a positive relationship between the
level of student interaction and the progress [or gain] on [a] . . . test” [of cognitive abilities] [16,
p. 201]. Second, it was predicted that the effect of teacher behavior on student cognitive gain
would be mediated by student interaction: “the more the teacher’s behaviors increase the level of
student interaction, the stronger the gains of the students” [16, p. 201]. Ben-Ari claims that a
statistical path model (solved using LISREL [137]) based on measures of teacher behavior, student
interaction and cognitive gain yields results consistent with the above predictions.
Teacher and Student behaviors were observed and counted, yielding values for the follow-
ing six variables: TSupervises, TDevelops, SInteractsVB, SInteractsNV, SInteractsNo, and
SCognGain. The variable TSupervises records the number of Teacher supervisory behaviors
observed and TDevelops records the number of Teacher behaviors characterized as intended to
develop thinking. Student behaviors were classified as verbal interaction with another student
(SInteractsVB), non-verbal interaction with another student (SInteractsNV), and no interaction
with another student (SInteractsNo). Changes in student scores were recorded by SCognGain.
The exogenous variables are TSupervises and TDevelops. The endogenous variables are SInter-
actsVB, SInteractsNV, SInteractsNo, and SCognGain.
These six variables were measured at the individual level (n = 1017 student participants) and
then aggregated to form (n= 36) classroom-level measures. In the LISREL model, the Student and
Teacher behavior variables are computed as classroom total or averages. Since both McDermott
and Ben-Ari address the impact of teacher-student communication on classrooms of students, it
seems reasonable to use average behavior within a classroom as the unit of analysis.
The study satisfies a rule of thumb that the sample size be at least five times the number
of variables [137, p. 26]. Since path analysis requires that relationships between variables be
linear and without interaction, it is technically impossible to consider whether the children of
different class, race, and gender respond similarly [97, p. 147]. In addition, the model must be
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(and is) over-identified [97, p. 163]: that is, the number of data points exceeds the number of
parameters to be estimated. Unfortunately, Ben-Ari’s description of the study does not provide any
details concerning the context, how the sample was selected, the observational methods used, or
significance levels.











Figure 4.2: Ben-Ari’s model
of another, this suggests the possibility that the left variable may exert a causal effect on the right
variable. Taking two such variables at a time there are eleven possible causal paths.13 The absence
of a line between two variables, such as TSupervises and SCognGain, indicates that the direct
causal effect between the two variables is not statistically significant. A solid line indicates that
the causal effect is statistically significant and positive: for example, the path from TSupervises to
SInteractsNV. A dotted line indicates that the causal effect represented by the path is statistically
significant and negative: for example, the path from TSupervises to SInteractsVB. Thus, four of
the eleven causal paths were statistically significant.
Higher levels of supervisory behavior by teachers (TSupervises) were associated with both
higher levels of non-verbal interaction amongst students (SInteractsNV) and lower levels of verbal
13Although it is a statistical truism that correlation is not causation, there are grounds for making causal inferences
on the basis of correlations together with other information [147].
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interaction amongst students (SInteractsVB). Supervisory behavior by teachers, however, had no
significant direct effect on student cognitive gain (SCognGain). This last finding is at odds with
widespread belief, although consistent with Ben-Ari’s predictions.
Higher levels of teacher behavior intended to develop thinking (TDevelops) were associated
with higher levels of verbal interaction among students (SInteractsVB), which in turn were asso-
ciated with higher levels of cognitive gain by students (SCognGain). The direct effect of teacher
behavior intended to develop thinking on cognitive gain was not, however, statistically significant.
The only variable to exert a positive effect on the cognitive growth of students was teacher behavior
intended to develop thinking (TDevelops), and this effect was indirect (via SInteractsVB) rather
than direct.
Recall that two predictions were made. First, that a positive relationship existed between the
level of student interaction and student cognitive gain. Second, that the effect of teacher behavior
on student cognitive gain would be mediated by student interaction. Although both predicted out-
comes were observed, the study (or the reporting of it) may be technically flawed.14 As omissions,
the technical deficiencies of the study are not difficult to remove. Assuming that these deficien-
cies were repaired and the indicated inferences upheld, how would the model contribute to the
explanatory adequacy of the theory of Complex Instruction that grounds it?
A theory is more-or-less adequate, on critical realist grounds, to the extent that it specifies
a set of mechanisms that generate the phenomena, the observed events. The task, then, is to
assess whether and in what way Ben-Ari specifies the mechanisms that generate the events that are
statistically analyzed via the LISREL model. For Bhaskar, “mechanisms must be analyzed as the
ways of acting of things” [27, p. 184, emphasis added].
Ben-Ari distinguishes between the conditions required for a mechanism to be triggered and the
mechanism itself.
Under such conditions [of autonomy and interaction], children are able to pay attention to the
arguments of their peers, act in collaboration, and play roles that further problem-solving. [16, p.
198, emphasis added]
14Analysis of Figure 4.2 from first principles [97] suggests that five degrees of freedom ought to be associated with
the initial, full, LISREL model. Ben-Ari associates three degrees of freedom, but does not indicate the assumptions
(such as fixing, rather than estimating, the covariance of TSupervises and TDevelops variables) made in determining
the appropriate degrees of freedom. Nor can these assumptions be deduced by repeatedly running the LISREL model
with the data provided since the variance of the SCognGain variable is not reported. Finally, since correlations are
reported, rather than covariances, it is impossible to deduce the variance of SCognGain from the data provided.
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Paying attention, acting collaboratively, and role-playing are the mechanisms that explain cogni-
tive growth. Assuming the validity of Ben-Ari’s interpretation of Vygotsky, Piaget, and Bandura,
children tend to act in these ways (ceteris paribus) unless they are delayed or prevented from doing
so by supervisory teacher behaviors.
If supervisory teacher behaviors inhibit the tendency of students to act in ways that promote
cognitive gain, as suggested by the LISREL model, this must be explained.15 The level of inter-
action amongst students is tied to teacher behavior by expectation states theory, which posits that
lower status members (in this case, students) of a small, task-oriented, group tend to defer to, and
participate less, than high status members (in this case, the teacher) [168].16 Since expectation
states theory has been shown to hold in experimental, more closed, situations, it is reasonable (on
critical realist grounds) to assume that the mechanisms involved are active, though not necessar-
ily determinative, in open systems. Hence, the negative, but mediated, effect of TSupervises on
SCognGain is, in principle, explained by the operation of a mechanism identified by expectation
states theory: that is, the status organizing process [21].
Recapitulating, we have a set of mechanisms that are hypothesized to generate socio-cognitive
events, some of which are registered in classroom observation and standardized testing. If the
predictions offered by Ben-Ari are or were confirmed, this would seem to provide (indirect) confir-
mation of the theory of Complex Instruction (and the mechanisms it specifies, as described above).
Yet, the LISREL model does not itself explicitly represent these mechanisms. Rather, it represents
the causal effects expected if the hypothesized mechanisms are active and if their operations are
not canceled out by the simultaneous operation of other mechanisms.
Ben-Ari has a mechanism-based special theory of Complex Instruction and a statistical model
that seems to be based on that theory. Even though the statistical model presupposes a set of
mechanisms and is, therefore, stronger than one which lacks such a basis, it is insufficient in an ex-
planatory sense. A statistical model consists of variables and statistical associations between them
and so does not explicitly represent mechanisms, at least not in any of the senses of mechanism
indicated by Machamer and colleagues.17 The model offered by Ben-Ari inadequately realizes the
15Of course, this is a first approximation: student behavior perceived to be unproductive may cause teacher super-
visory behavior. This would require a more complex model based on more sophisticated coding scheme.
16Although the teacher is in several senses an outsider with respect to a small group of students, from the standpoint
of expectation states theory, the teacher and the students together constitute a small, task-oriented, group.
17For Pearl [147], each mechanism is specified as a single functional relationship and a causal model consists of a
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special theory of Complex Construction that it presupposes.
What does it mean for a model M to realize a theory T? If T involves objects and relations
among them, M is more-or-less adequate to the extent that model objects [65] map to theoretical
objects and model relations map in some explicit way to theoretical relations. Although it is not
necessary that the relation between theory and model be one of identity, thereby allowing for
abstraction, it is essential that a model M explicitly represent key theoretical objects and some
subset of the theoretical relations among them. To the extent that a model M does not do so, the
connection between M and theory T is arbitrary, so that M inadequately realizes the explanatory
potential of T .
Put otherwise, a statistical model does not itself tell a causal story. Variables record events and
make it possible to estimate causal effects. Events cannot explain the mechanisms that generate
them, although the occurrence of a given event is only consistent with a restricted set of mecha-
nisms. At best, events lead to the creation of data that can be woven into a causal story based on a
theorized set of mechanisms [119].18
As with McDermott, I have constructed the simplified mechanism shown in Figure 4.3. Here
the activities involved are Behaviors, where teacher Behavior produces student Behavior, student
Behavior produces a CognitiveScore, again with the teacher as the chief agent. These Behaviors
jointly produce path coefficients. This mechanism highlights Behaviors rather than Positions and
assumes that all causal effects are captured in path coefficients.
4.6 A QUALITATIVE-QUANTITATIVE MECHANISM
Ben-Ari’s quantitative study highlights Behavior; McDermott’s qualitative study highlights Po-
sitions. Figure 4.4 incorporates the mechanisms shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.3, distinguishing
set of probabilistic (or deterministic) equations and a directed graph. With the restriction that each variable appears
on the left-hand side of only one equation, and further restrictions derived from the graph, each such equation is
designated by Pearl as a mechanism. The relationship between mechanisms as understood by Pearl and Machamer
and colleagues requires additional study.
18This raises the question, “Can variables ever record (or represent more directly) the processes that generate the
events the variables record?” It seems that the distinction between variables and mechanisms is fundamental: put
philosophically, variables are epistemic entities, whereas mechanisms are ontological entities. It seems that processes
are either mechanisms or ensembles of mechanisms, which implies that variables cannot explain the processes which,
assuming the premise offered in the question, generate the events that the variables record.
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Primary entities (Behaviors): A” = TBehavior, B” = SBehavior
Secondary entities (Measurements):
C” = CognitiveScore
PA′′B′′ = path coefficient linking A” and B”
PB′′C′′ = path coefficient linking B” and C”
A′′ −−−→ PA′′B′′x
B′′ −−−→ C′′x y
A′′ −−−→ PA′′C′′
Figure 4.3: A reconstruction of Ben-Ari’s account
between: Persons; the Positions they occupy; the Behaviors in which Persons engage when occu-
pying a Position; and Measurements made on the basis of the Behavior of Persons when occupying
a Position. I now identify Figures 4.1 and 4.3 within Figure 4.4.
Recall that the (McDermott) mechanism depicted in Figure 4.1 emphasizes activities that pro-
duce entities of type Position, namely Student, that tend to “bring off” their performances through
certain kinds of Behavior [118]. It is incorporated by means of the path from A′→ B′→ B′′→C′′,
thereby including a Behavior element missing from the McDermott mechanism. The (Ben-Ari)
mechanism depicted in Figure 4.3 emphasizes that one type of Behavior (TBehavior) produces
another type of Behavior (SBehavior), which in turn produces a Measurement. It also appears in
Figure 4.4.
In Figure 4.4, however, Behaviors are produced by Persons who occupy Positions. Moreover,
the kind of Behavior produced by an occupant of the Student Position is strongly shaped by the kind
of Behavior produced by an occupant of the Teacher Position. Hence, by incorporating Persons and
Positions, it becomes possible to account for both terminal and intermediate Behaviors in terms of
social mechanisms.
Figure 4.4 is meant to depict the mechanism by which the Behavior of interest to quantitative-
only researchers is produced by the intentional and unintentional [87] Behaviors of Persons by
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Primary entities (Persons): A = Person, B = Person
Secondary entities (Positions): A’ = Teacher, B’ = Student
Tertiary entities (Behaviors): A” = TBehavior, B” = SBehavior
Quaternary entities (Measurements):
C” = CognitiveScore
PA′′B′′ = path coefficient linking A” and B”
PB′′C′′ = path coefficient linking B” and C”
A′′ −−−→ PA′′B′′x .
B −−−→ B′ −−−→ B′′ −−−→ C′′x x y
A −−−→ A′ −−−→ A′′ −−−→ PA′′C′′
Figure 4.4: An integrative mechanism
virtue of their occupancy of a Position. It is in their capacity as occupants of Positions that Persons
generate Behaviors which can be correlated with various properties. Though this mechanism is
still much too simple and unidirectional, it does suggest a series of activities that could in principle
be simulated to show how one type of entity relevant to the effects of classroom communication
produces another.
4.7 WHAT IS SIMULATION?
According to the New Oxford American Dictionary (2001), to simulate is “to imitate the appear-
ance or character of”. By this definition, a weather prediction might be taken as an imitation of
the character of upcoming weather. Another way to think of simulation is in terms of the sort of
problem to which it may offer a solution.
Although it is may be inappropriate to describe every problem in terms of inputs, outputs,
and the models that transform inputs to outputs, it is helpful to use such language to distinguish
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problems involving simulation from those involving optimization and system identification. When
inputs and outputs are known, but the model connecting them is not, we have a system identifica-
tion problem. In optimization problems, the (desired) outputs and the model are known, but the
inputs needed to obtain the outputs are unknown. In simulation problems, the inputs and model
are known: the task is to compute the outputs that correspond to the inputs.[61, p. 9].
In this study, the inputs are based on: (1) a set of parameters that govern the behavior of
the model; (2) a dataset previously collected by others, and (3) a range of status distributions. The
model, which is based on the status and task participation model developed by Skvoretz and Fararo
[168], is specified using a computer program that produces outputs from inputs. The outputs of
primary interest represent collective decisions made by Family Support Teams, each composed of
five persons belonging to distinct educational professions, who meet to deliberate regarding the
truth of a proposition A(c) that pertains to a particular child c.
4.8 A JUSTIFICATION FOR SIMULATION
Those who do simulations and write about simulation seldom offer a justification for its use. Those
who do, generally justify simulation on pragmatic grounds: it makes artificial experiments possible
in situations where actual experiments cannot, or should not, be carried out. Simulation is then,
in this view, simply another tool for conducting (albeit artificial) empirical research. Such authors
understandably focus on “the practical and methodological issues of how to do simulation” and
leave the philosophizing to others.
Some social system simulators have gone so far as to claim that social system simulation offers
the possibility of research free from presuppositions, since simulation requires that many presup-
positions be made explicit [57]. Although simulation does provide a linguistic and computational
vehicle for the formulation and development of sociological theory, the idea that simulation offers
the possibility of a kind of empirical rock-bottom upon which to develop theory seems quite naive
and redolent of the unfulfilled (and indeed unsatisfiable) aims of logical positivism. Simulation
offers social and educational theoreticians and researchers the ability to express their views in a
formal language perhaps better suited to tracing the consequences of the essential recursiveness of
social life [86, 69].
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For a critical realist, to explain a phenomena is to specify the mechanisms that generate it.
Although, to those in the qualitative-only camp, simulation modeling and statistical modeling are
two peas from the same positivist pod, finer distinctions are possible.
We would expect a simulation model to include explicit representations of the processes which are
thought to be at work in the social world. In contrast, a statistical model will reproduce the pattern
of correlations among measured variables, but rarely will it be modeling the mechanisms which
underlie these relationships. [88, p. 17]
This distinction between statistical modeling and simulation modeling turns, then, on the concept
of mechanism.19 Because computational simulation affords the possibility of layered models,
where each layer corresponds to a layer of reality, simulation offers the possibility of modeling
such mechanisms.20
4.9 CONCLUSION
Simulation can be used on the basis of empiricist as well as social realist ontology. As conceived
here, simulation is a mixed-method approach in that it provides a framework for integrating quanti-
tative and qualitative methods and results. This synthesis is possible on the basis of an ontological
distinction between Persons, Positions, and Behaviors derived from the Realist Social Theory of
Archer. I now consider the first of two analytical components of what Archer terms the Socio-
Cultural system: namely, the Cultural System.
19One sociologist complains that most researchers have confused statistical models with theory [173].
20Hierarchical linear models represent a different, but similar, approach to representing multi-level causation.[34]
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5.0 CULTURAL SYSTEMS
5.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The social flux in which we live and act is termed by Archer the Socio-Cultural System (SC) [6].
My objective in this chapter is to describe one of the analytical components of the SC: namely, the
Cultural System (CS). The other component, the Social System (SS), and the SC are themselves
the focus of the following two chapters. I regard professional knowledge as a species of belief that
professionals can draw upon and add to in the course of inter-professional competition.
5.2 CONCEPTS OF CULTURE
According to Archer, a SC is to be understood in terms of the history of interaction between a SS
(of positions) and a CS (of propositions). In order to take the reporting behavior of professionals
as expressions of beliefs that are (often) constitutive of their professional cultures, I focus on the
records generated by such professionals. In order to analyze the role of such records, I introduce
something like the Archive of Foucault as an intermediary between an CS and an SC as shown in
Figure 5.1.
Popper distinguishes what he terms three worlds: the (physical) world of physical events; the
(“subjective”) world of mental events such as beliefs; and the (“objective”) world of logical propo-
sitions and their relations [151]. Although the subjective world presupposes the physical world,
mental events belong to a different ontological order than physical events. Logical propositions
may refer to mental or physical events, but logical propositions are deemed by Popper to belong
to a different ontological order than the events to which they (sometimes) refer since only two or
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more propositions can in the strict sense be said to be logically consistent or inconsistent.1
Archer the sociologist appropriates the broader distinctions made by Popper, tailoring them for
a realist social theory to contend with structuration theory. What is the the subjective world for
the philosopher becomes the Socio-Cultural System for the social theorist. What Popper terms the
objective world, Archer terms the Cultural System. Having no need to take account of the physical
world, Archer focuses instead on the Social System.
Archer agrees with Popper that belief is an element in the subjective world: that is, it consists
of “a state of mind or of consciousness or a disposition to behave or react” [151, p. 108]. The
content of a belief is, for Archer, a proposition. Propositions are, in this view, the objective content
of thought. For Archer, the Cultural System contains, among other entities, those propositions that
are presupposed by the books of libraries (or perhaps WWW archives).
5.2.1 Analyzing cultural systems
Conceptual analysis, it is said, yields “an ontology for a possible world - a catalog of everything
that makes up that world, how it’s put together, and how it works” [174, p. 294]. One method for
extracting the ontology that supports the cultural system under study is componential analysis of
a set of terms, a technique first popularized by cognitive anthropologists [75, 189]. The resulting
network of descriptions is intended to enable an ethnographer to classify a relatively indeterminate
object or event as it would be classified by a ‘native’ user of the cultural system under study
[135, 140]. It is a commonplace of cultural anthropology that the same terms often have different
meaning in different cultural systems.
The Australian anthropologist Keesing takes culture to be each individual’s
. . . theory about what his[/her] fellows know, believe, and mean. Culture is then an idealized body
of competence differentially distributed in a population, yet partially realized in the minds of indi-
viduals, [110, p. 58]
an “ideational subsystem” within a system that is at once biological, social, and symbolic [110, p.
63]. Keesing’s concept of culture detaches culture from practice and artifact, instead viewing it as
the organization of those practices and artifacts.
I assume, contrary to fact, that professionals of a given type have a the following theory about
1Habermas partially roots his Theory of Communicative Action in Popper’s tripartite ontology.
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what his/her fellow professionals know, believe, and mean: “they know, believe, and mean what I
know, believe, and mean.” Based on their professional socialization, each actor a of a given occu-
pational type (e.g., Teacher, Principal, Nurse, Social Worker, Counselor) has the same knowledge,
the same beliefs, and the same meanings as their fellows when entertaining a proposition that falls
within the scope of their professional interests and activities. Cognitively speaking, professional
birds of a feather flock together.2
5.2.2 Beliefs
Another simplification is to regard knowledge as a kind of belief and to take the meaning of an
expression of belief as the propositional content of that belief. Suppose that A(c) symbolizes the
following proposition: The child described by case cmay have been physically abused by one of its
natural parents. Then, ignoring the difficulties of translating ordinary language into logical form,
¬A(c) symbolizes the following proposition: The child described by case c was not physically
abused by one of its natural parents.
Suppose actor a believes that A(c) and actor d believes that ¬A(c): these beliefs can (ignoring
time) be symbolized, respectively, by Ba(c) = 1 and Bd(c) = 0. Ba(c) and Bd(c), also termed
propositional attitudes, are events of the subjective world and thus reside (at least analytically)
in the Socio-Cultural System. The propositional content of Ba(c) is A(c) and the propositional
content of Bd(c) is ¬A(c).
In considering the relationships between Ba(c) = 1 and Bd(c) = 0, one might ask: (1) what
caused the occurrence of each, and (2) what is the logical relationship between A(c) and ¬A(c)?
Competing causal explanations of Ba(c) = 1 and Bd(c) = 0, in their status as subjective events,
may be grounded in differing social, economic, psychological, communicative, or other histories.
It is a matter of supreme epistemic importance to construct such explanations, yet, whatever causal
explanations are advanced for Ba(c) = 1 and Bd(c) = 0, a fundamental distinction between them
2The reason for this over-simplification is one of necessity. The model that provides the capstone of this dissertation
pertains to a set of N = 111 distinct collective decisions made by five education professionals deliberating in a Family
Support Team meeting regarding the truth of the proposition A(c). The very small-scale ethnographic study described
in Chapter 8 required over 100 hours of observation and several hundred more hours of analysis and writing. Even if
it were feasible to construct an ethnographic decision model for each type of educational professional, individualizing
such models would probably not be.
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remains: each belief presupposes the logically inconsistent propositions A(c) and ¬A(c).3 Even if,
in the course of social-cultural interaction, actors a and d reverse position, so that Ba(c) = 0 and
Bd(c) = 1, the propositional contents of those beliefs remain inconsistent.4
Suppose, more generally, that 0≤ Ba(c)≤ 1, reflecting the fact that our beliefs regarding a
proposition often lack the element of subjective certainty. In this case, one can be regarded as
either leaning toward A(c) or ¬A(c) or neutral regarding A(c) (and, therefore, ¬A(c)). In either
case, the propositional content of Ba(c) (Bd(c)) remains A(c) (¬A(c)), so that the analysis in the
previous paragraph is applicable.
5.2.3 Statements
Archer’s analysis does not distinguish between propositions and the texts or other forms of expres-
sion that presuppose them. To distinguish between the objective, propositional, content of belief
and the linguistic or other vehicles by which belief is expressed I invoke something like what Fou-
cault terms the Archive. For Foucault, statements are what can be stated (verbally or in writing)
in a given society at a given time and are thus distinct from propositions [74]. The Archive that
I imagine consists of utterances and texts, the latter more or less permanently recording the oc-
currence and consequences of particular kinds of subjective events: namely, beliefs. Since beliefs
presuppose propositional contents, so too do the statements of the Archive.
The Archive contains, among other things, the records generated in bureaucracies such as
schools. The Archive is conceived as a finite, but indefinite and growing, store of texts. Individuals
and groups may draw upon the Archive, and add to it, as they attempt in Socio-Cultural System
interaction to advance or protect their ideal and material interests.5 Of course, their ability to do so
depends on their position within the Social System.
Since belief presupposes a propositional content, the Cultural System both enables and con-
strains the expression of belief. I assume that in deliberative settings relatively free from strategic
interaction [92, 76], a belief is more likely to be expressed if it has as its content a proposition re-
3Two propositions P and Q are logically inconsistent if both cannot be true and both cannot be false.
4In Chapter 10, I represent belief as a graded phenomena: that is, 0≤ Ba(c)≤ 1.
5For Archer, ideal interests are those beliefs that provide justification for the acquisition or retention of material
interests.
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garded as true than if that proposition is regarded as false.6 Since texts are statements that more or
less permanently record the occurrence and consequences of belief, the Cultural System likewise
constrains and enables the creation of statements. Thus, statements exert a causal effect insofar as
they constrain and enable belief, and, with it, social action.
A statement may function, as Archer suggests in regards to propositions, like the Rosetta stone:
the meanings associated with it may increase or decrease over time. In the case of a bureaucracy,
such as a school, a statement such as a student permanent record may record the beliefs of a
variety of actors. Of course, a statement is subject to interpretation which is, for some, a process
of imaginatively reconstructing the relevant beliefs of the actor(s) that authored the statement.
Since a belief without propositional content is not a belief, reconstructing a belief means ac-
cessing the propositional content of that belief. The existence of a statement presupposes some set
of beliefs of the form Ba(c) = 1, where A(c) is the propositional content of Ba(c). If that statement
(such as the United States Constitution or The Communist Manifesto) conditions SC interaction,
then so too does the propositional content of the belief.
As noted earlier, individuals in the Social System draw upon the Archive (and, thereby, the
Cultural System) to advance their ideal and material interests. Individuals occupying positions of
higher rank in the Social System have a relatively greater chance of having their statements enter
the Archive. Individuals who subsequently have permission to read the Archive thereby acquire
the potential to access the propositional content of the statements in it. Entering a statement in
the Archive bestows upon its propositional content the relatively autonomous (Popperian, even
Durkheimian) existence [6] by virtue of which it can logically constrain and logically enable the
thought and action of those who subsequently access that propositional content.
I do not address the general question of when and how statements enter the Archive. Rather,
it is restricted to considering the relationship between: (1) a particular statement (dossier(c)) that
records information concerning a child c which is considered relevant to the determination of A(c)
and; (2) the collective decision of a group of school professionals regarding A(c). Based on the
collective decision regarding A(c), dossier(c) is then updated. Having taken culture as a belief
system, I now consider the ideological character of culture.
6One test of this assumption can be put in form of an assertion: It is possible to believe a proposition that one takes
to be false.
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5.3 CULTURE AS IDEOLOGY
5.3.1 The ruling ideas
For Marx,
[t]he individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and there-
fore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class, it is self-evident that they . . . rule as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age . . . . [62,
p. 302]
Although the economic power formerly wielded by individual capitalist owners is now exercised
by corporate entities, it still seems clear that, for good or ill,
insofar as they rule as a class and . . . [help] regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of
their age, their ideas are [major components of] the ruling ideas of the epoch. [62, p. 302]
Ruling ideas are those beliefs that articulate the interests of the ruling class in the language of
classless universality [62, p. 302]. Who articulates the ruling ideas? For Marx, this is done by
the thinkers of this [ruling] class (its active, conceptive, ideologists), who make the formation of
the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood. [62, p. 302, emphasis added]
In the language of Habermas, Marx lived during a period of “liberal capitalism” in contrast with the
“advanced capitalism” more characteristic of the present, at least in the United States. Members
of the ruling class were largely bourgeois; bourgeois intellectuals functioned as the thinkers of the
ruling class.
In the modern era of corporate capitalism, when the rulers are corporate entities rather than
individual persons, the legitimation services formerly rendered by intellectuals are now provided
by a particular species of intellectual: namely, the professional. It is, of course, no accident that, in
the modern era, corporations, government bureaucracies, and professions have co-evolved [17, 48,
200]. The results of this organizational and intellectual differentiation can be seen in, among other
places, large-scale public education systems. As a consequence, schools are often sites at which
professionals, as thinkers of the ruling classes, express competing, and sometimes ruling, ideas.7




In order to earn the rewards of service, professionalized or professionalizing coalitions of workers
must compete for the opportunities of service. Whether or not such coalitions of workers constitute
a class depends a good deal on how classes are defined. AlthoughMarx delineated but three classes,
he acknowledged the contradictory class status of the middle-class professions.
Exploitation is the concept most characteristic of Marxist social theory [126, pp. 58-84].
Wright adopts Roemer’s reformulation of exploitation and defines a typology of class locations that
reflects the distribution of assets in the means of production [126, p. 138]. Wright distinguishes,
first, between owners and non-owners of the means of production, mirroring the class locations
identified by Marx. Wright further distinguishes non-owners by the amount of skill/credential as-
sets and organizational assets that they control by virtue of occupying a particular class position
[126, p. 139].
As shown in Table 5.1 (where the symbols E,S, and U designate, respectively, expert, semi-
skilled or semi-credentialed, and un-skilled or un-credentialed workers), this cross-classification
generates a typology with nine distinct class locations that, Wright acknowledges, looks neo-
Weberian but is Marxist by virtue of its basis in the concept of exploitation. This typology helps
us to analyze intra-professional competition because it suggests the differential distribution of
skill/credential and organizational assets that enable and constrain the actors that occupy positions
within each class-location. For Wright, “class consciousness refers to all class-pertinent beliefs,
regardless of how these correspond to class interests” [126, p. 149, emphasis added].
5.3.3 Ideology
I assume that beliefs formed in an occupational setting concerning a matter of occupational rel-
evance are class-pertinent. This assumption opens the way for a consideration of the ideological
character of culture, specifically belief, in relation to the class-locations identified by Wright. Ide-
ology critique, of course, is nothing new, and perhaps has its most trenchant form in the The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Marx.
Mannheim subsequently sought to subject Marxism itself to ideology critique based not on
class location but on social groupings. For him, the sociology of knowledge is the study of how
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“social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the
former concretely determine the latter” [122, p. 239]. Unfortunately, a lack of specificity regarding
the phrases ‘social structures’ and ‘structure of assertions’ prevented Mannheim from describing
mechanisms to account for how social structures determine the structure of assertions. In a double
irony, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge implies that all belief systems are ideological, includ-
ing (as acknowledged by Mannheim) the sociology of knowledge itself.
The neo-Weberian Abbott describes the system of the professions as an evolving system of
competing occupations. In the typology of Wright, we might term the system of the professions as
an evolving system of competing middle-class locations. For Abbott, the professions compete for
jurisdiction on the basis of “different exclusionary schemes in diagnosis, inference, and treatment”
[1]. Such exclusionary schemes express the propositional content of professional belief systems.
While rejecting the group as a sufficient basis for ideological analysis, I accept as a premise for
this study that all belief systems are ideological the sense that they constrain and enable cognition
and, thereby, social action. In particular, the exclusionary schemes of the professions both constrain
and enable their members. Of course, social theorists have argued bitterly over the degree to
which ideologies constrain social action. For example, the dominant ideology thesis highlights the
coercive aspect of ideology. According to its critics, the dominant ideology thesis is that ideology
“does successfully incorporate subordinate classes by the process of disguising their real condition
or by misleading them” [2, pp. 187-190]. Unfortunately, ideology analyses often reify social
processes rather than identify the potential mechanisms that might animate such processes. This
study attempts to identify the potential mechanisms by which inter-professional variation in belief
is associated with variation in social outcomes.
5.4 CONCLUSION
Since professionals can draw upon and add to what I term the Archive in the course of inter-
professional competition, I focus on the Archive of statements rather than the propositions of the
Cultural System that these statements presuppose. I next consider the second analytical component













Figure 5.1: Relations involving aCS, SS, SC and Archive
Table 5.1: A class-based typology of assets
Occupation Skill/Credential Organizational
+ > 0 -
Manager E S U H
Supervisor E S U M
Worker E S U L
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6.0 SOCIAL SYSTEMS
6.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The objective of this chapter is to show that, by thinking of an expectation in terms of an expecta-
tion state, and social structure (properly understood) in terms of networks of social relations it is
possible to model the interplay of agency and structure. By so interpreting agency and structure,
it will be possible to embed a particular theoretical disagreement between Archer and Giddens in
the model of status and task participation. Such a model can be used to determine whether, in a
simulated world, the theoretical disagreement yields outcomes that systematically differ.
6.2 INTRODUCTION
Rist and other qualitative researchers have ascribed causal efficacy to expectations without spelling
out the theoretical nature of expectation [63]. Expectation states theory (hereafter designated as
EST ) is a theory, it is said, by virtue of its abstract, logical, structure [40]. EST provides a formal,
abstract, definition of expectation and other concepts. Using these concepts, it expresses certain
axioms from which other propositions are derivable as consequences. I believe it is possible to
model the interplay of agency and structure along the lines shown in Figure 6.1.
As suggested by Figure 6.1, the task-relevant communicative acts of persons are constrained
and enabled by expectations states which, in turn, are constrained and enabled by the social struc-
ture of the task group.1
1As discussed below, performance expectations are formed in two ways: on the basis of task-external status (if
salient) or on the basis of behaviors. A link from Communicative Acts to Expectation States is not shown because the
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Figure 6.1: The mediated interplay of agency and structure
A cautionary note is in order. The arrows shown in Figure 6.1 can be said to be “productive”
in the sense that, as modeled, social patterns generate expectation states, which generate commu-
nicative acts, which generate social relations (and, therefore, social patterns) and so on. To say that
the arrows are “causal” would, however, require a discussion of causality that is beyond the scope
of this dissertation.
Although Figure 6.1 does not explicitly represent the social relations in which the actors par-
ticipate outside the task-oriented group, such relations are partly taken into account via expectation
states. In addition, although social relations might be established on the basis of acts which are
not intended as communicative, such acts are not considered since it is assumed that the acts of
primary importance in a task-oriented group are those involving task-relevant communication.
6.3 EXPECTATION STATES THEORY
EST is an axiomatic theory, with both primitive (that is, undefined) and defined terms. EST
assumes a set of actors who share a preferred task outcome, a standard for evaluating whether a
behavior will lead to task success, and a commitment to the completion of the group task [19, 20].
Although EST pertains only to situations that meet these conditions, it is intended to apply to the
ordinary sense of expectation as subjective feeling [40].2
2As noted in Chapter 4, research on Complex Instruction suggests that expectation-as-state does indeed shed light
on expectation-as-feeling.
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My description of EST draws heavily on a particular prior exposition [131] for two reasons.
First, Meeker’s discussion is more accessible, being addressed to undergraduates, than the math-
ematically complex and formal expositions of EST given by Fararo, Skvoretz, and other mathe-
matical sociologists [168]. Second, the link between expectation and belief made by Meeker is
suppressed in the work of Fararo and Skvoretz. Because this study relies heavily on both belief
and expectation, I attempt to highlight the earlier link between expectation and belief.
It is assumed that group members share “beliefs about the existence and characteristics of phys-
ical and social objects” and “about the nature of cause and effect” [131]. Clearly, this assumption
may or may not hold, or hold to a greater or lesser degree, in any specific situation. The existence
of a set of shared beliefs thus constitutes a scope condition for expectation states theory that limits
the number of situations to which it is applicable, and thus subject to possible disconfirmation.
In addition, members of a social group often act consistently with particular sets of “statements
about what is desirable [i.e., goals] and how to evaluate what is happening [i.e., values]” [131, p.
99]. Consider, for example, a discussion group or committee focused on a complex topic such as a
human relations: it is sometimes the case that
these groups have a set of beliefs about ‘human nature’ and the organization of work and family
that allow the participants to interpret the ‘facts’ in the human relations case. [131, p. 99]
Of course, not all such groups exhibit consensus regarding goals and values: EST is not applicable
to these groups.
It seems reasonable to suppose that if group members share a goal, then they are more likely
to agree on what constitutes task success and failure. It also seems reasonable, though hardly
universal, that group members regulate their behavior in order to achieve success. Shared goals and
beliefs concerning cause and effect, even if contrary to fact, generate “valued behavior standards,
. . . the standards by which group members assess how likely an act is to lead to success” [131, p.
100].
6.3.1 Basic Concepts
The basic concepts of EST designate the primitive elements of the theory. These are: “actor”
(who, in this context, is a group member); “task” (something actors work on that can have future
states identified with “success” or “failure”); actor “behavior” (of which “communicative act” is
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a special case); and “valued behavior standard”. EST involves additional concepts that refer to
behaviors (which are regarded as observable), outcomes of behavior, and most importantly, mental
states (which are regarded as unobservable) [131, p. 102].
6.3.1.1 Behaviors. The following three concepts refer to behaviors: “action opportunities”,
“performance outputs”, and “positive/negative reactions”. An action opportunity is “any chance to
perform granted by one group member to another, including verbal acts . . . and nonverbal acts such
as questioning looks and momentary silences”.3 Any task-relevant behavior that can be regarded
as an attempt to contribute to task success is a performance output. Positive/negative reactions are
expressions of approval or disapproval in response to performance outputs, presumably according
to valued behavior standards. Consider the following example.
Suppose, first, that a task-group (termed a Family Support Team) consisting of a Counselor,
a Teacher, a Principal, a school Social Worker, and a school Nurse are meeting to address the
behavioral problems of a particular student. Suppose that at time t1, the Counselor contributes
a performance output (perhaps by attributing the source of the problem to the child’s will) and
at time t2 the Social Worker also contributes a performance output (perhaps by attributing the
problem to possible physical abuse). At least on the face of it, these performance outputs conflict,
so it is natural to describe their relation as one of disagreement. If this disagreement is resolved
by the Counselor accepting the judgment of the Social Worker at time t3, in the absence of any
intervening performance outputs by other members, then the latter is said to have influenced, but
not controlled, the former.
6.3.1.2 Mental states. The two concepts that refer to unobservable (or, at least, infrequently
observed) mental states are “performance expectation” and “performance expectation state”. The
former is a mental state that, if it exists, links one actor to a task outcome. It says nothing about the
relative performance of the actors in the group. The latter is a mental state that, if it exists, relates
two actors on the basis of their respective performance expectations. Performance expectations are
the building blocks that compose performance expectation states.
3Whether granting is an act that is voluntary or involuntary requires a consideration of the nature of influence,
control, and power that is beyond the scope of this study, but one that has been studied by sociologists such as
Goffman.
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A performance expectation is a prediction about the quality of a future performance output by
a member of the group, which can be self as well as other.4 If it is predicted that the behavior will
lead to task success, then the performance expectation is designated as HI; if it is predicted that
the behavior will lead to task failure, then the performance expectation is designated as LO; if no
prediction is made, then the performance expectation is undefined.
A performance expectation state is a relation between two performance expectations. If a
“believes” (consciously or otherwise) that his/her performance output will lead to task success and
d’s performance output will lead to task failure, then a’s performance expectation state with respect
to d is denoted [HI,LO]. If a “believes” that his/her performance output will lead to task failure
and d’s performance output will lead to task success, then a’s performance expectation state with
respect to d is [LO,HI]. In this study it is assumed that if a is in performance expectation state
[HI,LO] with respect to actor d, then actor d is in performance expectation state [LO,HI] with
respect to actor a. Although the assumption of symmetric performance expectation states is not
required by EST , I assume symmetry.5 The assumption of symmetric performance expectation
states implies that any pair of actors agree about the relative quality (as discretized via the values
HI and LO) of their expected performance outputs.
Field studies [199] and analytical studies [102] have documented the seemingly inevitable
emergence of a power and prestige order in groups of initial status equals. Some actors initiate
more action for the group, exert more influence, and make decisions that are binding for the group.6
The key mechanism involved such emergence is what EST theorists term a “full fundamental
sequence of interaction . . . composed of” [131, p. 104]:
action opportunity→ performance output→ reaction.
Since performance expectation states are based upon predictions about the quality (or effective-
ness) of future performance outputs, performance expectation states must exist (if at all) prior
to relevant performance outputs. I illustrate the full fundamental sequence of interaction in the
4A performance expectation is a primitive concept: whether or not a performance expectation takes into account
the possible contingency of a future performance output upon the behavior of others is not addressed.
5The chief reasons for assuming complementarity are: (1) it simplifies the analysis and exposition, and; (2) it
is better than the assumption of asymmetry for explaining behaviors of deference and dominance that appear to be
routinized.
6Although it is important to consider what kinds of actors do more work, both before and after group meetings,
EST has not addressed this aspect of inequality.
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following example, where the group considered is simply a dyad.
Note that the following analysis is actor-centric: it depicts a sequence from the point of view
of one actor a. Suppose that School Principal a views school Social Worker d as less adept at
“correctly” categorizing parental behavior as an instance of either physical abuse or corporal pun-
ishment, so that the expectation state of a with respect to a Social Worker d is [HI,LO]. By sym-
metry, the expectation state of d with respect to a is [LO,HI]. As depicted in Figure 6.2, suppose
also that a takes an action opportunity to address d (as denoted by aAd). A second unobservable
mental state, called a unit evaluation (as denoted by ue), now enters the picture: namely, the d’s
evaluation of the quality (+ or−) of a’s performance output immediately after it has occurred. It is
assumed that d’s unobservable positive unit evaluation of a’s performance output is followed by d’s
observable + reaction; likewise, an unobservable negative unit evaluation is assumed to produce a
− reaction.7 In turn, the expectation state of the actor who receives a unit evaluation may change
depending on whether the actor accepts or rejects the influence of the evaluator. In this example,
if d receives a negative unit evaluation and negative reaction to a’s performance output, a may
change his/her unit evaluation of self from positive to negative. If a’s initial self unit evaluation
is positive and that unit evaluation changes to negative in response to d’s negative reaction, then a
is said to have accepted d’s influence. As a result, actor a moves from the initial performance ex-
pectation state [HI,LO] to [LO,LO] in relation to actor d. In short, an actor’s expectation state can
change. The fundamental sequence of interaction is assumed to be cyclic: a reaction may produce
a change in expectation state, which in turn affects action opportunities, performance outputs, and
unit evaluations. The fundamental sequence of interaction (adapted from [131, p. 104]) has some
advantages and disadvantages as an expository vehicle. Simplicity and faithfulness to intuition
is certainly an initial advantage. On the other hand, the sequence does not itself offer a mecha-
nism that describes why one actor accepts or rejects the influence of another. This disadvantage
is addressed via more complex models constructed on the basis of E-state structuralism, itself an
extension of EST , described below.
7Personality research is bedeviled by the fact that individual attitudes are very weak predictors of behavior. One
explanation for this phenomena is that attitudes are general. In this instance, however, it is assumed that outputs are
assessed in terms of a shared valued behavior standard which is, by hypothesis, task-specific.
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[HI,LO]
a keeps + ue
− reaction




+ ue by d
− ue by d
Figure 6.2: The fundamental sequence of interaction
6.3.2 Scope conditions
Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism would not (one hopes) be considered falsified if it were
used to predict economic behavior and the predicted behaviors were not (even approximately)
observed. This is because each theory has, at least implicitly, a set of scope conditions that limit
the circumstances for which it is applicable, let alone predictive. EST is applicable to groups
that satisfy the following four scope conditions: (1) the group is small enough for face-to-face
interaction; (2) the group convenes in order to accomplish a shared goal; (3) there are shared
standards for task success and failure, and (4) group members must “consider it both necessary
and proper to take each other’s contributions into account” [10, p. 123].8 These conditions restrict
the applicability, and hence the falsifiability, of EST .
The simulation component of this study focuses on decisions made by Family Support Teams.
Typically, a Family Support Team (FST ), consists of five education professionals who jointly
decide whether an elementary school student has been potentially physically abused by a parent.
Since the FST members meet face-to-face, an FST meeting satisfies the first scope condition
8The reader may wonder whether a contribution by an actor whose expectation state is [LO,HI] would be taken into
account. The fundamental sequence of interaction claims only that if the actor takes the action opportunity to address
another actor, that performance output will be met by a positive or negative reaction. The fundamental sequence does
not indicate which kind of reaction it will be.
66
noted in the previous paragraph. It is assumed that the team meets to determine whether to report
a possible instance of physical abuse, so the second condition is satisfied.9 I assume that group
members share the following minimal definition of task success. FST decisions are not followed
by either: (1) the death or obvious physical injury of the student or (2) parental retaliation against
any member of the Team. Finally, the ideology of inter-professional cooperation [1] suggests that
FST meetings satisfy the fourth scope condition.
What are the implications of a FST meeting not satisfying one or more of the scope conditions
of Balkwell? That is a question which, to my knowledge, EST researchers have not addressed.
These researchers concede that the scope conditions are not precise: a fair amount of experimental
work has been done to make them more precise. In the main, EST theorists have focused on identi-
fying conditions which, in their view, allows them to design social-psychological experiments that
satisfy the scope conditions and thus make it possible to explain the results obtained.
It is useful to distinguish between whether a condition is completely satisfied, approximately
satisfied, or completely unsatisfied. Complete satisfaction and complete dissatisfaction are taken
as logical opposites. In this scheme, to say that that a condition is approximately satisfied is to
mean that the condition is neither completely satisfied nor completely unsatisfied.
Suppose that at least one of the scope conditions of EST is completely unsatisfied. My analysis
of FST is built upon a theory which requires for its applicability that the scope conditions are at
least approximately satisfied: if this is not the case, then the results obtained from the analysis are
ungrounded theoretically and at best coincidentally relevant. Suppose now that at all of the scope
conditions are approximately satisfied. In order to assess the consequences of having only approx-
imately satisfied the scope conditions, one would need to formulate a new set of scope conditions
that “real” FST meetings would satisfy, either completely or approximately. One would then face
anew the question concerning the theoretical and pragmatic consequences of assuming that a “real”
FST meeting completely satisfy the new set of scope conditions. This line of argument, of course,
leads to regress. At some point, one must either: (1) give up or (2) assume that the scope conditions
of EST are at least approximately satisfied, use a model based on EST to derive consequences, and
assess the consistency of experimental or empirical observation with the outcomes of the analysis.
Since it is dubious whether the scope conditions of EST can be anything but approximately sat-
9This way of formulating the goal suppresses the importance of differing priorities.
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isfied by any “real” FST meeting, what are the pragmatic consequences of using analytical results
based on the assumption of complete satisfaction to formulate policy regarding the formation or
operation of such teams? This questions invites the construction of an even more complex model
in which degrees of approximate satisfaction are linked by policy-making processes to school prac-
tices that affect school professionals, school children and their families. In the absence of such a
model, one must advocate further efforts to refine the scope conditions and determine when they
are approximately satisfied. In short, any act of modeling, whether it be of simulation or ethnogra-
phy, runs the risk of “doing violence” to that which is being modeled.
6.4 STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY
The previous discussion of EST tacitly assumed that the actors are essentially status equals. EST
itself, however, makes no such assumption. In this section, I draw on Balkwell’s analysis to de-
scribe how Status Characteristics Theory, a branch of EST , handles status differences, thus laying
the groundwork for the more formal exposition required for E-state structuralism.
6.4.1 Representing the definition of the situation
Status Characteristics Theory (hereafter SCT ) assumes that task-external status information and
task-internal performance information affect the formation of social relations, and hierarchy, within
groups. A status characteristic is “any attribute possessed by members of a group whose culturally
specified meaning is such as to make it potentially relevant to performance at [or, on] the group’s
task” [10, p. 124]. Status characteristics can be diffuse or specific.
Age, gender, race, and ethnicity are designated as diffuse status characteristics because in many
societies, most people believe (or act as if they believe) them to be associated with differential
levels (and, perhaps, types) of performance across a broad range of tasks. On the other hand, the
ability to perform mathematical calculations is a specific status characteristic because it is believed
in many societies to have few (if any) implications for performance on non-mathematical tasks,
such as writing haiku poetry. Finally, the beliefs considered by SCT need not be true: it is assumed
that if persons believe something to be true, they act as if it is true, which increases the likelihood
68
that it will become true [180].
Recall that Meeker defines an expectation as “a prediction about the quality [LO or HI] of
a performance output produced by a group member”, so that an expectation state is “a set of
performance expectations for two (or more) persons relative to each other” [131, p. 103, emphasis
added]. This means that an actor may have a HI performance expectation for self, yet also have a
LO performance expectation in relation to another actor. Although representing expectation states
as a pair is helpful for exposition, it also means that expectation states of the actors in a group must
be enumerated and managed.
In a two-person group, there are four possible (defined) expectation states for each actor with
respect to the other actor: [LO,LO], [LO,HI], [HI,LO], and [HI,HI]. For two actors a and d,
there are two sets of expectation states: the first is associated with a’s view of d and the second is
associated d’s view of a. Hence, in a two-person group, there are a total of 2×1×4= 8 possible
expectation states.
In a three-person group, there are three sets of expectations states: one set for each actor a with
respect to each of the other two actors. This implies that one of 2× 4 = 8 expectation states are
possible for each actor a. Since there are three actors, there are a total of 3× 8 = 24 expectation
states. In general, for a group of n actors there are a total of n× (n− 1)× 4 possible expectation
states. For example: with n= 5, the total number of possible expectation states is 5×4×4 = 80;
with n= 6, the total number of possible expectation states is 6×5×4 = 120.
The definition of an expectation state can be generalized. The expectation state associated with
x, denoted e(x), is now represented as a continuous, signed, quantity.10 A positively valued e(a)
indicates that the actor is connected, in a social-psychological sense, to task success. A negatively
valued e(x) indicates that actor x is connected to task failure. Task success is denoted by T (+)
and task failure by T (−): these are simply states, not signed quantities. The magnitude of e(x)
indicates how strongly x is connected to one of T (+) or T (−).11 We can account for the possibility
that some group members have positive, while others have negative, expectations for x, by adding
positive and negative expectation states to yield the aggregate expectation state, denoted ae(x)
associated with x.
10A variable is: continuous, if it can take on every value in some interval; signed, if it is negative, zero, or positive.
11The calculation of expectation states as continuous, signed, quantities is described below.
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6.4.2 Postulates of the theory
SCT is based on four postulates concerning how status processes operate in small, task-oriented,
groups. First, the salience postulate asserts that any status characteristic which discriminates
among the members of a task group will tend to become a salient element in group interaction,
unless there is a cultural belief that the attribute is irrelevant to the particular task.12 Second, the
burden of proof postulate says that actors tend to structure a task-situation by linking salient charac-
teristics to the task outcomes, even if the characteristic is not initially linked, unless is it expressly
demonstrated that the characteristic is inapplicable to task outcomes. The notion of structuring a
task situation is described in detail below. Third, each actor in the group will process all salient
characteristics of every member in the group, generating an aggregate performance expectation
state for each group member. Finally, if e(a)> e(d), then r(a)> r(d), where r(a) and r(d) are the
expected (or long-run average) rates at which performance outputs (or behaviors) are generated by
a and d.13
Over three dozen specific hypotheses based on these four postulates have been experimentally
tested. The findings suggest that “. . . [task-]external status differences among members of a task
group determine the distribution of power and prestige within the group” [18, p. 43]. Higher rates
of participation have been shown to be positively correlated with social influence [10]. In order to
analyze the impact of status differences, SCT uses a graphical model that depicts the definition of
the situation in a small, task-oriented, group.
6.4.3 A graphical model
Suppose that, given a task T , participants share the presumption that some ability IA is necessary to
attaining T (+), thus rendering it an instrumental ability. For example, recall of multiplication facts
is an ability that can be presumed instrumental to the mathematical task of completely factoring
a “large” positive integer. Given the presumption that IA is necessary to attaining T (+), it is
assumed that the actors associate the possession of a high level of IA, denoted IA(+), with T (+),
12Although SCT does not distinguish between culture-in-the-large and culture-in-the-small, it might be possible to
extend it to cover an “idiocultural” case where, for example, all members of the group share the belief that status
characteristics should never be considered relevant. [70]
13The fourth postulate expresses the intuition that if a and d expect a to perform better than d, a will be given or
take more opportunities to produce performance outputs.
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a IA(+) −→ T(+)
d IA(-) −→ T(-)
Figure 6.3: Definition of the situation showing a specific status characteristic
while associating IA(−) with T (−). How actors a and d each define their situation is diagrammed
in Figure 6.3.
Several items are noteworthy. First, both a and d differentiate between IA(+) and IA(+). Second,
each views IA(+) as relevant to T (+) and IA(−) as relevant to T (−). Third, neither a nor d
associate themselves with IA(+) or IA(−) nor with T (+) or T (−).
This is aminimal definition of the situation. It consists of only: an awareness of task outcomes;
the presumption that a particular level or kind of ability is relevant to each task outcome, and; an
awareness of self and other as otherwise undifferentiated actors. This may correspond to the case
where, although a and d associate IA(+) with task success, and IA(−) with task failure, neither
have identified whether they, or the other, possess IA(+) or IA(−).14 A graphical representation
of a definition of the situation makes possible certain kinds of analysis.
Path length is determined by the number of lines and arrows in the path, so that in Figure
6.3 there is a path of length 1 from IA(−) to T (−) and a path of length 1 from IA(+) to T (+).
According to SCT , the initial definition of the situation is sequentially transformed until each actor
is connected to the task outcomes. So, although Figure 6.3 shows only two paths, the complete
definition of the situation will show multiple paths from actors to outcomes.
Suppose that a and d are also aware of their own gender: even very young children are aware of
gender and other diffuse status characteristics [37]. This element of the definition of the situation
is modeled by D, a diffuse status characteristic with states D(+) and D(−): the fact that maleness
is the high level of D, signified by D(+), reflects the higher status generally accorded to males in
the United States. Suppose that a is male and d is female. If a is linked to D(+) and d to D(−), the
(fuller) definition of the situation is shown in Figure 6.4. This definition of the situation takes into
14Although actors may enter a group having beliefs concerning their relative superiority or inferiority to other with
respect to some ability, these beliefs must be activated in order to structure interaction. Further on, this possibility is
taken into account.
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a −→ D(+) IA(+) −→ T(+)
d −→ D(-) IA(-) −→ T(-)
Figure 6.4: Definition of the situation showing a diffuse status characteristic
a −→ D(+) −→ G(+) IA(+) −→ T(+)
d −→ D(-) −→ G(-) IA(-) −→ T(-)
Figure 6.5: Definition of the situation showing a generalized expectation
account not only each actor’s beliefs concerning IA and T , but also whether they possess D(+) or
D(−). While this definition of the situation is more complete than that shown in Figure 6.3, it does
not yet produce a complete path from each actor to the task outcomes.
In SCT , a prediction about the quality of actor’s future performance on any characteristic pre-
sumed to be task-related is termed a generalized expectation. Although one might question the
applicability of such an (unobservable) expectation to a task-oriented group, it plays a key ex-
planatory role in SCT . In the context of this example, G is a prediction about each actor’s future
performance on the specific status characteristic IA. Behaviors predicted based on the activation
of generalized expectations and their association with specific status characteristics have been ob-
served in experimental settings [20].
By the burden of proof postulate, any characteristic that differentiates group members is taken
as task-relevant unless the relevance is explicitly precluded (when possible). Actors associate
diffuse status characteristics with differential levels of performance across a broad range of tasks.
Hence, actors associate the possession of a diffuse characteristic D with a generalized expectation
G so that individuals possessing D(+) are associated with the G(+) generalized expectation and
individuals possessing D(−) are associated with the G(−) generalized expectation. Note that
although the new definition of the situation as depicted by Figure 6.5 is more structured than
Figure 6.4, neither actor is yet connected to the task outcomes.
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a −→ D(+) −→ G(+) −→ IA(+) −→ T(+)
d −→ D(-) −→ G(-) −→ IA(-) −→ T(-)
Figure 6.6: Definition of the situation showing the association of G and IA
Since a’s level of generalized expectation is HI (namely, G(+)), he is likely to assume, in the
absence of contrary information, that he also possesses a HI level of IA(+). Similarly, actor d
is likely to assume that she possesses IA(−). Hence, G(+) (G(−)) becomes associated with the
specific status characteristic IA(+) (IA(−)) as shown in Figure 6.6. In Figure 6.6, a and d are
now each connected to a task outcome by a single path of length 4. Note that the definition of the
situation does not take behavior into account nor does it represent any relation between a and d.
6.4.4 Computing expectation states from the graphical model
Graphical models of the definition of the situation represent how, given the assumptions of SCT ,
actors define the task situation. They also make it possible to compute the expectation state asso-
ciated with each actor. To do so, however, some additional elements must be introduced.
The sign of a path from an actor to a task outcome is determined by multiplying the sign of all
lines along the path and the sign of the outcome. Unless otherwise indicated all lines and arrows
are positively signed. The path from a to T (+) in Figure 6.6 is a positive path because each of the
four arrows that appear are positive and the and the task outcome is positive, i. e., T (+). The path
from d to T (−) is a negative path: Each of the four arrows that appear are positive and the task
outcome is negative, i.e., T (−). Multiplying four positive and one negative signs yields a negative
sign. In SCT , a positive path between actor a and T (+) provides a basis to expect a positive
performance output by a; a negative path between actor d and T (−) provides a basis to expect a
negative performance output by d.15
With respect to Figure 6.6, actor a “expects” a positive performance output from himself and
actor d “expects” a negative performance output from herself. Note, however, that neither actor
15As shown below, it is possible to have a negative path to a positive outcome.
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a −→ D(+) −→ G(+) −→ IA(+) −→ T(+)
|-
d −→ D(-) −→ G(-) −→ IA(-) −→ T(-)
Figure 6.7: Definition of the situation showing an actor-actor association
has expectations for the other. The fact that an actor is linked to T (+) (T (−)) does not mean that
the next performance output of the actor will necessarily be positive (negative): the definition of
the situation influences, but does not determine, the future behavior of the actors.
Let f (p) represent the how strongly an actor is associated to a task outcome when the length of
the path connecting the actor to the outcome is p. The shorter the path, the more strongly connected
is the actor and the more positive or negative will be the expectations associated with that actor. If
the path length is p, the strength of the path from p to the outcome is f (p), where 0< f (p)< 1. I
now use f (p) to calculate the expectation state for both a and d based on Figure 6.6.
Since a is connected to T (+) by a path of length 4, the expectation state of a is defined to be
e(a) = [1− (1− f (4))]. It turns out, based on a theoretical derivation [72, p. 128] [168, personal
communication], that f (4) = 0.1358. Now
e(a) = [1− (1− f (4))] = [1−1+ f (4)] = 0.1358,
which indicates a slight expectation that a will generate a performance output leading to T (+).
Since d has a negative path of length 4 to T (−), the expectation state associated with d is
e(d) =−[1− (1− f (4))] =−[1−1+0.1358] =−0.1358,
which indicates a slight expectation that d will generate a performance output leading to T (−).
So, the expectation states of a and d are the same magnitude, but oppositely directed.
In establishing a definition of the situation, interaction is also important in addition to ob-
servation. Interaction enables comparison and thus generates additional paths from actors to
task-outcomes. If a possesses D(+) and d possesses D(−) and a and d interact, then a social-
psychological association (termed a dimensionality relation) between D(+) and D(−) may be
activated, depicted in Figure 6.7 as a − between D(+) and D(−).16 In addition to the positive
16Why, if a and d interact, is there no link between them in Figure 6.7? In modeling a task-oriented group, what is
of primary importance is how the actors view themselves in relation to the task outcome.
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path of length 4 from a to T (+), there is now also a positive path of length 5 from a to T (−). The
second path is positive because: the lines from a to D(+), D(−) to G(−), G(−) to IA(−), and
IA(−) to T (−) are all positive; the line from D(+) to D(−) is negative; the outcome T is negative;
and the product of two negative signs is a positive sign. This means that, on the basis of Figure
6.7, a is connected to task failure and task success, but less strongly to failure than to success. In
addition to the negative path of length 4 from d to T (−), there is now also a negative path of length
5 from d to T (+). The second path is negative because: the lines from d to D(−), D(+) to G(+),
G(+) to IA(+), and IA(+) to T (+) are all positive; the line from D(−) to D(+) is negative; the
outcome T is positive; and the product of a negative sign and a positive sign is a negative sign.
This means that d is connected to task failure more strongly than to task success.
SCT makes assumptions about how multiple paths and path lengths affect expectation states.
If there is a path of length p1 and a path of length p2 that each connect a specified actor to a task
outcome, as in Figure 6.7, then the combination of the paths is denoted by p1∪ p2. More generally,
if there are n paths p1, . . . , pn connecting an actor to T (+) or T (−), the combination of these paths
is denoted by p1∪ . . .∪ pn. The idea is that actors process all salient status information, so that if
an actor is connected to a task outcome by multiple paths, the strength of the connection between
the actor and the task outcome must take into account all such paths.
The strength of the connection between an actor to a task outcome via the combination p1∪
. . .∪ pn is given by
f (p1∪ . . .∪ pn) = 1− [(1− f (p1))× . . .× (1− f (pn))] (6.1)
Using the values f (4) = 0.1358 and f (5) = 0.0542 (derived in [72]), it follows that (1− f (4))×
(1− f (5)) = 0.8642× 0.9458 = 0.81736. It is assumed that every pair of paths with one path of
length 4 and the other of length 5 has a strength of (positive or negative) 0.81736. This assumption
has led to behavior predictions that have been confirmed across a variety of actors and tasks.
In terms of Figure 6.7, then,
e(a) = 1−0.81763= 0.18264
e(d) = −[1−0.81763] = −0.18264
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a −→ b(+) −→ BE(+) −→ Y(+) −→ T(+)
|-
d −→ b(-) −→ BE(-) −→ Y(-) −→ T(-)
Figure 6.8: A behavioral definition of the situation
each of which is greater in magnitude than the expectation state calculated in reference to Figure
6.6, in which only one path connects each actor to an outcome. Hence, social comparison can
change the expectation states of the actors.
6.4.5 The structural equivalence of status and behavior
Although the above calculations are based on a task-external status differential between a and d,
task-oriented groups are not structured by task-external status differentials alone. In the course of
task-related interaction, one actor d may engage in a behavior b(+) that activates abstract concep-
tions of high-status behavior BE(+) (e.g., “leader”), while another engages in a behavior b(−) that
activates abstract conceptions of low-status behavior BE(−) (e.g., “follower”). In turn, these ab-
stract conceptions get connected to abstract task ability states Y (+) (e.g., “smart”) and Y (−) (e.g.,
“dumb”) which then become connected to T (+) and T (−). If in interaction a engages in b(+)
and d engages in b(−), then the actors may become associated via b(+) and b(−) as depicted in
Figure 6.8.
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 are structurally identical, only the labels have changed. The diffuse status
characteristic D is replaced by the behavior b; the generalized expectation state G is replaced by
BE, abstract conceptions of typical high and low status behaviors; the instrumental ability IA is
replaced by Y , an abstract ability state Y [168, p. 373]. In both cases, there is: a positive path
of length 4 from actor a to T (+) and a positive path of length 5 from actor a to T(-); a negative
path of length 4 from actor d to T (−) and a negative path of length 5 from actor d to T (+). In
the simulation model developed by Skvoretz and Fararo, and continued in the simulation model
implemented as part of the current study, it is determined dynamically whether expectation states
are computed based on: (1) a difference in the task-external status of a and d, or; (2) a behavior
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Table 6.1: An example of precedence relations
Actor taking precedence Actor granting precedence Symbolized
Counselor (w) Social Worker (d) wPd
Principal (a) Social Worker (d) aPd
Social Worker (d) Teacher (z) dPz
by a or d. Since expectation states are computed based on a graphical model, Figures 6.7 and 6.8
associate exactly the same expectation states to actors a and d.
Since, based on the hypothesized definition of the situation in either Figure 6.7 or 6.8, actors
a and d expect the future performance outputs of actor a (d) to lead to T (+) (T (−)), it would
seem rationally necessary, ceteris paribus, for actor a to tend to take precedence in future task-
related action and for actor d to tend to grant it. If such a tendency becomes stable, it is said
that a social relation of precedence exists involving the two actors. This state is symbolized as
aPd and represented graphically by a −→ d. Hence, a dimensionality tie between actors a and d
may generate a social relation whereby actor a has precedence over actor d in future task-related
activities.
A number of precedence relations may form between the members of a group. For example,
suppose the group task is that of a Family Support Team: to identify whether a student is partici-
pating in a “physically abusive” social relation with a primary care-giver to the student. Suppose
w represents a Counselor, a represents a Principal, d represents a School Social Worker, and z rep-
resents a Teacher. Suppose, for whatever reason that the relation of precedence indicated in Table
6.1 has formed. From Table 6.1, then, we can construct the precedence graph shown in Figure 6.9.
Although a precedence graph contains no more information than a list of precedence relations, it
does provide a compact representation.
6.4.6 Aggregate expectation states
Thus far, I have discussed only expectation states. In SCT , the expectation states associated with






Figure 6.9: Initial precedence graph
yielding the aggregate expectation state associated with x, denoted by aex, where aex = aex+ +
aex−. If aex < 0, then a negative performance output by x is expected: that is, one believed to lead
to T (−). If aex > 0, then a positive performance output is expected.
What if additional precedence relations form so that Figure 6.10 represents the precedence
relations between w, a, d, and z that exist at some time t2? It has been observed in a number of
social situations that when one actor w takes precedence over d and d takes precedence over z,
it often occurs that w comes to take precedence over z. In this case, as shown in Appendix C,
the fact that w and a have precedence with respect to z will result in a stronger expectation that
a future performance output by either will lead to T (+) and a stronger expectation that a future
performance output by z will lead to T (−). The aggregate expectation state of d is unchanged.
So, changes in the precedence graph (social structure as pattern) may generate changes in the
aggregate expectation states associated with certain actors.
The aggregate expectation state associated with actor a at time t1 shapes the decision of actor a






Figure 6.10: Successor precedence graph
78
formation of new precedence relations at time t3. Hence, structure (in the form of precedence rela-
tions) affects agency (in the form of communicative action) and agency affects structure. Whereas
communicative actions are observable, and precedence relations inferable on the basis of observ-
able behavior, the effect of each is mediated by unobserved/unobservable aggregate expectation
states.
SCT and EST , as described here, ignore several obvious, and important, complexities of social
settings. First, most situations involve multiple status characteristics. Although both have been
extended to cover multiple status characteristics, as a first approximation, this study considers
only a single status characteristic. Second, although SCT and EST acknowledge that performance
outputs influence performance expectations, the emergence of a power and prestige order, and thus
the task outcome, they do not provide a dynamic account of how this occurs. E-state structuralism
makes it possible to do so.
6.5 E-STATE STRUCTURALISM
As discussed in Chapter 3, E-state structuralism integrates social network theory and EST . A so-
cial network is a collection of persons connected by (relatively strong or weak) ties (of affection,
communication, dominance, etc.). In E-state structuralism, the expectation state [HI,LO] is inter-
preted as a social relation between two actors. The collection of such relations over the group is
represented as a precedence graph (or, equivalently, a network).
An E-state structuralist model is most precisely stated in axiomatic form. An axiomatic for-
mulation encourages the systematic exposition, elaboration, and refinement, of the theory. The
axioms describe how actors “decide” whom to address and how to respond when addressed by
other actors. The meaning of each axiom is summarized below. Readers interested in the precise
formulation of these axioms should consult [168].
Axiom 1. (Initial state) Each task is relatively unique, so there is no initial task-internal status
ordering. Although this assumption can be relaxed to allow for initial task-internal status differ-
ences, I do not do so in order to simplify the study.
Axiom 2. (Relational stability). If the precedence relation aPd forms between a and d, it
persists. This axiom is illustrated by advice sometimes offered to new teachers to establish order
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by “cracking down” on students at the beginning of the school year [194]. Recall that precedence
relations are not necessarily consistent with task-external status relations: certain behaviors by a
member with low task-external status can lead to that member having precedence over others who
may have HI task-external status.17
Axiom 3. (Interaction). If a addresses d, the probability that the precedence relation aPd forms
depends on several factors. First, if a and d are status equals, then aPd can only form on the basis
of behavior: such a tie is formed with probability pi . Second, if a and d differ on task-external
status, the probability that aPd forms depends on which is the higher status actor. If d is the higher
status actor, the tie aPd can form, but only on the basis of behavior and does so with a lower
probability: namely, (1−η) ·pi . If a is the higher status actor, then aPd can form on the basis of
status or behavior: such a tie forms with a probability that is the sum of η and (1−η) ·pi . This
formulation allows an actor a who is lower in task-external status than actor d to acquire a higher
ranking on task-internal status than d.
Axiom 4. (Observation of interaction). If any bystander z observes a address d, one or more of
the following four precedence relations may form: aPz, zPa, zPd, dPz. According to this axiom,
interaction provides information to not only to the interactants, but also to the observers of the
interaction. As this axiom depends upon whether a tie already exists between a and d and the
status ordering of either z and a or z and d, the interested reader should consult [168, p. 1379] for a
complete explanation. The point is that, under certain conditions, ties can form between bystanders
and interactants via observation.
Axiom 5. (Behavior). Each actor uses aggregate expectation states to select an actor to
address. The probability that a addresses d can be calculated at any time t since its value depends
on the aggregate expectation states of the actors at time t [168].
A small, task-oriented, group begins with no task-related social structure (Axiom 1). As result,
all actors have the same aggregate expectation state and by chance a particular actor a addresses
another actor d (Axiom 5). A precedence relation between two interactants may form on the basis
of differential task-external status or task-internal performance outputs (Axiom 3). If a precedence
relation does form between any two actors, it endures for the lifetime of the task group (Axiom
17The relational stability axiom has been weakened in various ways, but I do not do so here in the interest of
simplicity.
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2). Not only do precedence relations form between interactants, but between observers and inter-
actants (Axiom 4). Once at least one precedence relation has emerged, the selection of the next
communication dyad is determined on the basis of the newly updated aggregate expectation states
of the actors (Axiom 5).
Using E-state structuralist terms, the interplay of structure and agency can be described as fol-
lows. Agency (represented via task-related behavior) affects structure (represented via a network
of social relations) and structure affects agency via aggregate expectation states. Thus, the cycle
depicted in Figure 6.1 is complete.
6.6 STATUS AND TASK PARTICIPATION
A number of mathematical models have succeeded in reproducing the long-observed outcome in
task-oriented discussion groups that status and participation rates are positively correlated. Few
mathematical models of small group behavior have been able to explain the fact that low status
individuals sometimes have higher rates of participation than high status members. The status and
task participation model developed by Skvoretz and Fararo does so [168].18
Skvoretz and Fararo specify the E-state structuralist axioms listed above in terms of three sys-
tem control parameters: η ,pi and θ (for a description, see [168]). The η(pi) parameter represents
the probability that task-external status(task-internal behavior) is salient in the status organizing
process. The θ parameter represents the probability that a tie forms between each bystander and
one or both of the interacts. Via discrete-event simulation, they examine how the distribution of
participation varies with η ,pi and θ . As described in Chapter 11, I use the same axioms as Skvoretz
and Fararo, but only a small subset of the range of the parameters η ,pi and θ examined by them.
Hence, this study has a narrower scope.
18Skvoretz and Fararo propose an auxiliary, sixth, axiom.
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6.7 CONCLUSION
I have described the foundations of the status and task participation model of Skvoretz and Fararo
which makes it possible to simulate the emergence of social order in a small, task-oriented, group.
A small task-oriented group composed of ideal-typical educational professionals are likely, in the
course of a collective deliberation, to draw on professional beliefs. The next task is to show how
what Archer terms the Socio-Cultural system can be simulated on the basis of the status and task
participation model presented here and on a model of belief.
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7.0 SOCIO-CULTURAL SYSTEMS
7.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a process model of social influence, based on E-state
structuralism, that relates a Cultural System and a Social System. In particular, I describe how
individual belief and individual influence jointly determine the outcome of a collective decision
process. The process model of social influence makes it possible to analyze outcomes in a simu-
lated Socio-Cultural System in terms of its analytical components: namely, a Cultural System and
a Social System.
7.2 INTRODUCTION
For Archer, the lived reality of the Socio-Cultural System (SC) is analyzable as the interaction
of the Cultural System (CS) and the Social System (SS). I locate belief in the SC, but see it as
grounded in what I call the Archive, which functions as a passive intermediary between theCS and
the SC. The ability of actors to read and write the Archive depends upon their position in the SS,
which is reflected in part by their task-external status.
This study concerns the collective decision of a Family Support Team concerning A(c). The
outcome depends on the beliefs of the actors and the influence they exert in the course of collective
deliberation. Although the process by which each outcome is determined takes place in the lived
world of a SC, it is analyzable via elements of a SC, what I have elsewhere termed the Archive and
a SS.
Although they presuppose elements of the objective world, beliefs are elements of the sub-
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jective world. Beliefs animate action and experience. For each case c, I assign to each actor a
an initial belief, denoted Bi,a(c), regarding A(c): that assignment is based on an analysis of the
previous experience of actors of the same type, as described in Appendix A. I locate beliefs in a SC
and assume that, other things being equal, actors engage in communicative acts designed to bring
about collective decisions consistent with their individual beliefs.
Assume one knows the values of Bi,a(c) for each actor a participating in the Family Support
Team deliberating on A(c). One might simply assume that, since Bi,a(c)≤ 0.5 signifies a rejection
of A(c), one can determine the collective outcome democratically: that is, if the average belief in
A(c) ≤, then the group also rejects A(c). I term this the static model of belief because it assumes
that actors cannot influence one another, so that the outcome is determined entirely by the beliefs
of the actors, not by any interactions that occur during the Family Support Team Meeting.
In contrast to the static model of influence, one can allow one actor to influence another so that
the beliefs of the target of influence move toward those of the source of influence. Although the
model of status and task participation described in Chapter 6 does not itself represent the influence
of each actor, it does provide information about the evolving task-internal status of actors that can
be used to model interpersonal influence in a dynamic way.
7.3 A PROCESS MODEL OF INFLUENCE
Change of belief can be accounted for in terms of social influence in dyads [9]. In what follows,
I describe the change in belief of an actor b after having been addressed by an actor a. In the
language of Balkwell, b is the focal actor who is influenced by a. I further assume that the purpose
of a addressing b is to influence b to change his mind in the direction of a’s belief regarding A(c).
Let e represent the expectation differential between a and b, as described in Chapter 6 and in
greater detail in Appendix B. e is computed as the difference in the aggregate expectation states
of a and b: that is, e is a quantitative representation of the difference of how strongly a and b
are connected to task success and task failure. If e> 0, then a has an expectation advantage with
respect to b; if 0> e, then b has an expectation advantage with respect to a. The probability that
b maintains his belief at its current level is, using equation (7) from [9], is denoted by p(S) and
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Table 7.1: Updating belief: Examples
Bi,a(c) Bi,b(c) p(S) Bu,b(c)
0.353 0.642 0.83 0.593
0.320 0.152 0.48 0.240
0.400 0.400 0.59 0.400
computed as follows:
num= exp(0.472+0.632 · e) (7.1)
p(S) = num/(num+1) (7.2)
Hence, the probability that actor b changes her mind is given by the probability [1− p(S)]1
The value of p(S) can be used to compute the degree to which the focal actor b changes her
mind regarding A(c) after being addressed by actor a:
Bu,b(c) = p(S) ·Bi,b(c)+ [1− p(S)] ·Bi,a(c). (7.3)
In this equation, Bu,b(c) represents the new belief of actor b regarding A(c). Hence, the updated
belief of b is a weighted average of the prior belief of b and the current belief of a.
It follows from this equation that if Bi,a(c) = Bi,b(c), then Bu,b(c) = Bi,b(c). If a has an expec-
tation advantage with respect to b, then p(S) will be relatively low, so that b will make a relatively
large change his belief in the direction of a. So, assuming a and b disagree regarding A(c) and
modelIn f luence= T , then actor b is always influenced by a, but the amount of influence depends
on who holds the expectation advantage. Several examples of the computation are shown in Table
7.1.
Hence, under the process model, the influence of each actor depends upon both the task-
external status distribution over the actors and the task-internal status of the actors. As interaction
with the group unfolds, the beliefs of actors change. At the end of each simulated Family Support
1The coefficients in the first, exponentiated logistic, equation are taken from Table 1 in [9].
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Teammeeting, a collection decision is made according to the following rule, where B f ,a(c) denotes
the final belief of actor a:
O f (c) =
 0 if ∑5a=1B f ,a(c)/5≤ 0.51 otherwise
7.4 CONCLUSION
I propose to explain outcomes (in a SC) by reference to: (1) the initial beliefs (in a SC) which
actors form (based on statements in the Archive) regarding propositions A(c) and (2) changes in
belief due to the task-external status (in a SS) or the task-internal status (in a SC) of each actor
in a communication dyad. The simulation model by which the values of in f luence are obtained
has also not been shown. These are the elements that are described in detail in the last part of the
dissertation. Before describing the simulation model inputs, outputs, and outcomes, it is important
to provide a larger, if less easily modeled, context.
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8.0 CONTEXT: SOCIAL WORKERS AND REPORTING
8.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter is intended to provide background concerning the professional culture of school social
workers and (indirectly) teachers. It is claimed that, during the period and in the place examined,
school social work as a profession was de-professionalized. This suggests that school social work-
ers might well enter the collective task of reporting child maltreatment with a task-external status
lower that in previous times.
8.2 INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, school teachers were added to the list of those professionals required to report sus-
pected child maltreatment and are today the major source of such reporting [163]. Among all
school-based reporting sources, cross-sectional data obtained during the Third National Incidence
Study on Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-3) suggest that educators were most likely to report the
suspected abuse of elementary school children [163]. Moreover, reports from educators were much
more likely to satisfy the technical definitions of maltreatment given in the NIS-3 than is indicated
by the rate at which such reports were substantiated in Pennsylvania.
According to the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), Pennsylvania in
1995 reported approximately 8.29 children per 1,000 [103]. Using 1993 NIS-3 data and the con-
servative assumption that all children already injured or in danger of injury had been reported, one
would expect 41.9 children per 1,000 to have been reported in Pennsylvania [163, p. 3-17]. Many
states that, like Pennsylvania, provide child-based (rather than incident-based) statistics had report-
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ing rates at least twice and in several cases seven times larger than Pennsylvania (NCANDS). This
difference might have been principally due to a lower rate of child maltreatment in Pennsylvania
or to factors depressing the reporting rate.
It has been a matter of dispute whether the enlistment of teacher in these crusades has been for
better or worse. One analyst implies that schools report too many inappropriate cases [26]. On the
other hand, one researcher suggests that schools address the “social problem” of child maltreatment
in ways that “marginalize” it [184]. One way to prepare to operationalize the sociological concept
of marginalization is to consider it from a historical perspective.
During the period from 1970 to 1984 child abuse reporting mandates were imposed upon
educators in Pennsylvania. I here examine the issue of marginalization in that period as it was
addressed by the Pittsburgh Public Schools (hereafter PPS), in particular the elementary schools.
I employ the following primary source materials: Pittsburgh Public Schools, Records, 1870−
1980 [hereafter referred to as PPS-MSS], found in the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania;
materials categorized under “school.discipline” in the Carnegie Public Library, main branch; and
Annual Child Abuse Reports from the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare. Secondary
sources include the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (PG) and Pittsburgh Press (PP) newspapers.
I claim that, during the period in question, the PPS did indeed marginalize the reporting of child
abuse. This was the result of de-professionalizing school social work and redefining the functions
of school social workers. By 1984, building principals, rather than school social workers, were
the locus of expertise and decision-making concerning the recognition, reporting, and response to
child abuse.
I begin this chapter with an overview of the role of schools in the reporting of child maltreat-
ment in Pennsylvania, describe that portion of the PPS-MSS that was examined, and note the initial
findings. Next, I consider how the initial findings might be interpreted. In the third part, I resolve




The first “Child Abuse Law” in Pennsylvania, known as Act 91, was signed in 1967 and took effect
in 1968. The purpose of the act was to require reports of suspected child abuse so that protective
services could be made available to prevent children from further injury or neglect and to preserve
family life whenever possible [14, p. 5]. Pennsylvania Act 91 did not include teachers and school
nurses among the persons required to report suspected child maltreatment, it was amended in 1970
to include both.
In the Spring of 1973, the Women’s Auxiliary of the Berks County Medical Society held a
symposium on child abuse attended by Pennsylvania State Senator O’Pake of Reading. In January,
1974, the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act was passed, 100 years after the first
case of child maltreatment was brought to the attention of the New York Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals [186, p. 13]. “After two-and a half years of intensive effort” [14, p. 5],
during which Republican Governor Shapp vetoed the earlier Senate Bill 1166, Democratic State
Senator O’Pake introduced Senate Bill 25 early in the legislative session of January 1975. “Sen-
ate Bill 25 underwent five legislative drafts before reaching its final form. Those various drafts
also incorporated changes proposed by a number of concerned interest groups” [143]. The bill
was passed unanimously by the Senate, overwhelmingly by the House, and signed into law on
November 26, 1975, becoming Pennsylvania Act 124.
Between 1983, when Pennsylvania began keeping statistics on reporting sources, and 1999,
school personnel have contributed an increasing proportion of the total number of reports filed.
Perhaps in part reflecting difficulties in the investigative process, a very low and declining percent-
age of reports made by school personnel were substantiated upon investigation. Although school
personnel who fail to report suspected maltreatment are subject to legal penalties, it is unlikely that
these penalties were ever levied during the period in question.1
1An attorney familiar with such matters noted that he was unaware of any case in Pennsylvania involving prose-
cution for failure to report suspected child abuse. He also observed that even a search of legal records for such cases
would not necessarily be conclusive.
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8.4 PROVING A NEGATIVE?
Hoping to see how public schools in Pennsylvania anticipated and responded to Act 124, I ex-
amined a portion of the PPS-MS manuscript collection. It consists of 183 boxes (measuring 108
linear feet) of materials that were, at least officially, reviewed prior to their release. After scanning
the fifty page archivist’s index, I decided to focus on Series III: Assistant Superintendent Offices
(1900−1982); Subseries 2: Elementary Schools Assistant Superintendent.
Of particular interest were the correspondence files for 1974 to 1979 since they covered the
introduction of Act 124.2 Using the index, I searched four boxes for relevant materials: Much of
the examined material dealt with school closings, desegregation, collective bargaining, the impacts
of federal funding under Title 1. With two exceptions, there are no explicit, direct, references to
child maltreatment.
In 1974, an elementary teacher at Arsenal school was accused of exposing himself to sev-
eral girls, all previously identified as “socially and emotionally disturbed”. Beginning as a few
scribbled notes on a telephone message form, a running discussion among educators and students
ensued, with the documentation becoming increasingly formal until the girls recanted. The rele-
vant PPS-MSS materials include the full names of the children involved in the incident: Because of
the Eastern European heritage of many Pittsburgh residents, several last names are unique and lo-
catable in the 1998 telephone directory.3 It seems likely that systematic review of the materials by
the PPS prior to their release would have resulted in the deletion of these and other sensitive data,
such as personnel information. This suggests that PPS personnel did not “sanitize” the small part
of the collection that I examined. Therefore, it seems reasonable to use (that part of) the PPS-MSS
which I examined to make inferences about the level of PPS commitment to child abuse reporting.
The sole document using the phrase “child abuse” is a copy of the 1975 Pennsylvania Act 124.
It is possible to interpret this scarcity of materials in two very different ways. First, it might be
argued that unexamined portions of the collection could contain documents related to the reporting
of child maltreatment. Indeed, anything is possible, but incidence data suggest that most reporting
2As an aside, the Assistant Superintendent of Elementary Schools during that period was future Superintendent
Brennan.
3To reduce the likelihood of (additional?) breach of confidentiality of these persons, I do not cite the location of
the materials related to the incident.
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by educators involves elementary school children. While the absence of materials in this small
portion of the collection does not prove system-wide “marginalization” of child abuse, neither
does it provide evidence of commitment. This interpretation, which I call the guilt-by-omission
interpretation, a lack of materials on child abuse reporting indicates marginalization. Second,
the absence of materials may simply indicate the unproblematic nature of the requirement: as
suggested by the presence of a copy of Act 124, educators may simply have followed the law by
reporting child abuse when they suspected it. Under this interpretation, the presence of a copy of
the legislation demonstrates, not a lack of concern, but a determination to abide by the law. Under
this (the unseen compliance) interpretation, a lack of materials on child abuse reporting proves
nothing vis-a-vis marginalization. I do not see how, on the basis of the documents examined, one
can choose between these two interpretations of the sparse number of occurrences of the phrase
“child abuse”.
The outline of contract negotiation priorities in 1978, developed by the Pittsburgh Federation
of Teachers, included the following provision.
The Board agrees to assign school social workers . . . full-time at schools having higher than normal
concentrations of pupils with social, personal, attendance, and educational problems. The Board
further agrees to examine its present policy of assigning school social workers to schools in order
that it may provide lower than normal “students per social worker” ratios at schools having higher
than normal concentrations of pupils with social, personal, attendance, and educational problems.
(PPS-MSS, Box 141, folder 5)
This suggests that the district was in fact allocating social work resources to schools where one
might expect, for whatever reason, to find cases of child abuse. Nevertheless, I claim that, during
the period in question, PPS marginalized the reporting of child abuse.
8.5 DE-PROFESSIONALIZING SCHOOL SOCIAL WORK
In May, 1975, the president of the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers (hereafter denoted PFT) com-
mented on the recent publication of Metropolitan Achievement Test results. After noting that the
PFT did not oppose the publication of system-wide test scores, President Al Fondy said the results
“indicate that there are significant learning problems in the schools . . . something . . . that teachers
and the PFT have been saying for a very long time” (PPS-MSS, box 141, folder 7). Moreover, said
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Fondy,
there is no doubt that there is a direct correlation between unacceptable disciplinary conditions in
schools and unsatisfactory student achievement. This fact has been stressed for years by the PFT
and must now be dealt with realistically and firmly by the School Board. (PPS-MSS, box 141,
folder 7)
Fondy indirectly refers to the long-standing support by the PFT for reinstating the availability
of corporal punishment in city schools, banned since 1968. To understand the PFT position on
corporal punishment it is useful to examine a bit of the historical context out of which it emerged.
In 1970, having previously organized a “successful” strike to be recognized as a bargaining
agent, the PFT proposed what the PG termed “school for agitators”. Noting that, under the then
current system, “troublemakers” were simply transferred to other schools, PFT representatives
called for one high school and seven elementary schools at a cost “in excess of $1 million when
the program hits full-stride” (PG, 3/24/70). The American Federation of Teachers (AFT), national
counterpart of the PFT, offered a grant to the University of Pittsburgh to establish a program to
train teachers to work at the special schools (PG, 3/18/70). Not surprisingly, this proposal drew
strong opposition from local psychologists and others (PG, 3/20/70).
The associate Director of School Social Services termed the PFT plan a kind of segregation.
School problems have several sources, according to Clara Colteryhahn: first, “the average child
. . . is confused because the discipline used by parents is inconsistent with that inflicted in the
schools” (PP, 3/29/70); second, “we are grossly understaffed in terms of the load we carry. For
one reason or another, our services are not recognized as being top priority”. In 1970, Colteryhahn
supervised a staff of 69 school social workers, including five supervisors, with a ratio of 1 social
worker to 1,000 students in the elementary schools.
By 1976 (the first year of implementation of Act 124) school social service priorities were
changing in dramatic ways. The PPS-MSS shows two versions of a memo having “budget nar-
rative” as its subject. Both versions, dated late July, 1976, proposed under the heading of “inno-
vations” that the ratio of elementary school social workers to students would drop from 1 : 1,100
in 1975 to 1 : 1,300 in 1976, thus reducing the cost of social worker salaries and benefits. Might
school officials, perhaps aware of the increased (state and federal) funding available for treating
abused children [14, p. 7], have been “externalizing” PPS costs relative to the treatment of child
abuse? With less need to directly treat the consequences of child abuse, the reasoning might be,
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fewer social workers were needed.
The first version of the memo proposed the following functions for the department of social
services:
1. To provide an integrated service approach to understanding and helping all children who have
difficulty in school. 2. To provide casework and group work services to the family for the purpose
of increasing understanding of child development and encouraging constructive participation in the
educational process. 3. To participate in case consultation, to establish plans for the modification
of the pupil’s behavior and to offer appropriate exchange of professional assessment of each pupil’s
situation. 4. To assist parents in the use of school and community resources. (PPS-MSS, box 136,
folder 1).
Function 2 is especially important for several reasons. First, it articulates the “method” that,
in historical terms, has given social work its identity as a (semi-)profession: namely, casework.
Second, it expresses the view of some professionals that child abuse often stems from a failure to
understand what, on average, children can and cannot do at a given stage of development. Thus,
function 2 pertains directly to the role of school social workers in the prevention, recognition,
reporting and treatment of child abuse.
The second version of the memo categorizes school social workers as “regular” or ESEA ,
the latter being paid through Federal Title 1, ESEA (Elementary and Secondary Education Act),
funding. The casework and group work function in function 2 noted above is replaced by the
requirement “To enforce the compulsory attendance laws and encourage regular attendance” (PPS-
MSS, box 136, folder 1). Hence, casework, a key element of the semi-profession was no longer an
official part of the functions to be performed by school social workers.
With Pennsylvania Child Protective Service units mandated to provide “protective and preven-
tive social counseling . . . emergency caretaker services, shelter care, and medical services” [14,
pp. 10-11], budget-constrained school administrators could perhaps reasonably argue that there
was less need to have child abuse related functions performed by school social workers. The con-
trol of child abuse matters could, if not already so organized, be detached from the social work
function and assigned to building principals.
Consider, by contrast, the management of school psychologists. A memorandum dated April
9, 1979 indicates that psychologists were rated by the Director of Special Education, but social
workers were rated by the principal of their assigned base school with input from other principals
(PPS-MSS, box 141, folder 5). This suggests that the position of associate Director of School
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Social Services, to which school social workers reported in 1970, no longer existed. At precisely
the time that one might expect school social workers to act as gateways to Pennsylvania Child
Protective Services units, their professional standing within schools became less certain.
As already noted, the ratio of school social workers to students appears to have declined be-
tween 1970 and 1976. In discussing the 1984 budget, Superintendent Richard Wallace distin-
guished between mandated and non-mandated programs for students, noting that while curriculum
is mandated, funding for SED (socially and emotionally disturbed) students came from separate,
state, funding. Counseling and social work services were among the non-mandated programs for
students (1984 PPS annual report, pp. 16-17). It appears that financial factors shaped the priority
accorded to school social workers.
8.6 CONCLUSION
Among the direct consequences of a reduced social worker to student ratio would be a smaller
number of potentially trained detectors and reporters of suspected child maltreatment, leading to
a lower rate of reporting.4 The indirect, but perhaps more significant, consequences are threefold.
First, the de-professionalization of school social work put greater demands on teachers to detect
and respond to possible child abuse. Second, and related to the first consequence, if in-service
training (presumably conducted by social workers) became more difficult to obtain, teachers were
less likely to feel adequate to the task of recognition and reporting. Thus, child abuse was indeed
marginalized in Pittsburgh Public (elementary) Schools during the period in question. Moreover,
to then extent that social workers were seen as tied to the social problem of child abuse and its
reporting, it is plausible child abuse reporting was perceived by others to be of minor importance
in comparison with other objectives.5
4Further research is needed to determine what kind of training was provided for principals and teachers. No
evidence of such training was found in the documents reviewed.
5Of course, this raises several questions that cannot be addressed here. How did social work staffing vary as
a function of overall school budget? If social work was indeed reorganized, what were the consequences for the
reporting of child maltreatment? Was it reduced? Or increased? What were the implications of this reorganization for
elementary teachers? What were the motives and beliefs of the reorganizers and the reactions of those reorganized?
What was the broader cultural context in which questions about child abuse and corporal punishment were entertained?
These questions, while worthy of investigation, are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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9.0 CONTEXT: EDUCATOR REPORTING
9.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background on the professional cultures of educators as it
relates to the reporting of potential child abuse. This chapter is based on a short-term ethnographic
study. In particular, I interpret the helping behavior of educators in terms of a variety of material,
social, and ideological constraints, suggesting that in the setting examined these constraints would
have reduced the likelihood of an individual decision of report potential child maltreatment.1
9.2 INTRODUCTION
The ethnographic fieldwork reported here was conducted during the 1997-1998 school year. After
a brief exposition of the theoretical perspectives informing the research reported here, I describe
the methods involved. I then describe how educators at the site understood child maltreatment
in a practical way and conceptualized it. I then turn to a consideration of the material, social,
and ideological factors that help explain why educators at the site reported as they did. In the
conclusion, I offer some methodological suggestions aimed focused on the integration of cultural
elements in the development of a theory adequate to the phenomenon of child abuse reporting by
educators. When using material taken from field-notes, I will rely on the present tense.




I propose to explain educator recognition and reporting of suspected child abuse from the perspec-
tives of “psychological social psychology” and “sociological psychology” [35, p. ix]. According
to the “bystander effect” model, if an intervention typically involves low reward and high cost,
psychologically or otherwise, bystanders tend - often in an “unconscious” way - to redefine “emer-
gency” situations so that intervention is not required [114]. The bystander effect is assumed to be
a universal principle of human psychology in social life.
What places this study in the theoretical genre of “sociological psychology” is a considera-
tion of the particular material and social factors that structure the cost to educators of reporting
child maltreatment, and thereby affect their capacity to recognize (and, therefore, report) potential
child maltreatment. Further, I suggest, educators draw upon certain widespread cultural beliefs, or
theoretical ideologies, in interpreting ambiguous and/or contradictory situations [23]. Out of the
raw material provided by theoretical ideologies, educators construct practical ideologies that help
them account for what happens in concrete situations [166]. In effect, these material, social, and
ideological factors provide values for the parameters that govern the operation of the bystander
effect in specific contexts.
9.4 SETTING
Lincoln Elementary School (a pseudonym) is located in a Pennsylvania town that has experienced,
among other troubles, substantial de-industrialization over the last several decades. The per capita
income of school district residents is $8,000, in sharp contrast to a nearby district for which the per
capita income is $32,000. The average salary of district teachers during 1993-1994 was approxi-
mately $48,000. State assessment scores at Lincoln were among the best of the several elementary
schools in the district, but the district as a whole was ranked among the lowest in the state.
Within a block of Lincoln Elementary stand several burnt-out, but not condemned, houses
replete with gang graffiti. According to information provided by a school educator, early in the
school year a group of gang members pulled up in front of the school with loaded weapons [202,
02/19/98, par. 7]. Perhaps related to the fear expressed by many European-American educators at
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the school, the nearby Patella Funeral Home had donated to school a supply of wooden 12 inch
rulers with its address and phone number printed on each [202, 02/19/98, par. 21]. A block further
away, a modern brick building initially suggests business resolve or renaissance, but is seen up
close to be empty, windows broken or boarded up, its walls inscribed with graffiti.
A predominantly African-American student body of approximately 450 contrasted with 41
largely European-American educators and staff. In the 1996-1997 school year, over 80 percent of
Lincoln Elementary students were considered by the Pennsylvania Department of Education to be
from ’low-income’ families. By comparison, 75 percent of students in the district and 32 percent
in the state met that same criteria.
9.5 METHODS
I conducted critical ethnographic fieldwork [36], [192, pp. 127-130] during the 1997-1998 aca-
demic year. I was at the site for approximately one hundred hours on nineteen different days. In
addition to analyzing various administrative documents, I played the role of observer-as-participant
[55] in and around the school building, on a field trip, and in classrooms. I interviewed approxi-
mately fifteen teachers at least once or twice for ten to twenty minutes during their daily planning
period of thirty minutes.2
In employing the standard practice of using pseudonyms, I have drawn many from the pool of
television characters over the last forty years, while others come from my experiences as a K-12
student. In some instances, my assignment of pseudonym is based on the occupational role of
the person. In other cases, I have selected the pseudonym based on an retrospectively imagined
similarity of appearance between the real person and the associated character/person. Finally, I
sometimes choose a pseudonym simply as an aid to recalling a particular interaction. Because
of the small number of educators involved, the views they offered, or the way in which they are
portrayed by me or others, I have made special effort to obscure the identities of persons who
would otherwise be more readily inferred.
2A similar district is described, with a different but related purpose, in [181].
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9.6 FINDINGS
The findings reported in this study should be approached with caution. This chapter is largely
based on rough field-notes written at the site or a short time later. As a result, I have opted mostly
for paraphrasing and some quotations may not be exact. In order to correct errors of fact and
interpretation, I provided to educators at the site several copies of a draft of a paper similar to
this chapter and requested written comments. When none were forthcoming, I followed up with
a telephone call and a message, but no reply was given. Email a year or two later with several
educators who had retired made it clear that, not only did many of the educators at Lincoln disagree
with my interpretations of what I observed and the meanings I associated with what was stated by
educators in the interviews. No one contacted, however, questioned the accuracy of the descriptions
given.
It appears that the readers accepted the factual aspects of the paper, but rejected its principal
conclusion: namely, that educators at Lincoln were disposed to not see, and thus not report, poten-
tial child maltreatment. My interpretation of this reaction is that it is entirely consistent with the
(largely understandable, if not necessarily acceptable) tendency of the educators at Lincoln to deny
the occurrence of child abuse. In short, my paper presented them with possibilities about which
they were understandably uncomfortable.
All adults at Lincoln Elementary took child maltreatment and its reporting seriously. Although
many distinguished linguistically as well as conceptually between abuse and neglect, the term
“abuse” was often used synonymously with “maltreatment”. Every teacher asked said that teachers
ought to be required to report abuse. For example, Ms. Ursinas said “I would be moved to notify
somebody if I saw a child being abused” [202, 11/21/97, par. 12]. Ms. Neal said “I don’t have
kids, but . . . [I would report] if I saw it [abuse]” [202, 11/21/97, par. 110].3 The school nurse,
other administrative personnel, and several community workers all voiced similar commitment to
reporting child abuse.
Most teachers interviewed said they saw very little abuse among the children at Lincoln Ele-
mentary. Ms. Ursinas [202, 11/21/97, par. 7], Ms. Potts [202, 02/05/98, par. 37], Mr. Arnold [202,
3Seven years later, my interpretation is that in using the word “saw”, educators meant it in a literal sense, although
my interpretation is based on a more global view of how educators viewed child maltreatment.
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10/24/97, par. 8] and Mr. Preston [202, 11/12/97, par. 25] all indicated that they didn’t see much
abuse. Yet, several teachers acknowledged that abuse, or something like it, occurred. Mr. Lelania
observed “the kids will flinch if you make any sudden moves, so that tells you that they’re being hit
at home” [202, 10/24/97, par. 8]. Although hitting does not entail physical abuse, physical abuse
does entail hitting.
The educators interviewed seem to think of abuse primarily in terms of physical, rather than
emotional, or sexual, abuse. Ms. Connor said, “I think many kids are abused or least neglected”,
adding that there was probably more neglect than abuse among Lincoln Elementary students [202,
12/12/97, par. 5]. This suggests that some educators are aware of the theoretical distinction be-
tween abuse and neglect.
Neglect poses several, related, practical problems for the educators working at Lincoln Ele-
mentary. While observing a reading session, I heard a child repeatedly complain of stomach pain
in an easily audible, but restrained, way. After fifteen minutes or so, during which Ms. Seville did
not respond, another child offered an explanation: “You’re hungry” [202, 12/05/97, par. 45]. The
comment seemed to settle the matter: the allegedly hungry child did not complain again and Ms.
Seville remained silent. On other occasions, Ms. Potts said, “Well, we do see a lot of neglect, but
if you start with that ...” [202, 02/05/98, par. 37] and Ms. Brooks indicated that neglect would
be easier to detect in well-off communities because the affected children would stand out [202,
11/21/97, par. 136]. If one teaches poor children and one reports physical neglect, where does one
start/stop?
Although some teachers seemed to think of neglect primarily in physical rather than emotional
terms, others clearly, if implicitly, acknowledged the distinction. For example, Mr. Arnold com-
mented that “little kids hang on me” and that they say “I wish you were my Daddy” and “I want to
go home with you”. As a result, he said, he “can tell they’re not getting much affection at home”
[202, 10/24/97, par. 8]. Although teachers, as part of their pre-service and on-the-job socializa-
tion, may have - like medical professionals - learned to manage the emotions that these interactions
occasion [171], this was not without residue.
When asked how they responded if a child said to them “I wish you were my Daddy”, several
teachers seemed uncomfortable. In part this may have been because of the feelings generated by
the particular type of student statement. Mr. Arnold replied “I say ’No you don’t’ or I ignore it”
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[202, 10/24/97, par. 11.]. Mr. Preston noted “They don’t have a father here, so it is not surprising”
[202, 11/12/97, par. 28]. When asked about his response to “I want to go home with you”, Mr.
Preston said “They just want to go home with you - I don’t interpret this” [202, 11/12/97, par. 28].
Ms. Connor said she made a joke when kids asked if they could go home with her. Asked what
she thought the question meant, she replied, “It varies, but some kids are just manipulative” [202,
12/12/97, par. 5]. It appears that although teachers may have a theoretical concept of emotional
neglect, and appear to recognize instances of neglect among the students they teach, they generally
do not view it as reportable [183].
Non-teaching educators seem to have more specific concepts of neglect. For Ms. Bloom,
frequent failure by a parent to dispense medication to a child is a clear instance of physical neglect
[202, 12/19/97, par. 38]. Non-teaching educators understand child maltreatment using concepts
rooted in their professional training.
The so-called signs of child maltreatment are many and often ambiguous, as aptly captured
by Mr. Preston and several others who seemed to use the expression “something’s going on” to
refer to situations of potential child maltreatment. Despite the ambiguity, some signs are perhaps
more trustworthy as bases for suspicion than others. The “probable signs of maltreatment” range
in specificity from “low” to “moderate” to “specific” to “high specificity”: signs that are “specific”
or of “high specificity” are associated with a high rate of “correct” identification [109].
Displays of aggression, or ’‘aggressive acting out”, are considered moderately specific signs of
physical abuse. On the assumption that the student is not acting in self-defense, most definitions of
aggression probably include using an object to attack or threaten a teacher. Consider the following
episode involving Danton, whose behavior, while less combative than it could have been, seems
aptly characterized as “aggressive acting out”.
When we arrive at the classroom, Mr. Preston is holding the boy’s arms straight behind his back in
order to subdue Danton. When released, Danton grabs a yardstick and makes threatening gestures
towards Mr. Preston. I attempt to restrain him by wrapping my arms around him. After telling me
to stop restraining Danton, Ms. Wayans picks him up by his clothes like a sack of potatoes, takes
him into the boy’s bathroom, asking him all the while what is wrong. Danton says a little bit here
and there, but mostly keeps struggling against her. Finally, she puts him over the sink, runs cold
water on her hand and rubs it on his face, telling him at the same time to breathe deep. Later, Ms.
Wayans asks him if it is necessary to call his mother; he says no. [202, 01/14/98, par. 81]
Danton’s threat can be viewed as a response to having his arms held behind his back. It seems
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likely that this restraining tactic was a response by Mr. Preston to prior aggression from Danton
or perhaps the result of in-service training. As a tactic designed to ensure the safety of the target,
the tactic used by Mr. Preston was similar to mine; it seems that the tactics differ, however, in the
intentional use of pain.
According to Ms. Arthur, “he [Danton] was hell when he was in kindergarten and 1st grade”
[202, 11/14/97, par. 12]. Although noted for fighting with kids, challenging adults, and receiving
numerous suspensions, Danton seemed to be generally liked by many educators at Lincoln. Yet,
his behavior was judged to be of sufficient severity that, at the end of my fieldwork, plans were
afoot to place him in a special state-run school for severely socially and emotionally disturbed
children. I never heard anyone ask whether “something’s going on” or whether Child Protective
Services (CPS) ought to be called.
It is not uncommon to believe that socially undesirable events occur someplace other than
where one is located. In the view of Ms. Bloom, for example, who visited several district ele-
mentary schools in addition to Lincoln, the typical maltreatment case at Lincoln involved neglect,
while the typical case at a nearby school involved abuse [202, 10/24/97, par. 67]. A Lincoln Ele-
mentary volunteer seemed to think it entirely natural that the district in which Lincoln was located
would have a relatively high incidence of child maltreatment. When asked about her experiences
in reporting child abuse, she replied that she had encountered only one suspicious case in her for-
mer, thirty-year, teaching career in a different, suburban, district. When asked if CPS had been
called in, she indicated that school personnel had “investigated” and determined that no action was
necessary. While this event may have occurred before the legal mandate to report suspected abuse,
she seemed unaware that educators are “supposed” to report, not investigate, suspicions [123].
A verbal account is another “specific” sign of physical abuse [109]. The following two exam-
ples might involve “specific” signs of physical abuse. First, during a reading session conducted by
Ms. Seville, a kindergarten or first grade child used the following sentence fragments: “sometimes
my mommy smacks me. It’s not nice to smack somebody, but it happens” [202, 12/05/97, par. 45].
Second, Ms. Ursinas noted that children sometimes “spontaneously” tell her that they have been
hit with some object by parents; in one instance, she additionally observed marks on a child that
appeared to be from the zipper of a handbag [202, 01/08/98, par. 46].
While marks and a verbal account might not be evidence of maltreatment, they might well
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constitute grounds for suspicion of abuse. Some researchers assert that mandated training is needed
to insure that professionals, including teachers, know when and how to report suspected child
maltreatment [152]. Asked if a school in-service on child maltreatment would be helpful, Ms.
Ursinas stated that no more than a half-hour of in-service training would be needed, largely to
allow veterans to help newer teachers [152, 02/05/98, par. 11]. On the assumption there was very
little abuse at Lincoln Elementary, this is an entirely logical position. When facing what might
be problematic behavior, or accounts, by students, physical abuse as a possible explanatory factor
did not seem to be available to educators, even though many of them may have assumed that child
abuse and neglect were fairly widespread within families sending students to the school.
9.7 EXPLAINING THE FINDINGS
I suggest that educators at Lincoln Elementary reported or did not report suspected child abuse for
three reasons. First, because they needed to compensate for shortages brought about by economic
scarcity, personnel were too busy to notice probable signs of maltreatment (a material factor).
Second, they were reluctant to raise suspicions for fear of being seen as over-reacting or as racist
(a social factor). Third, they accepted the need for corporal punishment and interpreted actual
or imagined parental actions as instances of (“legitimate”) corporal punishment (an ideological
factor). Although these factors are analytically separable, they are likely to operate together.
9.7.1 Material factors
Turn-of-the-century building architecture, especially what was originally something like an in-
ternal courtyard, generated constraints on the occupants of Lincoln Elementary. Although walls
extending from floor to ceiling were eventually put up to keep students from falling over short rail-
ings on the second and third floors, the unintended and unavoidable consequence of this necessary
act of enclosure was the creation of an acoustical canyon. Teachers had the option of closing their
doors, but many kept them open. The sound emitting from several open doors created a roar in the
hallway. Perhaps it is partly for this reason that the School Handbook emphasized a “zero noise”
policy.
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The age of the building created other difficulties. On my first day at the school, electrical
wiring problems seemed to generate telephone and other equipment failures. On another occasion,
after a bomb threat was received and classes canceled, it was necessary to notify parents and I was
recruited. Since the electrical system supported only several telephone lines, both inbound and
outbound calls would likely have faced considerable contention for use of the lines. On another
occasion, part of the ceiling fell in a third floor classroom.
Space was a critical resource at Lincoln Elementary. According to Mr. Preston, the Lincoln
Elementary school building was “too small” for the student population. Art and music teachers did
not have offices; gym teachers shared the nursing office. The speech therapist worked with students
in the common area on the first floor where there was generally a relatively high level of traffic,
some of it producing considerable noise as unruly students made their way to the main office or the
behavior modification room. During the research study, the faculty lounge was most often used as
a reading classroom. During the previous school year, hallways had served as classrooms. Part of
the hallway space was then given to the storage of supplies as part of the district’s attempt to cut
the cost of facilities.
Personnel shortages were particularly vexing. During much of the fieldwork, the main of-
fice was without a full-time secretary. Substitutes were sometimes obtained from the district, but
educational staff were occasionally directly recruited. Ms. Brooks encouraged me on several occa-
sions to notify anyone that I knew who might be interested in substitute teaching to apply through
the district. Some teachers were required to work in the main office.
Staffing shortages would seem to have also affected the process of recognizing and reporting
potential child abuse and neglect. Although the district did have a psychologist on staff who visited
on what I estimate to have been a biweekly basis, no social worker visited the school. With respect
to school social workers, this arrangement may have been the outcome of a downsizing process
similar to that which occurred earlier in the Pittsburgh Public Schools (as described in Chapter 8).
The students in classes of absent teachers were often distributed among the classes of those
present. On one occasion, when four or more teachers were out, the “All Together Motivated”
(ATM) reading block, in which students move to a classroom suited to their reading-level, was
suspended. ATM literature indicated that the program involved restructuring the school around
reading. Thus, teacher absences sometimes disrupted what might be termed the organizing princi-
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ple of the school. The severity of the impact of absences resulted in one non-teaching staff member
(but former classroom teacher) spending a considerable part of one year as a teacher.
Personnel shortages affected not only administrative and teaching activities, but also the pos-
sibility of teacher training. In one instance, the principal, reading specialist, and kindergarten
teachers were forced to consider canceling three classes in order to permit the teachers to attend
an out-of-building ATM in-service training session. At least one kindergarten teachers received in-
service training by observing the in-building classrooms of ATM teachers in higher grades. This
suggests that the provision of training in connection with child abuse and neglect would have been
difficult.
In the serving of food, shortages of space and personnel combined. In many elementary
schools, the gymnasium doubles as a cafeteria. At Lincoln Elementary, there were actually two
gymnasiums, both fairly small but of unequal sizes. Mr. Popish supervised the children who par-
ticipated in the free breakfast program that started at approximately 7:30 a.m. Children arriving
after approximately 8:00 a.m. were turned away without food, or were able to eat only a bite or
two, a source of antagonism between Mr. Popish, the affected students, and the food service staff.
The pressure to close down the breakfast program at 8:00 a.m. came from two sources. First, the
small gym needed to be cleaned in order that it could be used as a reading classroom. Second, and
more importantly, Mr. Popish was obligated to perform grounds duty and students could not be
left un-supervised.
Ms. Grace and others referred to lunch duty as “hell”: although some teachers worked it on
a rotating basis, most declined. Several educators said they did lunch duty in order to give others
a break: some indicated that extra pay was also involved. Grade K-2 students filled the smaller
gym, and students in grades three to six occupied the larger gym. The younger children were
required to sit idly, but quietly, for approximately 15 minutes while the older ones moved through
a single serving line slowed by record-keeping in connection with subsidized lunches. On some
days, younger students found it especially difficult to observe the “zero noise” policy: as many as
20 violators might be assigned to after lunch or after school detention. During the previous school
year, there had been three lunch periods, reducing the length of time children in any one period
had to sit, waiting to enter the line. Ms. Grace noted with some disdain that one faculty person
vetoed the continuation of that arrangement because it cut faculty lunch time from one hour to 30
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minutes. Planning periods had also been reduced from forty minutes to thirty minutes per day.
Between September 1997 and February 1998 one classroom of the fifth graders had three
different regular teachers. Recruited to teach the previous year, one non-teaching educator had
been considering early retirement. It would seem that providing education at Lincoln Elementary
was a stressful affair, perhaps affecting the ability of educators to recognize and report potential
child abuse.
A “helping” response is the contingent outcome of a sequence of five cognitive “choices”
[114]. The first choice involves noticing that “something is happening”: unless that occurs, help
will not occur except by accident. Experimental evidence suggests that preoccupation with other
concerns affects whether a situation is noticed [11, p. 356]. Educators at Lincoln Elementary, as
noted above, were occupied with both material constraints and their consequences. This constitutes
a reason to infer their diminished capacity to notice probable signs of potential child maltreatment.
There was another, more general, reason why educators at Lincoln might have been preoccu-
pied: district faculty had been working without a collective bargaining agreement for three years.
Ms. Grace implied substantial resistance, especially from the union, to after-hours faculty meet-
ings on the grounds that these would constitute unpaid work. Knowledge of this resistance, which
was tied to systemic problems at least as much to individual personalities, may help account for
the following. It was said that, when a community worker proposed a staff in-service on child
maltreatment, Ms. Grace allocated three minutes [202, 02/05/98, par. 43]. On the other hand, near
the end of the fieldwork, the idea of a maltreatment-related in-service was being given renewed
attention. In any event, if educators (and districts) that lack time (and money) to formally consider
the issue of child maltreatment, it seems likely that they also have a diminished capacity to notice
probable signs of maltreatment.4
9.7.2 Social factors
Educators are not alone in their reluctance to intervene in certain situations. Ms. Connor said that,
during the 1996-1997 school year, kids told her they visited the home of a classmate who then
4Whereas I suggest that labor disputes helped generate in educators at Lincoln a diminished capacity to recognize
and report potential child maltreatment, it is strongly suggested in [181] that teacher unions were responsible for the
downfall of a district quite similar to that considered here. The authors do not consider the question of, and the proper
role of educators in connection to, child maltreatment.
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“mounted” them. The situation was “handled” in the sense that the offending girl was not allowed
to visit the homes of the visiting girls. No reports of suspected maltreatment were made to Child
Protective Services [202, 12/12/97, par. 7].
Does this description of the child’s behavior suggest that sexual abuse occurred or was worthy
of investigation? In recounting the case, Ms. Connor said that she thought she had a student
who was being, in her words, sexually abused. Recall that individuals in Pennsylvania “who, in
the course of their employment, come into contact with children are mandated to report suspected
abuse when seeing a child whom they suspect to be abused” [104, p. 5]. While one might justifiably
take issue with the division of labor implicit in this formulation, it seems clear that Ms. Connor had
seen a child who she suspected of being abused and, therefore, ought to have reported or caused a
report to be made.
That neither the parents nor the teacher intervened can be explained in terms of the cognitive
model of helping behavior mentioned earlier. Once a situation has been noticed, it must be decided
whether it amounts to an “emergency”. People are not sure exactly what is going on, and they tend
to hold back, waiting for additional information. And the more ambiguous the situation, the less
likely it is that help will be offered. “Because people may be reluctant to help in the first place,
they are especially attentive to any information that suggests there is no need to be concerned.”
[11, p. 358]. People hold back because they are fearful of over-reacting, of being embarrassed or
even suffering harm. Thus, would-be helpers are constrained by social factors.
If ambiguity leads to cognitive re-framing, and therefore inaction, in situations more likely to
be conceded as bona fide emergencies, how much more likely is this outcome when the perhaps
more ambiguous situation of potential child maltreatment is concerned? For example, Ms. Connor
evidently waited long enough to determine how the situation had been handled by the parents of
the children who conveyed the story to her. The parents defined the situation as requiring isolation
of the child rather than intervention. Ms. Connor accepted that definition, overriding her initial
suspicions.
Bruises, welts, burns, and marks are probable signs of physical abuse that have high specificity
and therefore have a high “correct” identification rate [109]. As noted earlier, Ms. Ursinas said she
saw zipper marks on a child and thought perhaps the child was being abused. She acknowledged
that she did not regard the treatment as “reportable abuse” [183] but rather as the result of “cultural
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differences” concerning corporal punishment [202, 11/21/97, par. 7]. The reporting behavior of
Mrs. Ursinas was not what the designers of the child maltreatment surveillance system intended, a
finding that would not surprise organizational sociologists [102].
After noticing a situation and interpreting it as serious, the third step toward helping is to as-
sume personal responsibility to act. Experimental evidence suggests that the more potential helpers
there are, the less likely it is that any one person will assume responsibility and act [11, p. 353].
This phenomena, known as diffusion of responsibility, has been suggested as a possible expla-
nation of what appear to be very low rates of child maltreatment reporting by Kansas educators
[51].
The concept of diffusion of responsibility can be applied as follows. When Danton entered
first grade and began to act unacceptably, his teacher was faced with managing his behavior and,
therefore, with the question of its causes (and, perhaps reasons). The following year, knowing
that the kindergarten teacher had experienced considerable difficulty with Danton, and that there
had been substantial involvement by the school counselor and the principal, but that CPS was
not called (or did nothing), his first grade teacher might naturally assume that Danton had not
experienced “reportable abuse” and would therefore be less inclined to explore the possibility. In
second grade, this process would be even more likely to repeat, perhaps less a matter of conformity
than situation-specific rational imitation [98].
If helping has a high cost and low reward it is less likely to occur [114]. Ms. Ursinas and
Ms. Neal each mentioned an incident for which they reported suspected child maltreatment. In
each case, the parent correctly inferred who had reported, became very angry and confronted the
teacher. Both teachers admitted to being fearful [202, 11/21/97, par. 12, 110]. Although one
teacher said there wasn’t much conversation among teachers about child abuse reporting, shared
knowledge of these parent-teacher interactions would raise the perceived costs, and according




Reporting is often thought to lead to undesirable outcomes for students, parents, and teachers.
Whatever they do, teachers are likely to feel guilty: they are caught in what is perceived as a no-win
situation. Hence, there is a incentive to re-frame a situation involving potential child maltreatment
as one that does not involve maltreatment. This re-framing occurs without conscious awareness
[114]. Broad cultural beliefs, which I term ideological factors, may shape the way in which the re-
framing occurs and thereby affect the capacity of educators to report suspected child maltreatment.
One possibility for avoiding a no-win situation is to somehow interpret personally objection-
able behaviors by students and parents as expressions of African-American or poverty culture. Ms.
Ursinas commented that several parents offered to come to school and, in her words, “beat” their
children to insure their good behavior [202, 11/21/97, par. 10].5 She also suggested that, while
she found such behavior personally unacceptable, she thought it did not cross the line of what was
acceptable within “the community” and, therefore, was not reportable. Ms. Ursinas in effect ex-
empted the poor, African-American, community in which she worked from the standards she felt
applicable to the white, middle-class, community in which she probably lived. By restricting the
application of her concept of abuse, Ms. Ursinas may have thus been able to avoid or reduce any
moral discomfort from not reporting [112].
Another way to re-frame probable signs of maltreatment is to associate them with corporal
punishment (CP). According to one observer, “there also is considerable opposition today [1994]
to ending CP in schools . . . [with] the nearly unanimous support of . . . parents . . . and the most
vocal advocates being fundamentalist Christians, teachers’ organizations, and school boards” [176,
p. 111]. Despite a broad acceptance of CP, there are differences concerning the forms it can
legitimately take.
It has been stated that “CP has become a part of black culture in response to slavery and
oppression” [4, 149, 176] and, when applicable, to the dangers of ghetto life [13, 15]. In response
to the theory that CP increases the likelihood of physical abuse, each of two highly respected
African-American social scientists are reported to have said “I was whupped, and I’m OK” [176,
5“In lower class language, the term ’beating’ is often used as a generic term to refer to any form of corporal
punishment, starting with a slap; just as in middle class language, the term ’spanking’ is often used as a generic term
to refer to all forms of corporal punishment, not just striking a child on the buttocks” [177].
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p. 116]. After emphatically declaring that child abuse should not be tolerated, one community
worker seemed to echo the view of the sociologists just quoted, saying “White people don’t know
how to discipline their children” [202, 01/08/98, par. 70].
Although some teachers did not explicitly mention either African-American or poverty “cul-
ture”, they seemed to allude to one or the other. Mr. Preston seemed to assert the prevalence
of single-parent families in the community [202, 11/12/97, par. 35]; Ms. English talked about
boyfriends, drugs, etc. as elements of what she termed “the culture” [202, 10/31/97, par. 6]. It is
not clear to what extent these comments represented views on race, class, or both.
The public suggestion that an African-American child might be maltreated might open a
European-American teacher to a suspicion of racism. The only educator at Lincoln Elementary
who spoke of race was Mr. Lelania, who unfavorably compared the academic performance of
African-Americans to that of Vietnamese-Americans and said that the African-American parents
at Lincoln Elementary did not encourage their children to do well at school [202, 02/19/98, par. 7].
Some research suggests that European-American teachers are disinclined to talk about race [162]
or acknowledge institutional racism [169], even among themselves.
There is and has been considerable union support for CP in the schools under the banner of
“community standards”. In 1976, the Pennsylvania Department of Education recommended that
school districts follow “community standards” concerning the use of CP in schools, perhaps im-
plicitly drawing on the fact that different cultures have different thresholds for what is considered
abusive. A perhaps unintended consequence of this policy recommendation may have been to en-
courage the unintentional cognitive re-framing of signs of potential child maltreatment, especially
physical abuse, as something thought by many to neither require nor warrant intervention: namely,
corporal punishment.
There is anecdotal evidence that educators within the district do indeed re-frame potential
physical abuse as corporal punishment. An African-American community worker related a story
about a parent/guardian who used a belt on a child during a meeting with a principal and counselor.
Six months later, the worker said, a report was made to Child Protective Services (CPS) concerning
this child, which I took to mean that, in the view of the worker, the use of a belt ought to have
triggered a call to CPS [202, 02/05/98, par. 40]. That it did not suggests that the principal and
counselor involved (not necessarily from Lincoln Elementary) may have interpreted the behavior
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in question as a form of CP and thus regarded it as legitimate.
Situations involving potential child maltreatment place educators in a dilemma [22]. Educators
feel compelled to report “if they see it”, yet there appear to be definite costs, particularly for
European-American teachers, for raising suspicions concerning the potential physical abuse of an
African-American child. According to the cognitive model of helping behavior outlined above, the
easiest way to avoid the guilt that is associated with reporting/not-reporting is to, somehow, come
to view the situation as one that does not require intervention [114].
At Lincoln Elementary, most teachers interviewed having careers spanning fifteen to twenty
years indicated that they had made one or two reports of suspected child maltreatment. The princi-
pal, nurse, and several teachers estimated that as many as five children had been reported to Child
Protective Services during the 1996-1997 academic year [202, 10/24/97, par. 70; 01/08/98, par.
73]. Considering the setting from the perspective of the cognitive model of helping, what can be
inferred from Pennsylvania statistics, and the amount of cognitive interference generated by mate-
rial, social, and ideological factors, it seems likely that the incidence of parental maltreatment of
children enrolled there was higher than the number reported.
9.8 CONCLUSION
Several years ago, the National Research Council advocated an “ecological” approach to the study
of child maltreatment [50] in which “culture” figured as an element. It is consistent with the eco-
logical approach to note that, like all individuals, educators are both constrained and enabled by the
organizational, occupational, social, and cultural realities in which they are embedded [87, 187].
If so, then educator reporting of suspected child maltreatment “is determined not [solely] in terms
of its concrete determinations or the subjective intention of the social actors but in terms of the re-
lational constants among the basic constitutive elements” [158, p. 5]. I have presented in linguistic
form a theory based on an ethnographic description of how material, social, and ideological con-
ditions control the bystander effect in connection with the recognition and reporting of suspected
child maltreatment. I now turn back to the task of specifying a model that, while not capable of
generating the phenomena described here, attempts to take into account some aspects of the social
and cultural realities in which elementary school educators are embedded.
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10.0 INITIAL BELIEFS AND STATUS DISTRIBUTIONS
10.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The purpose of this chapter is to describe two types of inputs to the simulation model described in
Chapter 11. The first type assigns to each of five types of actor a level of initial belief regarding
the proposition A(c): There is reason to suspect that the child described by case c was physically
abused by one of its natural parents. Initial belief change in response to social influence is struc-
tured, in part, by the distribution of task-external status across the five types of actor who meet, as
members of a Family Support Team, to determine the group response to A(c). The second type
of input concerns that task-external status assigned to each member of the Family Support Team
by virtue of their professional affiliation. Thus, this chapter provides the basis for concrete im-
plementations of a Cultural System (based on belief) and a Social System (based on task-external
status).
10.2 INTRODUCTION
The initial belief of each occupational type regarding A(c) is modeled based on a set of N = 111
individual, actual, affirmative decisions regarding A(c), each rendered by one individual, each one
of the following five occupational types: Teacher, Principal/Administrator, Nurse, Social Worker,
and Counselor. Although this list does not includes all types of educator, it does include the
majority. As noted earlier, this quantitative approach is a an attempt to approximate, at less cost,
results that might be obtained from an extensive ethnographic study of each occupational type
working in Family Support Teams.
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As suggested by the the ethnographic report given in Chapter 9, it is assumed that education
professionals are not necessarily of one mind concerning the boundary between the physical abuse
and the physical discipline that elementary school children may experience with parents. Each
case is described by a set of features and, consistent with the view that the system of professions
is marked by jurisdictional competition between the professions on the basis of “different exclu-
sionary schemes in diagnosis, inference, and treatment” [1], a different set of case features appear
to be salient for different occupations. As shown in Appendix A, a correlational analysis of actor
beliefs confirms that view that education professionals often behave differently when confronted
with cases having the same features.
10.3 DATA SOURCES
The most extensive attempts to gather quantitative and qualitative data relevant to the reporting
of child abuse and neglect in the United States of America are the National Incidence Studies
periodically mandated by the U.S. Congress. The data files associated with the Third National
Incidence Study (NIS-3) have been made publicly available (for a small fee) by the National Data
Center for Child Abuse and Neglect.1 This dissertation draws on the so-called “Main Public Use
File” of the NIS-3 quantitative dataset.
Each of the 6,486 records in the Main Public Use File corresponds to a child reported by a
“sentinel”. Sentinels were defined by the NIS-3 study as persons asked to remain “on the lookout”
for child maltreatment cases during the study period. The 5,612 sentinels who participated in the
NIS-3 were not specifically trained to “recognize” child abuse and neglect, but were considered
capable of recognizing children as “maltreated” [164, p. 1-3]. Each of five types of actor of
interest in this study (Teacher, Principal/Administrator, Nurse, Social Worker, and Counselor) are
represented in theMain Public Use File. I use data concerning sentinels to construct a behaviorally-
based model of the initial belief of each actor of a given occupational type when considering the
1The case data that formed part of the basis for this study were made available (in part) by the National Data
Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. The data from the Substantiation of Child
Abuse and Neglect Reports Project were originally collected by John Doris and John Eckenrode. Funding support for
public distribution was provided by a contract (90-CA-1370) between the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
and Cornell University. Neither the collector of the original data, funding agency, nor the National Data Archive on
Child Abuse and Neglect bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
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proposition A(c).
The Main Public Use File is regarded by the NIS-3 as a national sample, used for the purpose
of estimating incidence rates. Each case record in Main Public Use File represents 213 different
attributes [164, p. 2-15], some of which might not defined for a particular case. For the purposes of
this dissertation, however, the NIS-3 Main Public Use File is simply a superset of data from which
a subset is extracted. I now describe how the subset of the Main Public Use File used in this study
was constructed.
10.4 THE BEHAVIORAL DATA
Given the different purpose for which it was constructed, many of the 213 attributes shown in each
record of the Main Public Use File are of no immediate value for this study. The initial subset I
constructed is based simply on the values assigned to each of the following seven attributes:
(1) the family income level (INCOME);
(2) whether the family received Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC);
(3) the age of the child at the time of the incident (AGE);
(4) the sex of the child (SEX);
(5) the race/ethnicity of the child (ETHNICITY);
(6) the number of in-home natural parents (INHOME);
(7) the occupation of the sentinel (OCCUPATION).
The following kinds of records in the NIS-3 Main Public Use File were excluded from considera-
tion: (1) those provided by a non-School agency; (2) those associated with children younger than
six or older than eleven; (3) those for which the source of “recognition” was other than School;
(4) those not associated with the occupations of Principal/Administrator, Social Worker, Nurse,
Teacher, or Counselor; (5) those for which the sentinel categorized the possible maltreatment as
other than physical assault; (6) those for which neither natural parent resided with the child. By
excluding these types of records from consideration, a dataset was obtained for which each rele-
vant attribute was defined. I have capitalized occupational designations, such as Teacher, in order
to emphasize that the persons who occupy the positions of Teacher, etc., are represented as types
of actors in the simulation.
As noted earlier, each case record in Main Public Use File represents 213 different attributes
[164, p. 2-15], some of which might not defined for a particular case. When applied to the Main
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Public Use File, the restrictions described in the previous paragraph yielded R, a dataset of N = 111
records. Tables 10.1 through 10.7 provide information about each of the attributes in the disser-
tation dataset.2 Ignoring the last row, Table 10.1 suggests that sentinels who reported were most
likely to report children from the most economically disadvantaged families, although the absence
of correlated family size information makes it impossible to determine the income per family mem-
ber. Table 10.2 does not provide strong evidence for the claim that sentinels who reported were
more likely to report children receiving AFDC. Table 10.3 suggests that, other things being equal,
sentinels who reported were most likely to report children aged 7, although the distribution is bi-
modal. Other things being equal, Table 10.4 indicates that sentinels who reported were more likely
to report a male child. Other things being equal, Table 10.5 indicates that sentinels who reported
were most likely to report White children. Given that most children in the U.S. are White, this is
not surprising. Table 10.6 suggests that sentinels who reported were most likely to report children
from families with both natural parents in the home. On the (somewhat questionable) assumption
that most children in the U.S. live in a house occupied by both parents, this is not surprising. Table
10.7 suggests that sentinels who reported were most likely to be Counselors.
Tables 10.1 through 10.7 are in some sense misleading since they provide a collection of uni-
variate information about R whereas each case is actually multivariate in nature. For this reason, it
is important to relate the behavior of each sentinel to those attributes that were salient for that type
of sentinel when considering a case. In effect, then, I am assuming that, each member of a profes-
sion acts entirely in accordance with the other members of that profession. Since this dissertation
focuses on differences between professions rather than differences within professions, this radical
simplification should be less troubling than it otherwise would be.
10.5 CLASSIFICATION RULES
In order to identify those attributes and their values that are salient for each type of sentinel, I use
what is called a machine learning program.
2The names of several attributes in the NIS-3 study were changed: from CHSEX to SEX; from ETHNIC to ETH-
NICITY; and from INHSTATP to INHOME. The tables also provide the numeric codes (NCODE) used in the NIS-3
and the alphabetic code (ACODE) that I used.
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Table 10.1: Family income (INCOME)
NCode Meaning Count Percent
1 < 15K 40 36
2 15K ≤ INCOME < 30K 27 24.3
3 30K ≤ INCOME < 45K 6 5.4
4 or 9 ≥ 45K or Unknown 38 34.2
Table 10.2: Aid to families with dependent children (AFDC)
NCode ACode Meaning Count Percent
1 Y Yes 29 26.1
2 N No 26 23.4
9 U Unknown 56 50.5









Table 10.4: Child’s sex (SEX)
NCode ACode Meaning Count Percent
1 M Male 65 58.6
2 F Female 46 41.4
Table 10.5: Child’s ethnicity (ETHNICITY)
NCode ACode Meaning Count Percent
1 AP Asian/Pacific 2 1.8
2 NA Native American 1 0.9
3 BL Black 22 19.8
4 HI Hispanic 25 22.5
5 WH White 61 55





Table 10.7: Sentinel occupation (OCCUPATION)
NCode ACode Meaning Count Percent
1 SW Social Worker 26 23.4
2 NU Nurse 7 6.3
5 TE Teacher 31 27.9
8 CO Counselor 44 39.6
9 AD Principal 3 2.7
A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and
performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with experience
E.[134, p. 2]
The particular machine learning program I use, called RIPPER, employs an information-theoretic
approach to produce sets of if-then rules from R. Performance is measured by how well, overall,
RIPPER predicts the actual consequent given the actual antecedents. RIPPER was chosen in order
to obtain easily interpretable rules and because of its relatively high level of performance [43].
Each rule produced by RIPPER has the formCONSEQUENT :−ANTECEDENT , in contrast
to the usual form ANTECEDENT followed by CONSEQUENT . An ANTECEDENT consists
of one or more conditions, each specified in the form (a = v) and a CONSEQUENT designates
a sentinel occupation. For example, rule (03) is read as “If AGE=6 and SEX=F then OCCUPA-
TION=TE” indicating that if the child in question is aged six years and female, then the sentinel
reporting is a Teacher.
Rules that pertain only to small subsets of instances may be retained despite the fact that they
have low predictive quality with respect to that subset: Although the dataset R contains three
records for which the actual sentinel occupation was AD, only one of these records satisfies the
ANTECEDENT of rule (20). Using information gain as a criteria for keeping or deleting previ-
ously generated rules, RIPPER favors rule sets that minimize predictive error over the entire set of
instances.
Rules (1) through (20) suggest that, with the exception of Principal/Administrator, several sets
of case features are salient for each type of sentinel. Rule (20) functions as a default, reflecting the
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fact already noted that when a sentinel reports, the sentinel is most likely to be a Counselor. The
rules are unordered and no two sets of conditions are identical, although many overlap. Since the
value of OCCUPATION is already known for each record c in R, the point of constructing rules (1)
through (20) cannot be to predict that value.
10.6 INITIAL BELIEF
I distinguish initial belief from final belief, since it is hypothesized that participation in a small,
task-oriented group will lead members to change their initial beliefs in response to attempts at
influence by other members. As constructed, the initial belief data do not model the reasoning pro-
cesses of the actors to which they are attributed and, thus, cannot be claimed to play an evidentiary
role for the actors themselves. The initial belief data model the behavioral dispositions of actors.
The initial belief model attempts to represent how each sentinel would have reacted to each of
the other 110 cases had they considered them. I use templates (1) through (20) to estimate Bi,s(c),
the initial belief of sentinel s regarding proposition A(c), where s ranges over the five types of
sentinel and c ranges over all N = 111 records in dataset R. A model of how each sentinel of a
given type would have reacted to each case is then used, in Chapter 11, as a proxy for the initial
belief each simulated actor of a given type would form regarding A(c).
When considering a case c and a sentinel s, there are two possibilities: either s actually reported
c or did not. Suppose s is the sentinel who reported case c to the NIS-3 study: in this instance,
Bi,s(c) is assigned the value 1.0 to indicate the complete assent of s to A(c). Suppose s is not the
sentinel who reported c: in this instance, the value assigned to Bi,s(c) depends on the degree to
which the features of case c were salient to s. If the features were salient, then Bi,s(c) is assigned
a value strictly between 0.0 and 1.0, thereby indicating that the response of s to A(c) would be
something strictly between complete belief and utter disbelief. If the features of case c were not
salient to s, then Bi,s(c) is assigned the value 0.0 to indicate utter disbelief.3 By this means, a value
of Bi,s(c) can be assigned for every case c in dataset R, for each sentinel s.
3One might object that the value assigned should be 0.5 rather than 0.0. On the account of belief I have given,
salience of any degree produces some level of initial belief by s regarding A(c), so that complete lack of salience must
imply utter disbelief.
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Bi,s(c) is not a probability, but it is based on a set of probabilities. Ps(a= v) is the probability
that, for sentinels of type s, the attribute a takes the value v. For the purpose of differentiating
between types of actors, the values of Bi,s(c) need not be accurate in an absolute sense: it is
sufficient that they be comparable and computable. After describing how the values of Ps(a = v)
are computed, I describe the calculation of Bi,s(C) when s is other than the sentinel who actually
reported the case to the NIS-3 study.
10.6.1 Probabilities
Let Ds denote that subset of R for which the attribute OCCUPATION has the value s. Ps(a= v) is
computed based on a subset Ds of R. Let Ns signify the total number of records in Ds and n(s,a,v)
denote the number of records in Ds such that attribute a has the value v.
Ps(a= v) is calculated as follows, where | x | denotes the number of elements in the set x (rather
than the absolute value of x):
Ns = | {records ∈ Ds} | (10.1)
n(s,a,v) = | {records ∈ Ds : a= v} | (10.2)
Ps(a= v) = n(s,a,v)/Ns (10.3)
Ps(a= v) is an empirical estimate of the probability that, for a sentinel of type s, attribute a has the
value v.
To illustrate the use of these formulas, consider sentinels of type s = AD. It turns out that,
as shown in Appendix A, dataset DAD contains the following three records, each indicating an
positive reporting experience:
CASE INCOME AFDC AGE SEX ETHNICITY INHOME
58: 2 N 10 M BL 1
74: 1 Y 8 M WH 1
75: 1 Y 7 F WH 1
119
Applying equations (10.1) through (10.3), with a= INCOME and v= 2, we have:
NAD = 3
n(AD, INCOME,2) = 1
PAD(INCOME = 2) =
1
3
Similarly, we obtain the following probabilities:
PAD(INCOME = 2) =
1
3
,PAD(INCOME = 1) =
2
3
PAD(AFDC = Y ) =
2
3
,PAD(AFDC = N) =
1
3






,PAD(SEX = F) =
1
3






PAD(INHOME = 1) =
3
3
Note, for example, that the sum of the probabilities given is, for a particular attribute, equal to 1.0.
Likewise, the dataset DSW describes the NSW = 7 positive individual reporting experiences of
sentinels of type SW.
CASE INCOME AFDC AGE SEX ETHNICITY INHOME
24: 2 U 10 M BL 1
25: 9 N 7 M BL 2
26: 2 N 6 M BL 2
33: 9 U 10 F WH 1
35: 2 N 7 M WH 2
39: 9 U 7 F AP 2
54: 9 U 6 M BL 1
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For sentinels of type SW, we obtain the following probabilities:
PSW (INCOME = 2) =
3
7
,PSW (INCOME = 9) =
4
7
PSW (AFDC = Y ) =
0
7
,PSW (AFDC = N) =
3
7
,PSW (AFDC =U) =
4
7
PSW (AGE = 10) = PSW (AGE = 6) =
2
7
,PSW (AGE = 7) =
3
7
PSW (SEX =M) =
5
7
,PSW (SEX = F) =
2
7
PSW (ETHNICITY = BL) =
4
7
,PSW (ETHNICITY =WH) =
2
7
PSW (ETHNICITY = AP) =
1
7
,PSW (INHOME = 1) =
3
7
,PSW (INHOME = 2) =
4
7
After calculating a complete set of probabilities just shown, I calculate the values of Bi,s(c) using
the method described in Appendix A.
10.6.2 The initial belief of sentinels
Bi,s(c) is calculated from the values of Ps(a = v), using the heuristic described in Appendix A.
That heuristic may be summarized as follows: Make Bi,s(c) a monotonic increasing function of
the number of attribute-value pairs shared by the case record and the prior experience of actors of
type s.
The initial belief of sentinel s regarding A(c) is denoted by Bi,s(c) ∈ [0,1]. When Bi,s(c) = 0,
this signifies that s denies A(c). When Bi,s(c) = 1, this signifies that s affirms A(c) and when
Bi,s(c) = 0.5, this signifies that s is epistemically neutral regarding A(c). Although Bi,s(c) can take
on any value between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive, its value for each s and c pair is fixed.4
Perhaps the most important advantage of representing belief as a real number is that the value
to be assigned to Bi,s(c) can be computed as a function of a particular c and the positive reporting
experience of sentinels of the type s. On the other hand, qualitative information about the nature of
individual reporting is lost to the extent that it is not adequately captured by the computed values
Bi,s(c). In the remainder of this study, I do not distinguish between sentinels of occupational type
s and reporters of occupational type s, and simply identify actors and their occupational types.
Hence, in the simulation model, I make the initial assignment Bi,a(c) = Bi,s(c).
4It is possible, however, to individualize the initial beliefs of actors by considering the value of Bi,s(c) as a measure
of central tendency. As a first approximation, I have opted for the simpler approach just described.
121
10.7 STATUS DISTRIBUTIONS
Motivated by the approach in [205], I assign to each actor a a task-external status based on the
organizational resources that they control. Table 10.8 designates a status (of H(igh), M(iddle), or
L(ow)) for each: Principal, Counselor, Teacher, Nurse, and Social Worker based on the organiza-
tional assets controlled by each type of education professional, following the analysis of Wright.
I do not claim that Table 10.8 best represents the actual distribution of status. I believe the as-
signment shown is a plausible one for typical elementary schools in the United States. From a
psychological social psychology viewpoint, it is quite right to consider personality as a potential
determiner of task-internal status. From the perspective of sociological social psychology [115,
pp. ix–xiii], however, it is the task-internal behaviors generated by such personality characteristics
that are of interest in explaining the emergence of dominance or precedence structures in small,
task-oriented, groups. Variations of this baseline status assignment are described in Chapter 11.
10.8 CONCLUSION
Are results that depend on the dataset R also restricted to the dataset R? Since dataset R was
obtained from a national sample of sentinels, it seems the best available (if imperfect) model of
sentinel behavior and hence the best source of data for parameterizing an model of initial belief.
Results obtained on the basis of these data are best regarded as theoretical in nature, but empirically
informed.
It was asserted in Chapter 4 that quantitative-only analyses are necessarily deficient in an ex-
planatory sense. The above analytical approach outlined above is subject to the same criticism.
Yet, such a description is not without value since it provides information that can play an eviden-
tiary role in a bona fide explanation. The next task is to specify the broader set of inputs to the
simulation model, as well as the outputs and outcomes that model generates.
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(01) AD :- AFDC=N, AGE=10, INHOME=1.
(02) TE :- INCOME=3.
(03) TE :- AGE=6, SEX=F.
(04) TE :- INCOME=2, AGE=6.
(05) TE :- INCOME=2, AGE=7, SEX=F.
(06) TE :- INCOME=9, SEX=M, ETHNICITY=WH.
(07) TE :- INCOME=9, AGE=7, INHOME=1.
(08) NU :- ETHNICITY=AP.
(09) NU :- AGE=10, ETHNICITY=HI.
(10) NU :- AGE=11, AFDC=Y, ETHNICITY=HI.
(11) NU :- INCOME=1, SEX=M, ETHNICITY=HI.
(12) NU :- INCOME=1, SEX=F, ETHNICITY=WH, INHOME=2.
(13) SW :- INCOME=9, ETHNICITY=NA.
(14) SW :- AFDC=N, AGE=6, ETHNICITY=BL.
(15) CO :- INCOME=2.
(16) CO :- AGE=9, ETHNICITY=HI.
(17) CO :- INCOME=1, ETHNICITY=BL.
(18) CO :- INCOME=9, SEX=M, ETHNICITY=HI.
(19) CO :- INCOME=1, AFDC=U, SEX=M, INHOME=2.
(20) CO :- If no previous rule applies to case c.
Figure 10.1: Salient features for each sentinel type
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11.0 THE SIMULATION MODEL: INPUTS, OUTPUTS, AND OUTCOMES
11.1 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
The intent of this chapter is twofold. First, I list and describe program inputs, outputs, and the
processes by which simulation program inputs are transformed to simulation program outputs.
Second, I present a set of statistical analyses of the outcomes of the simulated experiment. The
simulation programs are written in Java using the channel-based process communication provided
by the JCSP (Java Communicating Sequential Processes) library [196]. By doing so, I provision-
ally complete the task of representing a Socio-Cultural System (a Family Support Team) in terms
of its two analytical components: a Social System (based on the distribution of task-external status)
and a Cultural System (based on beliefs).
11.2 INTRODUCTION
A number of experimental and observational studies over a half century suggest that the influ-
ence of an actor in a small, task-oriented, group is highly correlated with the quantity of their
participation.1 Those who participate most/least in a small, task-oriented, group generally have
the most/least influence. One of the purposes of this study is to use simulation to assess whether
two different models of influence generate different outcomes in a particular kind of small, task-
oriented, group.
1For a brief review of this literature, see [203, 168].
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Table 11.1: Control variables and values
Variable Value
interactions 375 per meeting
li f eMeetingTime 2,400,000 milliseconds
timeScaleFactor 1,200 milliseconds
timeForSimulation 2,000 milliseconds
li f eThinkTime 6.4 seconds
mockThinkTime 5.33 milliseconds
li f eDelayGiddens 0 seconds
mockDelayGiddens 0 milliseconds
li f eDelayArcher 7.2 minutes
mockDelayArcher 360 milliseconds
11.3 SIMULATION VARIABLES
In order to distinguish between certain simulation variables and what they represent, I prefix some
variables with “mock” and what they represent with “life”. The value assigned to interactions in
Table 11.1 is derived from an empirical study of small, task-oriented, groups [172]. From that
study I derived an average interaction rate and used to it to calculate the average number of dyadic
interactions that might occur amongst five group members meeting for forty minutes. In this study,
I use the value of interactions in two ways: first, to estimate a “think” time for each actor, and;
second, as a stopping criteria for each run of the simulation.
The value of li f eMeetingTime is 2,400,000 milliseconds, equivalent to forty minutes. The
passage of one millisecond of clock time during a simulation run represents the passage of 1,200
milliseconds in the group meeting that is being simulated by that run: hence, the timeScaleFactor
is 1200. Hence, to simulate a meeting of 40 minutes in length requires that a simulation run last
approximately
timeForSimulation= li f eMeetingTime/timeScaleFactor,
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Table 11.2: Bookkeeping variables
Variable Description
c A case number (0−110) associated with a decision
A(c) A proposition regarding case c
runId Identifier of a distinct run using a particular set of inputs
which is equal to 2 seconds. To allow for future incorporation of a cognitive component into the
actor model, I assume that, after actor b is addressed by actor a, b “thinks” about the content of the
communication. Initially, the “thinking” of each actor is simulated via a delay of 2000/375= 5.33
milliseconds, so that mockThinkTime = 5.33 milliseconds, corresponding to a actual delay of
12002˙000/375= 6400 milliseconds, or 6.4 seconds.
As discussed in Chapter 2 Archer maintains that, for Giddens, structuration occurs instanta-
neously, so that
li f eDelayGiddens= mockDelayGiddens= 0.
Archer does not, however, associate any values with structuration delay. For lack of a better
value, I assign to li f eDelayArcher the value 7.2minutes, which corresponds tomockDelayArcher=
360milliseconds. It is an empirical (simulation) question as to what value, if any, ofmockDelayArcher
might produce systematic differences in the output variables of interest to this study. Each run of
the simulator models a meeting of a Family Support Team. Family Support teams are small groups
of school professionals that sometimes meet to decide whether a case, indexed by c, of possible
child abuse should be reported to external authorities. As argued in Chapter 6, each meeting of a
Family Support Team can be legitimately modeled as a small, task-oriented, group to which the
model of status and task participation developed by Skvoretz and Fararo is applicable.
As shown in Table 11.2 the outcome of each simulated Family Support Team meeting is a
(simulated) affirmation or negation of an abuse-related proposition A(c). As described below,
each the behavior of the simulator is governed by a set of input variables. If the simulator is run an
additional time with the same set of input variables, this constitutes a replication of the (simulation)
experiment. The values assigned to the variables η ,θ and pi in Table 11.3 were drawn from those
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Bi,a(c) Initial belief of a: For each c, a fixed value ∈ [0.00,1.00]
−−−→status {(H,M,M,L,M),(H,M,M,M,M),(M,M,M,L,M),(H,M,M,H,M)}
theoryId {GiddensTheory,ArcherTheory}
used in the simulation study of Skvoretz and Fararo [168]. The η parameter represents the degree
to which task-external status differences are salient in the status organizing process. To assess
variation in the weight actors give to status differences, the parameter η is varied. For the sake
of simplicity, I assume in this study that ties are: (1) most likely to form on the basis of status
difference (η); (2) more likely to form on the basis of behavior (pi); least likely to form on the
basis of observation (θ ). The values assigned to η ,pi and θ reflect that ordering.
Bi,a(c), the initial belief of actor a regarding case c, is a fixed real number between 0.0 and
1.0 inclusive. Values of Bi,a(c) less than 0.5 reflect negation regarding case c; values greater
than 0.5 reflect affirmation; and the value of 0.5 reflects epistemic neutrality. The computation
of Bi,a(c) is described in Appendix As, along with values for each actor a and each case c. In
addition, an analysis of the correlation between actor beliefs is presented which is consistent with
the assumption that actors from different professions have different (initial) beliefs regarding the
physical abuse of elementary school children by parents.
The value of the variable −−−→status is one of the four vector elements shown in Table 11.3. Each
element represents an assignment of one of the three status values L,H,M to each of five actors. In
their study of status and task participation, Skvoretz and Fararo distinguish two levels of status: H
and L. As described more fully in Chapter 10, I distinguish between three levels of task-external
status based on an adaptation of Wright’s typology of middle-class locations. In particular, the
values L, M, and H designate the amount of organizational resources controlled by an actor of a
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given professional type, which I equate with what Wright terms a middle-class location.
Although there are 243 possible ways to construct a status distribution, I have chosen the the
four shown in Table 11.3 because they highlight the ways in which an actor who is a Teacher and
an actor who is a Principal can differ on task-external status. Status distribution HMMLM reflects
the amount of organizational resources currently held by each type of actor [205]. As noted in
Chapter 9, there is reason to expect that a Principal (actor 1) and a Teacher (actor 4) have different
views regarding physical abuse. The other three status distributions were constructed in order to
assess how differences in the task-external status of two focal actors, the Principal and the Teacher,
might affect the collective decision process.
One aspect of this study is to use the method of E-state structuralism to assess whether, as
modeled here, the theoretical dispute between Archer and Giddens over structuration time system-
atically affects the variables O f (c).
mockLag2Tie=
mockDelayGiddens if theoryId = GiddensTheorymockDelayArcher if theoryId = ArcherTheory
Once the task-internal status order is complete, no additional ties are formed, so the values assigned
to mockLag2Tie are irrelevant.
Each run of the simulation generates values for each of the variables listed in Table 11.4. In
each such run, participation(a), the number of times a addressed some other actor is recorded.2
The value of participation(a) is a random variable generated via pseudo-random number genera-
tion controlled by the simulation parameters pi,η , and θ .
11.4 HOW THE OUTPUT VARIABLES ARE DETERMINED
11.4.1 Outcomes under the static model
As described in Chapter 7, under the static model of influence, actors cannot change their minds so
that the outcome of each simulated collective decision regarding a case c is determined by whether
2The abstractness of the simulation model and the rudimentary nature of the simulation engine is such that there is
no mechanism for modeling the dependence of participation(a) upon c.
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Bi(c): yes = 1; no = 0
B f ,a(c) Final belief of actor a regarding A(c)
O f (c) Outcome under
−→
B f (c): yes = 1; no = 0
step2equilibrium Number of interactions from start to structural equilibrium
time2equilibrium Elapsed clock time from start to structural equilibrium
χ2 Statistic concerning systematicity of belief change
participation(a) The number of interactions in which actor a addresses some other actor
the average belief regarding c is closer to the value representing utter disbelief (namely, 0.0) or to
utter belief (namely, 1.0).
11.4.2 Final beliefs
In the simulation, change of mind is not a binary affair. The value of p(S) is used to computed the
degree to which the focal actor b changes her mind regarding A(c). In each simulation run, actor b
updates his belief regarding A(c) according to the following equation:
Bu,b(c) = p(S) ·Bi,b(c)+ [1− p(S)] ·Bi,a(c). (11.1)
Hence, the updated belief of b is a weighted average of the prior belief of b and the current belief
of a.
Belief updating continues throughout the simulation, but the amount of influence exerted dur-
ing any single interaction by any one actor on another is variable, depending on the expectation
states of the actors, which are themselves in flux. If the pattern reaches structural equilibrium, de-
fined by the existence of a tie between every pair of actors, whenever an actor a addresses an actor
b, b’s belief will change, but by a fixed amount. The last value of Bu,b(c) is assigned to B f ,b(c).
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11.4.3 Outcomes under the process model
Under the process model of influence, the outcome of each simulated collective decision regarding
a case c is determined by whether the average final belief regarding c is closer to utter disbelief
(namely, 0.0) or to utter belief (namely, 1.0).
11.4.4 Variables for checking the simulation and for future analysis
The values of step2equilibrium, time2equilibrium, and χ2 were collected in order to check the
correctness of the simulation and for future, secondary, analysis. Each of the 3551 simulated
social networks reached structural equilibrium after an average of 10.21 dyadic interactions: that
is, a set of 20 ties existed amongst the actors. The fact that fewer than twenty dyadic interactions
were involved in explained by the bystander effect, in which observers of direct interaction may
form ties to one or both of the observed interactants.
11.5 NUMBER OF SIMULATION RUNS
For each case c, two simulation runs were made for each combination of values of the input vari-
ables. For the six input variables listed in Table 11.4, there are a total of 2 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 4 · 2 = 16
combinations of six values that can be formed. Hence, each experiment has one replication. A
minimal, factorially complete, experiment requires 16 ·111= 1,776 distinct runs of the simulator.
With one replication, this implies 3552 distinct runs. Because of various delays that are built into
the model, each replication of the experiment requires approximately 4 hours of elapsed time. The
data summarized below is based on two sets of 1776 simulation runs, with one run missing (due to
a boundary condition programming error).
11.6 OUTCOMES
Having described the input and output variables, I now present the outcomes produced by the
simulation model. After identifying the features of the outcome data that are salient for this study,
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Table 11.5: Outcomes under static versus process influence model
Number of Number of Total Proportion
Agreements Disagreements of Agreements
2464 1087 3551 0.694
I use other output data to try to furnish an explanation of the outcomes obtained.
As Table 11.5 indicates that, in most instances, the static influence model and the process in-
fluence model operating in the context of the status and task participation model yield identical
outcomes. It is perhaps reassuring that the outcomes obtained under the two models of influence
are not wildly divergent since the static model does represent a commonsensical, if crude, under-
standing of group decision-making. On the other hand, sociological common-sense suggests that
status matters in group decision-making, so one would expect the simulation model outcomes to
reflect that understanding, and they do.3 Attending only to agreement totals can, however, be mis-
leading. It is of practical and theoretical interest to examine how often the models yield discrepant
outcomes. Note that the values shown in the first row and column of Table 11.6 are obtained by
adding up the values ofOi(c), whereas those shown in the second row and first column are obtained
by summing the values of O f (c). A 2-sided Fisher exact test indicates that the attained statistical
significance of the observed difference in proportions, under the null hypothesis of their equality,
is 1.517e-09.4 Overall, the process influence model results in more affirmative decisions that the
static influence model. Since a democratic decision process is assumed where each actor casts a
vote, this suggests that, as expected, some actors exert more/less influence than others and that this
is a systematic phenomena.
Given the the two influence models agree more than they disagree, it seems useful to focus on
the disagreements, since only these can matter in a practical way. I begin by showing the total num-
ber of disagreements between the two models, then refining the analysis by decomposing the total
into four components, each corresponding to one of the status distributions under consideration.
3The size of the discrepancy between the observed proportion of agreements and the hypothesized proportion of
0.50 is 0.38, an effect considered at least “small” in every discipline that uses statistical methods (except, perhaps,
sociology) [90, p. 303].
4The effect size, however, is quite small.
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Table 11.6: Comparison of the static and process influence models
Influence Number of Number of Total Proportion
model runs w/ runs w/ Number of runs w/
Outcome=1 Outcomes=0 of runs Outcomes=1
Static 1760 1791 3551 0.4956
Process 2015 1536 3551 0.5675
As shown in Table 11.7, the static and process influence models can differ in two ways. The
static influence model may yield a 0, while the process influence model yields a 1, which occurs
in 671 instances: this is termed a (0,1) discrepancy. The static model may yield a 1, while the
process model yields a 0, which occurs in 416 instances. It appears that a (0,1) discrepancy is
more likely than a (1,0) discrepancy.
A χ2 goodness of fit test using a 2x1 table with entries 671 and 416 (per [117]) yields a
statistic of 59.82, which is highly statistically significant. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis
that a (0,1) discrepancy is equally likely as a (1,0) discrepancy. On that basis, and assuming the
existence of status effects, we should expect to find statistically significant differences between
the effects of the status distributions on the number of (0,1) discrepancies, an expectation I now
examine.
One of the aims of this study is to assess whether systematic differences in task-external status
generate systematic differences in collective decision outcomes. For this purpose, I regard each
status distribution as a treatment applied to each group. One can then ask whether each such
Table 11.7: Over all status distributions: Static versus process outcomes
Process = 0 Process = 1 Total Static
Static = 0 1120 671 1791
Static = 1 416 1344 1760
Total Process 1536 2015 3551
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Table 11.8: Status HMMLM: Static versus process outcomes
Process = 0 Process = 1
Static = 0 296 152
Static = 1 100 340
Table 11.9: Status HMMMM: Static versus process outcomes
Process = 0 Process = 1
Static = 0 256 192
Static = 1 120 320
treatment is more likely to yield a (0,1) or a (1,0) discrepancy between outcomes produced via
the process influence model and those produced via the static influence model.
Tables 11.8 through 11.11 provide evidence that differential effects are associated with the
status distributions. In each instance, the number of (0,1) discrepancies exceeds the number of
(1,0) discrepancies. The statistical significance of the differences between the number of (0,1)
discrepancies exceeding the number of (1,0) discrepancies is tested via the same method used for
Table 11.7. Table 11.12 lists the results from testing the null hypothesis that (1,0) and (0,1)
discrepancies are, under each status distribution, equally likely.
As indicated by the values of χ2 in Table 11.13, there is, for each status distribution, statisti-
cal evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the static and process models
Table 11.10: Status MMMLM: Static versus process outcomes
Process = 0 Process = 1
Static = 0 264 183
Static = 1 88 352
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Table 11.11: Status HMMHM: Static versus process outcomes
Process = 0 Process = 1
Static = 0 304 144
Static = 1 108 332
Table 11.12: Statistical significance: Static versus process outcomes





of social influence. Hence, it appears that the process influence model is more likely to generate
affirmations of A(c). The proportion of (0,1) discrepancies for status distributions MMMLM and
HMMHM is, respectively, 0.675 and 0.571. Under the null hypothesis of no difference, the prob-
ability of obtaining an absolute difference as large as 0.104 is (as yielded by a two-sided Fisher
exact test) 0.0148. None of the other paired comparisons were significant at or below the nominal
α = 0.05 level. This means that, with respect to changes in outcome under each influence model,
one of the pairwise differences in the distribution of task-external status mattered, in accordance
with the view that sometimes status differences matter and sometimes not.
As indicated in Table 11.13, each theory of structuration time (Giddens’ or Archer’s) is asso-
ciated with a disproportionate number of the runs yielding a (0,1) versus a (1,0) discrepancy: that
is, there are more (0,1) than (1,0) discrepancies than would be expected under a null hypothesis of
no difference in (0,1) versus (1,0) discrepancies. A Fisher exact test indicates that the difference
in proportions, however, is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no reason to believe
- based on the simulation outcomes - that there are any systematic differences in the proportion of
runs with (0,1) discrepancies generated under the two models of structuration time: namely, 0.700
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Table 11.13: Structuration time: Archer versus Giddens
Theory Number of Number of Proportion χ2 p-value
runs w/ runs w/ of runs w/
(0,1) (1,0) (0,1)
Giddens 344 220 0.700 27.76 1.776e-07
Archer 327 196 0.625 32.81 1.015e-08
versus 0.625.
11.7 EXPLAINING THE OUTCOMES
How is it that a difference in task-external status distributions is associated with a difference in the
proportion of discrepancies between the static and process model of influence? In their study of
task and task participation, Skvoretz and Fararo (1996) showed that the the number of interactions
initiated by an actor varied with the task-external status distribution over the group. As shown in
Table 11.14, that finding is replicated in this study. The average participation of H/L status actors
is greater/less than that of actors of the other two status levels.
Within each task-external status distribution, the values of participation(a) are ordinally con-
sistent with the predicted outcomes: participation is positively correlated with task-external status
rank. For HMMLM, the Principal has H status and an average participation of 88.01 whereas the
Teacher has L status and an average participation of 61.63. Across task-external distributions, the
value of participation(a) for individuals with the same task-external status is not uniform. For
HMMLM, the Principal has an average participation of 88.01, whereas for HMMHM, that value is
reduced to 85.75. Hence, the relationships amongst the values for participation are in accord with
those noted in [168].
The importance of these differences, both within and across status distributions, in explaining
the outcomes described above is that they describe the number of occasions on which the receiver
of the communication was influenced by the sender of the communication. Even though a structural
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Table 11.14: Average participation by each actor type
Status Principal Social Nurse Teacher Counselor
distribution Worker
HMMLM 88.01 75.90 75.25 61.63 75.21
HMMMM 87.58 72.94 71.74 71.92 71.83
MMMLM 77.89 79.24 79.43 60.51 78.93
HMMHM 85.75 68.46 69.23 85.08 67.49
equilibrium was attained after an average of 10 dyadic interactions, group members continued to
interact.5 Although actors with higher task-internal status initiated communication more often than
actors with lesser task-internal status, the fact that lower status actors can address higher status
actors allows for lower status actors to influence the beliefs of higher status actors. Nevertheless,
the fact that η = 0.75 makes status differences very salient in organizing group interaction.
Given enough interactions, all actors hold essentially the same equilibrium belief regarding
A(c). For each of the 3551 simulation runs made in this study, each of the actors ended with
final beliefs that agree to three decimal places. Convergence in opinion is consistent with work by
Friedkin and Johnsen [77].6
The mere existence of differences in task-external status do not alone explain the differences in
the outcomes generated under each status distribution. The key issue is the extent to which status
differences are salient in the status organizing process. The input parameter η gives the probability
that a tie will form between two interactants based on a difference in task-external status. The p-
values shown in Table 11.15 suggest that, with respect to each each row, the null hypothesis of no
5As part of their study, Skvoretz and Fararo examined a group of six actors, each ranked H or L, with η = 0.75,
pi = 0.50, and θ = 0.25. With these parameters, convergence occurred on average after approximately 20 dyadic
interactions. Further investigation is needed to explain why structural equilibrium occurred more quickly in the present
study.
6Since the simulation produces a sequence of dyadic interactions, it also generates a sequence of belief vectors
of length five. Bu+1,b(c) is a convex combination of Bu,a(c) and Bu,b(c), and so approaches Bu,a(c). This means the
variance of the values in the (u+1)th belief vector is strictly less than the variance of the values in the uth belief vector.
Hence, the simulation defines a non-increasing sequence of real numbers that is bounded below. Since that sequence
of real numbers must (by the monotone convergence theorem [93, p. 39]) converge to zero, the associated sequence of
belief vectors must itself converge to some constant vector.
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Table 11.15: The effect of status salience on discrepancies
eta Number of Number of Proportion χ2 p-value
runs w/ runs w/ of runs w/
(0,1) (1,0) (0,1)
0.750 323 224 0.591 17.92 2.307e-05
0.625 348 192 0.644 45.07 1.904e-11
difference in the proportion of (0,1) discrepancies between the static and process influence models
ought to be firmly rejected.
Recall that η is the probability that a status difference, if it exists, is salient to the actors in
a small, task-oriented, group such as a Family Support Team meeting. Do the two values of η
examined in this study generate, via interaction, outcomes that differ in the proportion that are
(0,1) discrepancies? A Fisher exact test based on all four count cells (containing 323, 224, 348,
192) indicates that the difference in proportions is moderately statistically significant, yielding a p-
value of 0.071, although the effect size is fairly small. The small effect size is perhaps explainable
in part by the small different between the two values of η . In sum, the data in Table 11.15 indicate
that the static and process influence models are increasingly discrepant, in favor of affirmations,
when task-external status differences are less salient. In more substantive terms, this means that, in
cases where the static and process models would disagree, interventions (see [41]) that succeeded
in dissociating task-external status from the task of deciding the truth of A(c) would lead to more
changes toward the affirmative decision than toward the negative decision.
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12.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
12.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I restate the research questions posed in Chapter 1 and the findings of this study
with respect to those questions. I then consider the theoretical, methodological, and practical im-
plications. Finally, I assert a number of limitations to the applicability of these findings that should
be kept in mind and a set of possible extensions by which those limitations might be addressed.
12.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
12.2.1 Question One
Do the decision outcomes generated by a process model of social influence (based on the status and
task participation model) systematically differ from the decision outcomes obtained from a static
model of social influence? As described in Chapter 11, the chief finding of this study is that, as
applied to the group task of child abuse reporting, the outcomes obtained from the process model
differ systematically from those obtained from the static model of social influence in the sense that
the number of collective-decisions on which the two models yield discrepant results is larger than
what would be expected by chance.
12.2.2 Question Two
Does the theoretical difference in how time is represented in realist social theory and structuration
theory have practical import? As construed by Archer, Giddens’ view of structuration is that
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social ties form at the same instant as some precipitating action, whereas in the view of Archer,
tie formation requires some amount of time. As described in Chapter 11, I take the actual time
delay until a tie is formed to be 0 minutes for Giddens and (more or less arbitrarily) 7.2 minutes
for Archer. The finding of this study is that, as modeled, the theoretical difference between Archer
and Giddens concerning structuration time does not produce a systematic, larger than expected by
chance, difference in simulated group decision outcomes. In short, essentially the same outcomes
are obtained regardless of whether the time to form a tie is zero or the larger value I have stipulated
in this study.
12.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS
12.3.1 Theoretical
Although there are a number of models of social influence, some of which attempt to interpret
expectation states in terms of social influence [77], this study is the first instance I know of in which
a model of social influence is built on top of the model of status and task participation developed
by Skvoretz and Fararo. The virtues of this approach to modeling social influence is consistency
(with earlier work in expectation states theory and E-state structuralism) and simplicity.
12.3.2 Methodological
This dissertation takes a simulation approach to the study of social influence in small, task-oriented,
groups. The simulation is expressly framed to allow a comparison of the social theories of Archer
[6] and Giddens [86] on the basis of how they conceptualize one aspect, namely the temporal, of
structuration. In addition, by virtue of its comparison of the static and process models of social
influence, this study suggests the utility of simulation for tracing socio-cultural processes over the
long (or at least longer) term and thereby providing elements for the comparison of social theories.
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12.3.3 Practical
Although the static model and process model of social influence agree in most instances regarding
the set of cases described, the number of discrepancies are not small and, in human terms, may
well represent a considerable cost to the children, families, and education professionals involved in
child abuse reporting. As asserted by some, misguided interventions by educators are destructive
to children, families, and schools. On the the other hand, educators who fail to intervene when
appropriate condemn the affected children to continued harm and precondition the society to the
longer term affects of child maltreatment. To the extent that the detailed findings of this study
suggest conditions under which more/less educator reporting might occur, it may serve as fodder to
those policy analysts who have argued that child abuse in the United States is over/under-reported
[26, 42, 71].
12.4 LIMITATIONS
As noted earlier, a limited number of experimental conditions were examined via simulation. There
is no question that the scope and precision of the findings would be increased by the considera-
tion of additional experimental conditions and replications. In future work, I expect to cover the
entire set of experimental conditions, whether by simulation alone or simulation plus mathemati-
cal/statistical analysis.
Another limitation of the study is that I have represented the theoretical dispute between Archer
and Giddens concerning the temporality of structuration by reducing it to a parameter: namely, the
time required for a structural link to form. It may be the the negative finding of this study with
respect to Question 2 simply reflects a poor choice of values or it may be that the simulation
mechanism does not properly represent structuration delay. Based on the assumption made in this
study that the task-related social relations pertinent to small, task-oriented, groups form within
the duration of a single meeting, it may be that it takes longer than than 7.2 minutes for a social
relation to form. I expect, in conjunction with the additional simulation work, to consider both of
these possibilities.
My initial plan was to construct an ethnographic decision model [24, p. 371-385] for each
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actor. As I discovered in the ethnographic research leading to Chapter 9, the time demands for this
would be extreme. Moreover, having concluded in Chapter 4 that such a qualitative study could
not provide evidence of regularity, I decided to base the belief models on quantitative, rather than
qualitative, data. Those interested in collective decision-making as it concerns educators and child
abuse ought to invest in the construction of ethnographic decision-models [24], as they promise
a relatively more adequate representation of the beliefs and intentions of actors from different
educational professions.
12.5 POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
In addition to remedying the deficiencies and pursuing certain remedies noted above, I foresee sev-
eral extensions to this dissertation. First, it is important to extend the dynamic model by drawing
on sociolinguistic accounts of the relationship between social distinction and linguistic behavior:
In particular, it is important to augment the bare notion that actor a addresses b with a represen-
tation of socio-linguistic, especially argumentative, behavior. Second, and related to the previous
extension, it is important to endow belief-as-modeled with the power to constrain social action as
modeled: currently, belief plays no such constraining role in the unfolding interaction. Work in
these areas would go far to making the simulations and their results more believable and, thus, of




A.1 AIMS OF THIS APPENDIX
The purpose of this Appendix is to show how, for each case c, the initial beliefs of each type of
actor regarding A(c) are calculated. Although it would be preferable to construct a probabilistic
belief model derived entirely from the axioms of probability, I was unable to do so. Instead, I
settled for a heuristic that can be described, roughly, as follows. Bi,a(c) measures the similarity
between the features of case c and a classification rule for actor a shown in Chapter 10: The more
similar they are, the closer to 1.0 will be Bi,a(c) . Although psychological fidelity is important, in
this study the focus is on deriving consequences from assumptions that are merely plausible rather
than establishing how actors of each type form initial beliefs regarding cases.
A.2 INTRODUCTION
As noted in Chapter 10, each case c is represented by seven features: family INCOME and
AFDC status (namely, whether the family receives Aid For Dependent Children); the child’s
AGE, SEX , and ETHNICITY ; INHOME, whether a parent lives in the home of the child, and;
OCCUPATION, the occupation of the school professional that affirmed A(c). Each feature can
also be thought of as an attribute a that takes on some value v, so that the case record for c can be
equivalently represented as a collection of attribute-value pairs, hereafter referred to as R(c). Each
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of the twenty classification rules listed in Chapter 10 can be equivalently represented as a set of
objects of the form (a= v).
A.3 RULE ANALYSIS
It seems reasonable to suppose that if a rule T and R(c) have attribute-value pairs in common, then
T is qualitatively relevant to sentinels of type s in forming Bi,s(c). If T and R(c) have no attribute-
value pairs in common, then T is qualitatively irrelevant to sentinels of type swhen forming Bi,s(c).
If this is true for every T in Ts, the set of rules for s, then I assign to Bi,s(c) the value 0.0. In other
words, if no rule is relevant to sentinels of type s, then they have no basis for affirming A(c) and
thus reject it. Assume therefore that T and R(c) do have attribute-value pairs in common and let
N(T,R(c)) be the number of such pairs. As N(T,R(c)) increases, the qualitatively relevance of T
to a sentinel of type s when considering A(c).
Let Ss(c) = {T ∈ Ts : N(T,R(c))> 0}. We can enumerate the elements of T ∈ Ss(c) and iden-
tify those that maximize N(T,R(c)). Let MAXREL(T,R(c)) designate the set of T ∈ Ts that max-
imize N(T,R(c)). The algorithm for calculating Bi,s(c) uses the first rule encountered, designated
Tbest , for which T ∈MAXREL(T,R(c)). Bi,s(c) is calculated according to the following equation:
Bi,s(c) =













Several comments are in order concerning this calculation. First, a value of 0.95 is assigned to
Bi,s(c) to rule out the possibility of assigning the value 1.0 to a sentinel other than the one that
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actually reported case c to NIS-3 study personnel. Second, the expression num1 - num2 is intended
to approximate the probability measure of a set union, which would ordinarily be computed by
adding the probability masses associated with the union and subtracting the probability mass as-
sociated with the intersection. Third, the expression den1 - den2 is intended to approximate the
probability measure of a set intersection, which would ordinarily be computed as the product of
the probability masses of the intersection sets. Fourth, the index sets associated with num1 and
num2 are subsets of the index sets associated with den1 and den2, so that sums (products) over the
former will be less than or equal to sums (products) over the latter.
Because of the approximation involved, none of the four variables just mentioned is itself, as
noted in Chapter 10, a probability, although each such value does lie between 0 and 1 inclusive.
As shown below, Bi,s(c)≤ 1.0.
num1 ≤ den1 differences in scope of summations
num1−num2 ≤ den1−num2 subtraction
den2 ≤ num2 multiplication of terms
−num2 ≤−den2 multiplication by negative number
den1−num2 ≤ den1−den2 addition of two previous inequalities
num1−num2 ≤ den1−den2 previous and second inequalities
Bi,s(c)≤ 1.0 division
I now illustrate the use of these formulas by calculating BSW (58): case 58 was in fact generated by
a sentinel of type s= AD.
CASE INCOME AFDC AGE CHSEX ETHNIC INHSTATP
58: 2 N 10 M BL 1
Equivalently,
R(58) = {(INCOME,2),(AFDC,N),(AGE,10),(SEX ,M),(ETHNICITY,BL),(INHOME,1)}
For sentinels of type SW , RIPPER yields the following two rules.
145
(13) SW :- INCOME=9, ETHNICITY=NA
(14) SW :- AFDC=N, AGE=6, ETHNICITY=BL
Although rule (13) and R(58) share no attribute-value pairs, rule (14) and case 58 share two
attribute-value pairs: (AFDC,N) and (ETHNICITY,BL). Since, trivially,
Tbest = {(AFDC,N),(AGE,6),(ETHNICITY,BL)}
and
Tbest ∩R(58) = {(AFDC,N),(ETHNICITY,BL)}, I can use Tbest , Tbest ∩R(58), and the prob-
abilities previously calculated in Chapter 10 to compute BSW (58).























































































Calculations of the above sort yield Table A.1. The following abbreviations are used in columns
two through eight: INC(OME), AFD(C), ETH(NICITY), INH(OME), OCC(UPATION).
Table A.1: Case characteristics and initial actor beliefs
c INC AFD AGE SEX ETH INH OCC AD SW NU TE CO
0 1 1 11 2 4 1 2 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00
1 1 9 6 2 4 2 5 0.00 0.24 0.71 1.00 0.00
2 9 9 6 1 5 1 2 0.64 0.90 1.00 0.95 0.00
3 9 9 9 2 5 1 2 0.64 0.90 1.00 0.54 0.12
4 9 9 11 2 5 1 2 0.64 0.90 1.00 0.54 0.00
5 2 2 8 1 5 2 8 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.58 1.00
6 1 1 6 1 3 2 5 0.00 0.57 0.60 1.00 0.00
7 9 1 7 2 4 1 5 0.64 0.90 0.62 1.00 0.00
8 9 9 9 1 2 2 2 0.00 0.90 1.00 0.49 0.12
9 3 2 8 1 5 2 5 0.21 0.35 0.39 1.00 0.12
Continued on next page
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c INC AFD AGE SEX ETH INH OCC AD SW NU TE CO
10 9 2 6 1 5 2 5 0.21 0.49 0.39 1.00 0.00
11 9 9 11 2 5 1 8 0.64 0.90 0.35 0.54 1.00
12 9 9 10 2 4 2 2 0.21 0.90 1.00 0.49 0.00
13 1 1 8 2 4 1 8 0.64 0.00 0.62 0.49 1.00
14 9 9 8 2 3 2 5 0.00 0.90 0.38 1.00 0.12
15 1 1 10 1 3 1 8 0.64 0.47 0.60 0.38 1.00
16 1 1 6 1 5 2 8 0.00 0.24 0.72 0.58 1.00
17 1 1 6 2 3 1 8 0.64 0.57 0.36 0.68 1.00
18 1 1 7 1 3 1 8 0.64 0.47 0.60 0.56 1.00
19 1 1 9 1 3 1 8 0.64 0.47 0.60 0.38 1.00
20 1 1 6 1 4 1 5 0.64 0.24 0.95 1.00 0.00
21 1 2 8 2 3 2 8 0.21 0.62 0.71 0.49 1.00
22 9 9 6 1 4 2 8 0.00 0.90 0.51 0.49 1.00
23 2 1 6 1 5 1 5 0.64 0.24 0.37 1.00 0.00
24 2 9 10 1 3 1 1 0.64 1.00 0.46 0.45 0.00
25 9 2 7 1 3 2 1 0.21 1.00 0.38 0.49 0.00
26 2 2 6 1 3 2 1 0.21 1.00 0.38 0.95 0.00
27 2 9 11 1 5 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.00
28 1 1 8 1 5 1 2 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.12
29 1 9 6 1 5 2 5 0.00 0.24 0.72 1.00 0.00
30 2 9 10 1 5 2 8 0.21 0.00 0.39 0.58 1.00
31 2 2 8 1 5 2 8 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.58 1.00
32 9 2 10 1 5 2 5 0.36 0.90 0.39 1.00 0.00
33 9 9 10 2 5 1 1 0.64 1.00 0.35 0.54 0.00
34 1 1 7 1 4 1 2 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.00
35 2 2 7 1 5 2 1 0.21 1.00 0.39 0.47 0.00
Continued on next page
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c INC AFD AGE SEX ETH INH OCC AD SW NU TE CO
36 2 2 10 1 5 2 8 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.58 1.00
37 2 2 11 1 5 2 8 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.58 1.00
38 3 2 10 2 5 2 8 0.36 0.35 0.70 0.95 1.00
39 9 9 7 2 1 2 1 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.67 0.00
40 3 1 8 2 5 2 5 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00 0.12
41 2 9 11 2 5 1 8 0.64 0.00 0.35 0.63 1.00
42 9 9 9 1 3 1 8 0.64 0.90 0.38 0.49 1.00
43 9 9 9 1 5 1 5 0.64 0.90 0.38 1.00 0.12
44 1 1 7 1 4 1 2 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.00
45 3 2 8 1 5 2 2 0.21 0.35 1.00 0.58 0.12
46 1 9 11 1 4 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00
47 1 1 11 1 4 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00
48 1 1 8 1 4 1 2 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.12
49 9 9 9 2 4 1 8 0.64 0.90 0.70 0.63 1.00
50 9 1 8 1 4 2 8 0.00 0.90 0.62 0.49 1.00
51 9 1 10 1 4 2 8 0.21 0.90 0.95 0.49 1.00
52 9 1 6 1 4 1 8 0.64 0.90 0.62 0.49 1.00
53 9 9 10 2 4 1 2 0.64 0.90 1.00 0.63 0.00
54 9 9 6 1 3 1 1 0.64 1.00 0.38 0.49 0.00
55 2 9 8 1 3 2 5 0.00 0.47 0.38 1.00 0.12
56 2 2 7 2 3 1 5 0.64 0.62 0.23 1.00 0.00
57 9 9 9 2 3 1 5 0.64 0.90 0.23 1.00 0.12
58 2 2 10 1 3 1 9 1.00 0.62 0.46 0.45 0.00
59 2 2 7 1 3 1 8 0.64 0.62 0.38 0.47 1.00
60 9 9 7 2 4 2 8 0.00 0.90 0.38 0.67 1.00
61 9 9 7 1 3 1 8 0.64 0.90 0.38 0.95 1.00
Continued on next page
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c INC AFD AGE SEX ETH INH OCC AD SW NU TE CO
62 9 9 11 2 4 1 5 0.64 0.90 0.56 1.00 0.00
63 2 9 8 2 4 2 8 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.63 1.00
64 9 9 11 1 4 1 8 0.64 0.90 0.56 0.49 1.00
65 9 2 6 2 5 2 5 0.21 0.49 0.70 1.00 0.00
66 3 2 10 2 5 2 5 0.36 0.35 0.70 1.00 0.00
67 1 1 9 2 5 1 5 0.64 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.12
68 2 9 11 1 5 2 8 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.58 1.00
69 9 9 7 2 5 1 5 0.64 0.90 0.35 1.00 0.00
70 1 9 10 2 5 2 2 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00
71 1 9 7 2 5 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.00
72 1 9 8 2 5 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.12
73 1 9 11 2 5 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00
74 1 1 8 1 5 1 9 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.58 0.12
75 1 1 7 2 5 1 9 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.00
76 2 2 6 1 5 2 5 0.21 0.49 0.39 1.00 0.00
77 1 9 7 2 5 1 5 0.64 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.00
78 1 1 7 2 5 1 8 0.64 0.00 0.67 0.67 1.00
79 9 9 11 1 5 2 8 0.00 0.90 0.39 0.95 1.00
80 2 2 9 1 1 1 8 0.64 0.23 0.38 0.45 1.00
81 2 9 7 2 3 1 8 0.64 0.47 0.23 0.95 1.00
82 9 9 7 1 5 2 5 0.00 0.90 0.39 1.00 0.00
83 1 9 7 1 5 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.00
84 3 2 10 1 5 2 5 0.36 0.35 0.39 1.00 0.00
85 9 9 11 2 3 2 2 0.00 0.90 1.00 0.49 0.00
86 9 9 10 1 5 1 5 0.64 0.90 0.46 1.00 0.00
87 2 2 7 1 5 2 8 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.47 1.00
Continued on next page
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88 9 9 7 1 5 2 5 0.00 0.90 0.39 1.00 0.00
89 2 2 11 1 5 2 8 0.21 0.35 0.39 0.58 1.00
90 2 9 7 2 5 2 5 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00 0.00
91 1 9 7 1 4 2 8 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.30 1.00
92 1 9 10 2 4 2 8 0.21 0.00 0.71 0.49 1.00
93 9 2 8 1 3 2 2 0.21 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.12
94 9 9 10 2 4 2 2 0.21 0.90 1.00 0.49 0.00
95 1 9 11 1 5 1 5 0.64 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00
96 1 9 10 1 5 1 5 0.64 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00
97 1 9 11 1 5 2 8 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.58 1.00
98 1 9 9 1 5 1 8 0.64 0.00 0.60 0.58 1.00
99 9 9 10 2 5 2 8 0.21 0.90 0.70 0.54 1.00
100 2 2 9 2 5 2 8 0.21 0.35 0.70 0.63 1.00
101 2 9 11 2 3 2 8 0.00 0.47 0.38 0.63 1.00
102 1 9 10 1 5 2 8 0.21 0.00 0.72 0.58 1.00
103 1 9 9 2 4 2 8 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.49 1.00
104 2 2 8 1 5 1 8 0.64 0.35 0.38 0.58 1.00
105 9 1 11 2 5 1 8 0.64 0.90 0.56 0.54 1.00
106 1 1 10 1 5 2 2 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.00
107 1 1 7 2 5 2 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.00
108 1 1 10 2 5 2 2 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00
109 1 1 7 1 5 2 5 0.00 0.00 0.72 1.00 0.00
110 2 9 6 1 5 2 5 0.00 0.24 0.39 1.00 0.00
A.4 A CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL BELIEF MODEL
It is a cornerstone of this study that school professionals of different types hold different beliefs
regarding certain cases. The existence of a strong positive correlation between the beliefs of two
types of actor would be contrary to this supposition. The correlation between the beliefs of actors
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Table A.2: How the beliefs of actor types are correlated
Principal Social Nurse Teacher Counselor
Worker
Principal +1
Social Worker +0.124 +1
Nurse -0.153 -0.336 +1
Teacher -0.011 +0.082 -0.346 +1
Counselor +0.013 -0.012 -0.314 -0.389 +1
is given in Table A.2.
I view the entries of Table A.2 that exceed 0.30 in absolute value as indicators of relatively
strong agreement or disagreement. For example, the beliefs of the Counselor type show relatively
strong disagreement with the beliefs of the Nurse type, as indicated by a correlation of (−0.314).
Likewise, the beliefs of a Counselor are in relatively strong disagreement with the beliefs of a
Teacher type (−0.389). The absence of relatively strong agreement amongst any pairs of actor




Given any precedence graph, the aggregate expectation state can be calculated for each actor. As
argued in Chapter 6, each tie in a precedence graph presupposes a pair of positive paths and a pair
of negative paths in the definition of the situation. As an example, the total number of positive and
negative paths associated with the precedence graph in FigureC.1 can be determined as follows.
Actors w, x, and d each have precedence over some other actor. This implies, as described
in Chapter 6, that each actor has one positive path of length 4 and one positive path of length 5
connecting them to the task outcomes. In addition, actor d grants precedence to both w and a, so d
also has two negative paths of length 4 and two negative paths of length 5 connecting it to the task
outcomes. Finally, since actor z grants precedence to actor d, z has one negative path of length 4
and one negative path of length 5 connecting it to the task outcomes. Having the number of pairs
of positive and negative paths, the aggregate expectation state for each actor can be calculated.







Table B.1: Initial aggregate expectation states
Actor Type k pairs of + paths j pairs of − paths aex
w Counselor 1 0 0.18237
x Principal 1 0 0.18237
d Social Worker 1 2 -0.14911
z Teacher 0 1 -0.18237
As described in Chapter 6, if actor x is connected to task outcomes by k pairs of positive paths
and if x is connected to task outcomes by j pairs of negative paths, then aex+ = 1−0.81763k and
aex− =−[1−0.81763 j] so that
aex = aex+ +aex− = −0.81763k+0.81763 j
For example,
aex = −0.817631+0.817630 = −0.81763+1= 0.18237
The calculated values for aex are given in TableC.1.
Hence, the Counselor, Principal, and Teacher are most strongly connected to a task outcome,
either T (+) or T (−). The Counselor and Principal are connected to T (+) and the Teacher to
T (−). The Social Worker is less strongly connected to T (−) than the Teacher. In relation to T(+),
the definition of the situation presupposed by Figure C.1 implies that the lowest expectation state
is that one associated with the Teacher.
As depicted in Figure C.2, it has been observed in a number of social situations that when
one actor w takes precedence over d and d takes precedence over z, it often occurs that w takes
precedence over z. The precedence graph in Figure C.2 generates the aggregate expectation states
shown in TableC.2.
Hence, the fact that the precedence of actors w and x over actor z has been established results in
a stronger expectation that a future performance output by either will lead to T (+) and a stronger
154






expectation that a future performance output by actor z will lead to T (−). The aggregate expecta-
tion state of actor d is unchanged. As illustrated above, changes in a precedence graph generates
changes in (at least one) of the expectation states.
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Table B.2: Updated aggregate expectation states
Actor Type k pairs of + paths j pairs of − paths aex
w Counselor 2 0 0.3315
x Principal 2 0 0.3315
d Social Worker 1 2 -0.1491
z Teacher 0 3 -0.4534
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